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Hegel, the Enlightenment and **Antigone**

(excerpt)[1]

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[1] incomplete sections are greenlined.

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1.1.1   <u>From the Geometry of Virtue to the Geometry of Matter</u>

The notion that Greek Tragedy, or indeed art in general - though admittedly it is not advanced in *quite* this uncompromising form - is not an appropriate subject for 'politics' seems to spring partly from a still lingering adolescent presumption to adulthood of a young academic discipline which is not yet confident of itself, because it senses that the justification for the parity of esteem with the other social sciences, which it has come - of late - to enjoy, is still owing. Hence the impression that political science research in particular - more, that is, than for example sociological research - has to validate its findings by strict adherence to empirical[3] *methods,* while alas this subtly confirms the (imagined or actual) scientific deficiency of 'politics,' is one that is actively cultivated by many scholars who are engaged in it. The vogue of behaviourism among political scientists for some decades in the current century is only one of the more conspicuous symptoms of their professional complex, for it amounted to a freeloading by them on the success of *psychology* of having built for itself a reputation 'as a genuine branch of science,'[i] for which *that* 'science' was principally indebted to Sir Francis Galton's pioneering introduction of *statistical analysis* into the practice of psychological enquiry, but for which it was indebted also and more generally to the British empiricist tradition, which had begun to sediment into conceptions of mental life already some generations before Galton - that is in just those decades of the eighteenth century in which Thomas Hobbes's materialism could avail not only political ammunition to Voltaire for the

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[3]   Words with a dotted underline have an entry in the Glossary of Scholarly Terms.

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challenge to the *Ancien Regime* but also a philosophical legitimation for the absorption of analogous ideas into the fledgling science of psychology. Evidence for this latter trend may be seen for example in the publication, in 1748, of J. O. de Lamettrie's **L'homme machine,** and it, in fact, may be regarded as an early wager towards the doctrine of John B. Watson that was to shape perspectives on the practice of political science research in the more recent period. Like politics, so also was psychology, by virtue of its origins in the speculative scholarship of the ancients, older than the (later so-called) natural sciences, and inevitably so, indeed, in so far as the conceptual boundaries of those sciences had been *drawn* by the metaphysics of the classical age. And psychology too, hence, in its early days *as* 'psychology,' had no standing as science, so that for that reason the founding fathers of modern psychology pursued their scholarly investigations into the science of the mind under the banner of other, already well established 'methodologies' (such as philosophy, mathematics or anthropology) *as well,* just as did the pioneering political scientists in the nineteenth century; those scholars, therefore, in striving to raise the academic status of their discipline by stealthily associating it with a more respected science did no more than to adopt just that ploy of which psychology had availed itself for the same purpose only a short while earlier.

It was clearly thus a suspicion of classical metaphysics on account of which the births of both psychology and politics as sciences appeared to be accompanied by prolonged and laborious gestation, rather than by a persuasive momentum, in the Enlightenment era. Then, namely, the excesses of feudalism finally accomplished, in collusion with the church, what the church on its own, in centuries of corrupt exegesis, had not achieved - that the will to trust in bygone eras, including those of the mythological past, on whose 'truths' Christianity rested its claim to faith, began to be dissipated. It was a process which the Christian church, to its own eventual detriment, partly catalysed and partly prodded along for the sake of securing for itself just a little longer, in a myopic fashion, and when its spiritual authority was already on the wane, those transient privileges of wealth and power which secular patronage had permitted it to accumulate ever since the Christian church's first ecumenical council - the Council of Nicaea in 325. This council, significantly, had been convened by the last *pagan* emperor of classical Rome, Constantine I, for the end of diffusing thus the potential challenge to his rule

which had begun to germinate in the coincidentally *spatial* polarisation of a schism within the church and which therefore had a *geopolitical* dimension. For had not Constantine then allied himself with that faction of the church which had the largest concentration of supporters in an around Rome, he could not subsequently have exiled, with the connivance of Pope Sylvester I, the cleric Arius of Alexandria, from whose doctrine of the *creation* of Christ and of His consequent non-divinity a revival of *Greek* paganism might have emanated at the cost of Constantine's prestige and influence. And not only is, before this background, Constantine's shrewd political opportunism, for which he had become renowned already in the very early days of his prominence, evident also in the circumstance that he did not allow himself to be baptised until shortly before his death in 337, seemingly to 'reward' the papacy for those political favours which it could only have granted to the reluctant convert who Constantine had previously been (and to ensure thus for his heir the goodwill of the ecclesiastical establishment), but the all too neatly matching policy of the church, which was to elevate Constantine and his immediate successors to the sainthood, is equally remarkable for the blatancy of its political cunning.

Yet although, with hindsight, these ancient manoeuverings - in which is rooted the now taken for granted demarcation of the competencies for the regulation, respectively, of spiritual human sentiments and secular human sentiments between church and state, that in its turn functions only on the foundation of their discreet collusion - should have made the hypocrisy of the church lastingly transparent already in that age (while similar conduct by a worldly government has always been euphemistically regarded as *politics),* other factors spared the church this fate of profanation through *doubt* until the eighteenth century. For in the intervening Middle Ages it was precisely the convincing elegance of this *principle* of the 'division of labour' between representatives of the temporal authorities and representatives of the divine authority of God in the government of men which was not merely conducive to a tolerance of the poor approximation to this ideal by those two classes of leaders, but which even legitimated their purported continuing endeavours to realise this ideal *modus vivendi* between the realms of man and of God on earth; and behind this pretended, noble objective they could conceal the true motives for their cooperation, which were informed only by

considerations for the material welfare of the elite which they constituted and which, at least when seen from this angle, was only superficially divided.[4]

It was thus the legacy of Constantine's bold diplomacy, by which an alliance of last resort was cast in the image of a providential departure of Roman civilisation towards new vistas in thought and in action, in faith and in knowledge, which availed to the Christian church for some centuries optimal conditions for the consolidation of its hold on the imagination of the 'common people,' of those people in other words, whose role in the administration of their own affairs was not 'political' because it was permitted to be autonomous only in so far as it dovetailed into those designs of emperors and kings of which they were kept ignorant; these 'common people' were the disenfranchised majority in 325 as well as in 1789. The only pabulum that was available to them for the gratification of their spiritual needs, while their worldly rulers pursued statecraft as a form of divinely blessed *leisure,* was the promise of their own eternal vindication as morally virtuous beings, once they had qualified for it by enduring this frivolous yoke with dignified forbearance.

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[4]   And any reservation that may nowadays be felt about such references to the church as an agent of *government* certainly testifies forcefully to the very circumstance that the church was more than just 'successful' at achieving its worldly aims in the public affairs of the Roman state, but it had in many matters of great historical import, for example in the emancipation of Rome from the cultural predominance of Greece, an enterprise which had been begun by Cato‾ the Elder in the second century before Christ, a quasi-*prerogative* of politics, because it implemented for the government policies which would not have befitted it but in which, already before the infamous Council of Nicaea, the concurrence of political goals and 'spiritual' goals was no longer coincidental. There can hardly be any more tangible evidence for this fact than the 'records' of the early Christians' barbaric fervour in their extermination of those cultural objects of classical Greece which glorified the pagan religion, for the devastation which they caused to those symbols of artistic genius, while the roturiers‾ of the young *Roman* political establishment looked on with silent glee, continues to tell a sorry tale through the fragments which survived this merciless war on the effigies of the rival Greece.

Introduction

Such forbearance was not possible without foresight, and this is what the Christian church could claim to provide, because it preached that faith in God *was* foresight. And with the gift of foresight, or faith, the 'common people' could forbear and *forgive* the wrongs which they suffered through the arbitrary and inequitable policies of their temporal rulers. For theologians who, after 325, were desirous to ingratiate themselves with their new worldly partners in government, any scruples that might have deterred them from cementing this so recently established rapport by availing to it, rather than to their proper vocation alone, their skills in specious reasoning almost vanished overnight. It did not take long, therefore, until the *ability* to forgive became imbued with a normative character from which in turn a moral *duty* to forgive could be derived. And the assimilation of this notion into the teaching of the Christian faith inevitably resulted in the eventual equivocation of *civil* disobedience and sin, which obviously in its turn added a new dimension to the leisure of emperors and kings in so far as it *removed* from its practice, as it expressed itself in expansion abroad and oppression at home, those last vestiges of democratic accountability which still encumbered it until then by virtue of the glorious memory of Pericles, that continued to demand pious reverence notwithstanding even the cumulative corruption of politics that had nonetheless taken place since the days of his exemplary rule in Greece.

Thus the transition from the ancient *Greek* moral disposition, which has been described in philosophy as *geometry of virtue,*[ii] and which has been portrayed in art for example by Sophocles's play **Philoctetes** - for Philoctetes not only never ceased to love his friends but he also *never ceased to hate his enemies* - to the ethics that characterised the later Roman civilisation, which had their ultimate foundation in the *quid pro quo* postulate of the Old Testament and which hence were appropriately described as geometry of *matter,*[iii] was accomplished gradually, and it had for just that reason far-reaching historical effects that were as profound as they were subtle. And that these 'Roman ethics' were really, of course, *Christian* ethics, for they were already inspired by the moral teaching of the Bible long before the heresy of Arius made it politically opportune and *necessary* to acknowledge this fact in the public arena, substantiates the hypothesis which underlies this exposition, that namely classical Rome had been won over to the political benefits of a monotheistic state religion while its

leaders, generation after generation until the reign of Constantine, were still suppressing the *particular* religion, Christianity, which would have availed itself for this role - quite independently of those events which led to the banishment of Arius and many years earlier.

1.2   The Virtue of Atavism

1.2.1 Cultural Renewal in Classical Rome and in the Enlightenment

But in at least one respect the *Zeitgeist* of that period was prototypical of the social climate of sickly surfeit among the dominant but degenerate elite of the eighteenth century: in both periods the need for cultural renewal was acutely felt, and its gratification was sought in the historicisation of the mythical *past.* The readiness of classical Rome to open a new chapter in the process of its spiritual maturation therefore expressed itself in the proleptic verses of its greatest poet, Virgil, who in his fourth Eclogue looked ahead to 'the imminent birth of a boy, a divine child[,] who shall move among both gods and mortals, and in whose lifetime the golden age associated with Saturn, who ruled the universe before Jupiter will *return.* [iv] To observe as 'significant' how receptive Virgil's educated patrons were to his art would be somewhat naive, because in the light of Cato's cultivation, among Romans, of the conviction that their 'ancestral custom,' the *mos majorum,* was being *adulterated* by Greek culture[5] it can hardly be surprising that there was a fertile ground for nationalistic poetry by the time when Virgil's creative imagination had reached its peak only a few generations later. It is obvious, therefore, that Virgil was pandering to just that patriotic feeling which had been conceived by Cato's ideology, and he did so specifically by creating a *foundational* myth - the **Aeneid.** The power

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[5]   'As censor Cato aimed at preserving the *mos majorum* [original emphasis] ('ancestral custom') and [at] combatting all Greek influences, which [-]he believed [-]were undermining *older* [emphasis added] Roman standards of morality.' (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica,** Encyclopædia Britannica, Micropædia, Volume Two, page 959, column two)

of this particular work lay in the manner in which it deceptively harnessed the *tradition* of epic poetry for the end of *distancing* thus its readers from the moral appeal of those *particular* heroes which the earlier epic poems had glorified. And in this way Virgil succeeded in giving Roman national pride the same kind of respectability which the national pride of the Greeks had already enjoyed for some centuries on account of their subcutaneous identification with the fictitious adventurer Odysseus, of whom the Greek national bard, Homer, had told in the **Iliad** and in the **Odyssey.**[6]

A corollary of the belief, which Cato's ideology also nurtured, that Roman standards of morality were *older* than those of the Greeks, was the perception of merit in that which was older and still 'pure,' because his perspective on Roman statehood, in which the notions of 'foundations' and 'adulteration' were suggestively juxtaposed, made it logically compelling to consider closeness to *origins* as a value in itself; and this idea, in turn, made it morally commendable to be circumspect about 'culture' as it came to the 'old' Rome from Greece. In so far as the Roman worldview of that period not merely professed to being critically reserved about *Greek* culture but also appeared to be seasoned by a disdain for culture *per se,* it can be no more than a shortlived impulse to see *irony* in this circumstance, for only the *modern* image of classical Rome portrays it as the polity in which 'culture' - both the word and the concept - originated.[v] But this is not to say, not by any means, that the now so understood *Roman* concept of culture did *not* have its roots in the Rome of Cato and Virgil. Rather, at the time it was behind the distorting screen of *oratory,* for which - after all - Rome is now also more renowned than Greece, that the *mode* of culture, as it has been bequeathed to modern Europe by Rome, not Greece, could establish itself *in Rome,* because Roman nationalism congratulated itself on *not* cultivating the heritage and the environment in the 'Greek' way.

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[6] Intriguingly, Homer, unlike Virgil, may have been as much of an invention as the characters whom 'his' works have brought to life in the vain imagination of the Greeks, for research on his 'person' has been so inconclusive as to give basis to claims that those works have actually been written by different authors and that they were only subsequently attributed to 'Homer' for the sake of scholarly convenience.

Introduction

Rome's pride was its 'civilisation;' it was this by which it sought to distinguish itself from the Greek example, which was not 'civilised' in the Roman sense for it had no regard for the past. And for that reason Greek culture was already a decaying culture at the very time of its greatest flowering, whereas Roman 'civilisation' survived to the present day *as culture:*[7] it 'was . . . the great Roman reverence for the testimony of the past as such, to which we owe not merely the preservation of the Greek heritage but the very continuity of our tradition, [and this] was quite alien to'[vi] the Greeks.

For the Romans, 'the past as such,' however, never included *that* past which was told by the Bible, for they considered it to be not only *too recent* for as long as they were still a predominantly pagan society (whereas thereafter the Bible's stories of the past became *myth),* but also objectionable and alien, since, firstly, the story of God was spread by believers who were hostile to the anciently established polytheism of Rome (and Greece) and since, secondly, their faith, Christianity, was culturally associated with the 'uncivilised' people who inhabited the hinterland of those uncharted regions which lay beyond the far shores of the Aegean sea. Contempt for the barbarism which was assumed to beleaguer the pagan diaspora at its edges tempered Roman hostility to Greece, and it indeed even provided the basis for a tacit solidarity between Rome and Greece versus the encroachment of the Christian evangelists in that period of transition from polytheism to monotheism which preceded Arius's heretical challenge to the Christian dogma. Until then the erosion of the political viability of paganism and the windfalls of legitimacy which Christianity might provide to Rome's imperial government could be acknowledged only by implication.

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[7]   It is almost self-evident in this context that the more recent sentiments which idealise those great works of sculpture and, to a lesser extent, of other forms of expression, which have survived until now from the great era of Pericles, as being representative of the 'childhood of art' (cf. Bostock, Anna, translator, **Ernst Fischer: The Necessity of Art - A Marxist Approach [Von der Notwendigkeit der Kunst],** Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963, page twelve) are in their turn shaped by contemporaneous ideological influences which corrupt the reception of that art because of preoccupations which are alien to the age in which it was created.

And it was hence that classical Rome considered its then already almost tangible destiny - namely the political greatness which it was to attain - and the glory which this was to attract to be blessed by virtue of its relatively greater affinity with Rome's distant, *pre*-historical past than with its present. To emphasise this assumed 'blessing' of its coming worldly supremacy, therefore, the last pagan leaders of classical Rome cultivated this association of Rome's 'golden' future with its 'golden' past - the age of Saturn, which another literary genius of Rome, Ovid (who, not surprisingly, was also influential[8]), described thus:

> First flowered the age of gold, which while it knew
> No judge nor law, was freely just and true.
> No penalties were fixed; no threats appeared
> Graven on bronze to make stern edicts feared;
> No judge's works dismayed the suppliant throng;
> Without protectors all were safe from wrong;
> None lusted then for travel: no tall tree,
> Felled on its native hills, then sailed the sea;
> No breakneck trenches ringed the cities round;
> No trumpet straight, no twisted horn gave sound;
> No swords were forged, no soldier plied his trade;
> Men lived at peace, carefree and unafraid;
> Unscarred by plows, and by no contract tied,
> Earth of her bounty, every need supplied;
> Content with nature's gifts, men plucked the fruit
> Of mountain strawberry and wild arbute;
> Cornels for them and prickly brambles bred.
> For them from Jove's broad tree were acorns shed;

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[8] The grounds for Ovid's banishment from Rome are believed not to have been of an ideological nature, but to have had to do, rather, with the political piquancy of an amorous relationship which Ovid had with the first emperor of imperial Rome.

Spring was eternal, earth a garden, blessed

With blooms unsown, which temperate winds caressed;

In fields untilled the bursting ears were seen,

And yellowing harvests where no plows had been;

And streams of milk and nectar flowing free;

And gold in green, the honey in the tree.[vii]

In the context of Roman nationalism and before the background of the Roman perspective that age in itself implied a superior morality,[9] the revival in the Roman political and popular culture of those blissful images of existence which were said to be characteristic of Saturn's Golden Age was clearly an assertion of a Roman *right* to precedence *vis-à-vis* Greece, since Saturn, as the father of Zeus, enjoyed precedence in the divine family of the pagan pantheon. And as Zeus was the chief of the *Greek* gods, to whom history had shown reverence in those centuries when classical Greece realised its full cultural and political potential, the evocatory association of the ideals which he embodied in mythology with a real and imminent period at once cast on the pagan *religion,* whose founder he was, that spell of decay which the *culture* of classical Greece had transformed into the beguiling magic of its own *nunc dimittis,* into a charm of Mnemosyne. Only as such was it to hail forever, like a cenotaph, those generations of posterity whom the Greek near-attainment of mythological ideals had deprived of the *experience* that such an otherworldly order as that which was represented in mythology could be a template for an actually existing polity. For it was precisely the momentary nature of the flowering of classical Greece which allowed it to assume, after its reality had been superseded by the reality of classical Rome, the mantle of myth some two millennia and three centuries later and thus to provide to the 'roturiers' of that later period a *quasi*-faith which they could not only substitute for that faith, Christianity, which then lost its potency as a metaphysical rubber stamp for the political status quo, but which they could moreover cultivate

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[9]   To this may be contrasted the ambivalent Greek view, which is compellingly conveyed in the play which is the subject of this essay, as may be seen in the long quotation from it which is reproduced in Appendix One.

for just that former function of Christianity without thus undermining the credibility of their commitment to Reason.[10]

1.2.2 <u>Atavism as a Source of Ideology</u>

The 'myth' in which the cultural heritage of classical Greece was then clothed was the apocryphal concordance of faith and reason, since this concordance was only posthumously imputed to the ancient Greek model for the end of giving a historical validation to the new bourgeois ideologies which began to germinate in the eighteenth century. While namely in those contending, but not as yet fully formed, anti-feudal ideologies Reason was to become the means of assault on the pillars of superstition which still held the old order in place, those reminiscences of classical Greece which have been bequeathed to modern Europe also through the art of its tragedians were condensed into *philosophy* in so far as their essence *was* conveyed in that art. And thus, by nourishing itself partly on the inspiration of ancient tragedy (and on other forms of belletristic engagement with political life), philosophy could retain that facility of a heuristic framework for its speculations which metaphysics could no longer avail. It was also this background, this change in the conditions for philosophical enquiry and in the perceptions of its political role, by which literary art became imbued, as if by superfetation, with fresh signifying force to such an extent that it was plausible to speak of it as having changed qualitatively in the eighteenth century, for it then acquired that proto-philosophical character which Hegel acknowledged when he referred in his lectures on aesthetics to poetry as

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[10]   Placed between India and Rome, and compelled to make a seductive choice, the Greeks managed to find a third form of classical purity - certainly, they did not have long to use it themselves, but *for that very reason* it is immortal. For although it is an immutable truth that those whom the gods love die young, it is no less certain that they then live with the gods for ever. The noblest men of all cannot be expected to be as tough and hard-wearing as leather; staunch durability, as we find it in the nationalist impulses of the Romans, is probably not one of the necessary predicates of perfection. (Tanner, Michael, editor, **Friedrich Nietzsche: <u>The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music,</u>** Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1993, pages ninety nine and one hundred, emphasis added)

being 'at the very edge of art.'[viii] (Hegel touches upon a similar idea also elsewhere in his philosophy: 'Self-conscious Spirit . . . seeks a more adequate artistic expression than the mere art-object. This it finds in language, which is simply self-conscious existence in its immediacy, where production is one with the product.'[ix]) And of all literary art, from Hegel's viewpoint, none was *more* 'at the very edge of art' than Greek Tragedy, and indeed than Sophocles's **Antigone** in particular, for although Hegel commented on its unmatched perfection *as art,*[x] he appraised it *as philosophy* on the very ground that *classical* tragedy, unlike the poetry and the plays of his own day, had lost its function of a *political* art which it had had in the time in which it was produced. Since in Hegel's theory '[a]rtistic, religious, and philosophic expression . . . give form to a civilisation's constellation of intrinsic values,'[xi] this *sublimation* of literature into philosophy was a phenomenon which necessarily accompanied the profanation of religion in the Enlightenment era and the concurrent substitution of Reason for it among the members of the future elite who, while the Absolutist mode of political control was still effective, had no opportunity to apply their minds to *matters of state*. And hence also, in spite of its pretensions to being of greater and more enduring consequence than current politics, and to being at once independent from current politics, the place of early bourgeois philosophy in the absolutist state was strikingly akin to the place of art in classical Greece, in that both were a form of feedback which in the former setting intellectuals and in the latter setting artists gave to a polity in which they were not esteemed.[11]

But returning now from this digression to that cultural and political transition in which was entailed the mutation of classical Rome from its early status in the pagan world as an epigone of classical Greece to its later status as a great historical force, whose momentum was not principally and wittingly derived from that foregoing formation, classical Greece, from which it had emancipated itself, it may be noted that the price which classical Rome had to pay for its eventual political and military vitality, of which its ultimate *cultural* impact was merely

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[11]   cf. the long quotation from Arendt, Hannah, 'The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance,' in Arendt, Hannah, **Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought,** Faber and Faber, London, 1961, pages 215 and 216, in Appendix Two.

a distinctive manifestation, was the 'consumption' of the myths - the consumption of their magic - which had inspired the visions of Rome's future greatness and which had motivated Rome's leaders in this unique period of potential growth to strive for the attainment of the greatness which Ovid had metaphorically foreshadowed by his allusions to Rome's past. In the process of the '*implementation*' of that Golden Age, in other words, which was associated with Saturn in the ancient mythology of Greece and Rome, its previously forever elusive and therefore always potential reality became a mere worldly objective. And as Rome thus chose to remove from its cultural self-image the so-perceived stigma of Greek parentage, to 'purify' itself by atavistically projecting the idealised heritage of an unknown, unexperienced past into its own future, it deprived itself of just that quintessence of *Rome,* it deprived itself of the *ideal* Rome, which it desired to approximate, for in transcribing this timeless vision into an *event* (that was yet to occur), Rome set the stage for the erection, in the form of its own coming military achievements, of a historical monument for Saturn, and it therein also sealed its own ultimate fate of decline and fall as a polity.

This fate, of course, was analogous to that which classical Greece had experienced only a few centuries earlier for it too had blasphemously aspired to assimilate its own physical existence and the imaginary world of the Olympian Gods to one another. That however the nemesis of Rome had not patently and irrevocably occurred until 1806, when the Battle of Jena ushered in 'Modern Europe' - as much in the collective consciousness of the then living generation of political leaders as on the battlefield - that therefore the exit of Rome from the stage of history, after the attainment of its greatest glory in the early centuries of the first millenium, was preceded by a long period of honourable grace, can be partly ascribed to the serendipitous 'discovery,' by Constantine, of Christianity. Whereas namely Greece, when *it* had 'actualised' the example of Zeus on earth, had not thus made the pagan faith obsolete, for - as the above arguments have illustrated - Zeus's father Saturn then still remained available as a *symbol,* which could be harvested for the end of creating a viable ideology, this resource of political inspiration that had existed within paganism was exhausted once Saturn had been 'brought down to earth.'[xii] It was of course also Rome, therefore, rather than Greece, where the modern concept of ideology had its roots, for in the Greece of Pericles the vindication of

political practice by reference to the religious norms which were encoded in the pagan myths was indeed still relatively spontaneous[xiii] (as historians later observed) and retrospective or simultaneous, not impiously proleptic, and it therefore, from that political standpoint of the modern bourgeoisie, when it made its first dithering steps into the limelight of power, appeared as that beguiling idyll in which people 'live[d] 'innocently[,]' . . . know[ing] of nothing except eating and drinking, and indeed of none but very simple foods and drinks, *e. g.*, the milk of goats and sheep, and, at a pinch, cows; vegetables, roots, acorns, fruit, cheese made from milk . . . [,]'[xiv] according to Hegel's sardonic characterisation of it, in which he further elaborated that

> bread . . . is really post-idyllic, but meat must be allowed earlier because shepherds and shepherdesses will not have wished to sacrifice their sheep whole to the gods[; and t]he . . . [people's] occupation consists in tending their beloved flock the whole livelong day with their faithful dog, providing their food and drink, and all the time nursing and cherishing, with as much sentimentality as possible, such feelings as do not disturb this peaceful and contented life; *i. e.,* in being pious and gentle in their own way, blowing on their shawms, scrannel-pipes, etc., singing in chorus, and especially in making love to one another with the greatest tenderness and innocence.[xv]

And of course already the tragedies of Sophocles, Aeschylus and Euripides pointed beyond that idyll.[12] It was only in Rome, however, that the *interpretation* of assumed religious norms became a ploy in the rhetoretician's armoury and that those norms were ultimately thus shorn off their erstwhile potential to *bless* the political status quo, since by their absorption into

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[12]   'Absolute art [in the art-religion of ancient Greece] is a product of the break-up of merely customary society. Previous art was merely instinctive, not a product of free Spirit.' (cf. Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit by G. W. F. Hegel,** Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, page 580)

ideology they were inevitably defiled, and they therefore came to be of the nature of ideology themselves.

1.2.3 From Ideology to Might

Within the context of this process a decisive change took place in the character of the Greek metaphysical tradition, in which ideal worldly life was believed to be correlated to the patterns of existence in the divine edifice of paganism, which the devout imagination construed. This change was effected by way of *supplementation* in that those enduring values which the ancient Greeks had exemplified in real life during the reign of Pericles and which then were upheld out of genuine piety *vis-à-vis* Zeus and the lesser divinities over whom he presided had superimposed upon them the values of a new political elite. And while this new *Roman* elite differed in both character and aspiration from that *Greek* elite which, with and under Pericles, had served to make the original *polis* such an important paradigm of state organisation that it was to constitute at least partially the *raison d'être* of modern political science, it was alas still lacking the maturity, the confidence in its own legitimacy, and the *kudos,* which had made Pericles's government that model of unrivalled statecraft as which it still was perceived, on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, long after its days had passed, and particularly during the short and chequered history of the Roman Republic.

This wider cultural and historical context too, therefore, was a stimulus to the first leaders of *imperial* Rome to assert their own *style* by demarcating it from the example of Pericles *and* by rising above those notions of public virtue to which the administration of Greek domestic policies always alluded even if the attainment of such virtue was not within reach. Hence those imagined reminiscences of the Golden Age of Saturn, of the bliss of peace and of cornucopia, which set Rome's distant mythological beginnings apart from the recent past of Greece, from the *silver* age - a mundane age of *trading* and of warfare, and of confrontation rather than of harmony with the elements (for

[t]hen first the furrows took the seeds of grain,

and the yoked steers went groaning o'er the plain . . . [xvi]),

which *Greek* politicians had realised and which thus, by implication, Roman politicians could also realise - provided the *mandate* for the imperial system of classical Rome in its crypto-Christian period, that is in those centuries of the first millenium when monotheism was still embraced as 'Saturn,' rather than as 'God,' because unreserved support of Christianity by the Roman state would have been impolitic for the image which it desired to project of itself, before Christianity had experienced its first crisis in the potential secession of Arius's camp.

It is also in this respect, that is in the respect of the assertion of secular authority of a living leader versus the conventions of culture and religion, wherein on the one hand Rome departed from the more esoterically-inclined *Greek* political mentality in the direction of the *cult* of pragmatism which was to have its most striking manifestation in the excesses of Robbespierre, and wherein on the other hand Rome fulfilled one of the premonitions which already the three great Greek tragedians had had and to which Sophocles had given a voice in his character Creon when he made him say that

[i]t is impossible to gain full knowledge of any man's character, mentality and judgement until he is seen practised in rule and law-giving. For to me a man who, governing a whole city, does not employ the best counsels, but keeps his mouth shut through some fear, seems, and has always seemed, the worst of men; and one who considers a friend more important than his country I regard as worthless.[xvii]

And intriguingly the roots of positivism were seen in these sentiments just at that time when the French Revolution had set in motion a retrogressive development, when it had reversed the trend *towards* positivism, though it was just then, also - and this is even more intriguing - that it was promoted as the saviour from the congealing grip of absolutist decadence which,

> in a world gone out of joint, . . . behave[d] as though everything were in perfect order, as though all that mattered was to repeat, with every kind of polite flourish, what the classics had once expressed with the full force of their originality as the true experience of their age.[xviii]

In the establishment of new civic institutions, namely, in which the ideals of justice and liberty were embodied, and which thus - even without any prospect of ever being able to realise such lofty ideals - forcefully expressed the passionate opposition of the modern bourgeois spirit to the rigid hierarchisation of society, with its attendant pattern of privileges, the ground was at once prepared for a renewed entrenchment of social priorities, that were specific to a particular historical period, in the thinking of later generations. And this, in turn, was to lead - even though it rarely was obvious *as such* - to another cycle of an increasingly dogmatic alternation between 'progress' and 'reaction,' for which in this context characteristic examples may be seen in the 'debates' between Novalis and Goethe about the 'value' of bourgeois values (which Goethe had portrayed in his novel **Wilhelm Meister),** between the disciples of Dionysus and of Socrates, whom Nietzsche in his book of 1872, **Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik,**[13] with persuasive irony consigned, respectively, to the Elysian sphere of art and to the morbid sphere of culture, and in the late 1960s between 'post-ideological' technocrats and the first 'post-modernists' (for whom the appeal of mere function in politics had become stale) - of which Lucien Goldmann's appropriately titled book of 1974, **Power and Humanism,** gives a poignant account; and as though the succession of *these* debates was an ominous echo of Europe's cultural history until 1789, it too culminated in violence on the streets of Paris.

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[13]   The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music

1.3 The Restoration of the Idyll

1.3.1 <u>Art, Pragmatism and Entertainment</u>

And in the light of these reflections on the part of faith in the making of a political order, Robbespierre's 'pragmatism' may in its turn be regarded as a renewed rearing of the 'head' of Dionysus and thus as a fresh glimmer of the excesses of the ancient cult which worshipped this pagan god. For in as much as, according to the legends, the '*religion*' of Dionysus - having been rooted in the wonder of his miraculous rebirth, after he had been *torn limb from limb* as an infant[xix] - was practiced by rites in which the barbaric dismemberment of Dionysus was re-presented initially by the symbolic substitution for Dionysus of a *goat,* or [a] bull, or [a] baby,[xx] and then, in modified form - when civilised pusillanimity had begun to transform the gory magic of this symbolism into comic entertainment - by the symbolic reconstitution of a god from his various members, *except the phallus,*[14] so the deadly precision of the French Revolution's guillotines, too, made its symbolic reappearance in the cold impartiality of law (for it was believed to be impartial at least by those who practised the *ritual* of its application) in the modern liberal democracies, which itself then was complemented by a *limp* form of politics, namely *administration.*

And while thus the French Revolution was in a sense a paradigmatic re-incarnation of the Dionysiac cult, which created a *vision* out of *disjecta membra,* it was at the same time also a paradigmatic re-enactment of the *death* of paganism, which however could then only assume the form of the death of *Christianity.* Since it has been noted, namely, that

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[14]   Of course, the circumstance that this new ritual was based on a different legend, namely on that of the *Egyptian* king Osiris, whose mythical fate thus clandestinely *took the place* of the fate of Dionysus (cf. Gonick, Larry, **The Cartoon History of the Universe: From the Big Bang to Alexander the Great,** Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1990, page 243), only irritates the scholar, but not the believer.

> this is how religions tend to die . . . the mythic premises of a religion are systematised, beneath the stern and intelligent eye of an orthodox dogmatism, into a fixed sum of historical events . . . [,] . . . one begins nervously defending the veracity of myths . . . [while] at the same time resisting their continuing life and growth . . . [t]he feeling for myth dies and is replaced by religious claims to foundations in history . . . [,][xxi]

one need only study the demise of paganism in the early centuries of the first millenium, following the *ideological* cultivation of the myth of Saturn as a real past which could be repeated, in order to understand why Christianity was a declining political force, at least in its institutional manifestations, two hundred years ago. When however paganism was in the same position at the time of the Council of Nicaea, the impetus which it had given to Rome's political momentum was not in the process of this shift of the political weight from faith to power, within their syncretic relationship, consumed *along with* the religious devotion to Saturn, from whose mythical role as a suppressor of savagery, who introduced civilisation and morality, this impetus had been derived. Rather, as Saturn's legendary suppression of savagery was conveniently - but not conspicuously - recreated by the Christian faith in its opposition to the *individualistic* religious sentiments that were characteristic of paganism, whereas 'civilisation' and 'morality' were the euphemisms of Christianity for the unquestioning intellectual conformity and *uni*formity which that new faith demanded, Constantine could exhort his subjects to embrace the message of Jesus as an *eternal truth;* and he could thus prophylactically ensure that the potential of ordinary Romans for ethical reflection would not turn into moral scrutiny of his endeavours to consolidate the imperial system, for - as his shrewd diplomacy had intended - the citizens' misgivings about the *world* would become a matter for 'spiritual' care by the *church.* And in this way - when that Golden Age with which Saturn had been associated had been 'historicised' for the end of 're-'surrecting Rome's political greatness - the consequent loss of the numinous force that had emanated from representations of Saturn in the epic poetry of Virgil and of Ovid, as well as in the more spontaneous folklore of the Romans, was temporarily - namely for circa fifteen centuries - sublimated and thus offset by the *mythification* of the erstwhile *historically*

grounded teachings of the Christian church (which in their turn - with the ultimate effect of accelerating *their* loss of authority - were *re*-historicised from the generation of the *philosophes* onwards).

Moreover, just as the savage worship of Dionysus could be made *salonfähig* by a subconscious switch of pious affections from his image to that of Osiris - or, rather, by the superimposition of Dionysus on Osiris - so also could the atavistic 'progression' from the worship of Zeus to the worship of those generations which preceded him be made to *appear* as a progression by the comparable substitution of monotheism for the truly archaic nature religion in which ancestor worship logically would have resulted[15] and which would have been too much to fathom even for the atavistically inclined mentality of the Romans. And one specific and *crucial* reason why Romans would not have returned to nature religion, even though they were 'returning' in other ways, is that the ideas of cultivation and *manipulation* were essential as much to their imperialist political enterprise as to their accommodation with the new faith. 'The *Greeks* did not know what culture is because they did not cultivate nature[,] but [they] rather tore from the womb of the earth the fruits which the gods had hidden from men;'[xxii] however 'the *Romans* tended to regard even art as a kind of agriculture, of cultivating nature.'[xxiii] It was of course just *therefore,* also, why art (and not just the art of tragedy) declined when the Roman nation experienced its political prime, because for the Roman elite, before the Christian era had begun, politics *itself* was art, and the 'culture' which was distilled from it for the Roman masses consisted in the bloody extravaganzas, such as gladiator fights and the feeding of Christians to lions, for which politics *later* became notorious, although it was *then* still practiced, albeit decreasingly so, within the parameters of those ethical standards which Rome had inherited from the Athens of Pericles, and which only in the Graeco-phile Enlightenment came to be considered as 'higher' ethical standards than those which the rising

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[15]   cf. the partly contrasting and yet obliquely corroborative view in the long quotation from Kaufmann, Walter, editor, **On the Genealogy of Morals** and **Ecce Homo** by Friedrich Nietzsche, Vintage Books, New York, 1969, pages eighty eight to ninety one, original emphasis, which is reproduced in Appendix Three.

politicians of imperial Rome, inspired by the example of Saturn as the creator of mores, began to assert. And only when this *positivist* form of *diplomacy,* at about the time of Constantine, had eventually become dominant over the *metaphysical* mode of *politics,* which ancient Greece had exemplified in assuming a virtuous correlation between the way in which the gods ordered their affairs and public life on earth, did politics become that elite entertainment as which it has been described earlier. And this almost imperceptible but therefore all the more consequential change in the character of politics also affected the role of art in the public world.

1.3.2 The Expulsion of Artists from Reality into a Sphere of Refined Talk[xxiv]

In 1766 the German aesthetician Gotthold Ephraim Lessing wrote of

[t]he law of the *Thebans,* which ordered the imitation of the beautiful and forbad the imitation of the ugly, . . . [that i]t was no law against the bungler, which it was generally supposed to be . . . . We smile [Lessing continued] when we hear that with the Ancients even the Arts were subjected to civil laws; but we are not always right when we smile . . . [because u]nquestionably laws should exercise no power over sciences, for the end of science is truth. Truth is necessary for the soul, and it would be tyranny to exercise the slightest compulsion with respect to this essential need. . . . The end of Art, on the other hand, is pleasure, and pleasure can be dispensed with; therefore . . . it may always depend upon the law-giver what kind of pleasure he will allow, and what amount of each kind. . . . The plastic Arts especially, over and above the certain influence which they exercise upon the character of a nation, are capable of an effect which requires the vigilant supervision of the law. If beautiful men are the cause of beautiful statues, the latter, on the other hand, have reacted upon the former, and the state has to thank beautiful statues for beautiful men.[xxv]

Introduction

In the light of the ancient Greek notion, moreover, that gods and men were separated from one another by only a few generations,[xxvi] which of course had become superseded when, in the *later* cultural formation of Rome the 'earlier' godly generation of Saturn was seen as the quintessential manifestation of the divine, the imitation of beautiful men in art, was *then* also a form of reverence for the Olympian Gods, from whom they were believed to be descended; and politics in ancient Greece, therefore, too, in its susceptibility to the example of art, was a form of worship. For the *Romans,* on the other hand, politics was no longer a *para*-devotional activity, but it was a normative activity in its own right. And thus Thomas Hobbes's dictum of 1651, that '[N]ATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the *Art* of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal,'[xxvii] was clearly an abstraction of the Roman - not of the Greek - practice of politics, for it was in Rome, for the first time in the history of Western civilisation, that '[*a*]*rt* . . . [went] . . . yet further, imitating that **Rationall** and most excellent work of **Nature,** *Man,*[xxviii] that in other words man was no longer seen, firstly, as the offspring of the *Olympian Gods* and secondly as merely another creature on earth, eking out its living, animal-like, in daring and violent ways.[xxix]

In imperial Rome the ideal of rational man, hatched by Socrates, but at his time despised, began to be accepted and with it the notion, which was still considered blasphemous in classical Greece, that man 'tames and rules nature.'[xxx] The imitation of *this* man in art, consequently, was also no longer a pious celebration of the work of gods, but it was an essentially *humanistic* enterprise, which however was then not yet perceived as such, because the rise of the Christian church to political pre-eminence, and hence also the emergence of Humanism proper as an ideological counterweight to the Christian church's later sway over public opinion, was still to come. Since however it was another facet of anthropomorphic monotheism, when - as Christianity - it became an 'official' pillar of the state, that the classical Greek understanding of what is godlike, and hence an appropriate subject for artistic expression, came to be transformed into a more personal, inward and non-empirical conception, in which the cultural object of admiration was no longer an athletic, well-proportioned, self-consciously animated creature - since, in other words, the Christian

worldview made the human body, especially in its sensuous appearance, an object of contempt which was not worthy of artistic representation[xxxi] - those impulses for artistic expression which had previously discharged themselves in the idealisation of the human *form* now chose as their new outlet 'politics,' which in this context may be referred to as the (ever since vainly attempted) idealisation of human *activity.* Thus '[m]ankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian Gods, now [- rather than only in the 1930s, when Walter Benjamin wrote these words - became] one for itself,'[xxxii] and the aestheticisation of politics began, as also Thomas Hobbes already duly acknowledged in the same passage of his **Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill** from which the previous quote of his philosophy is taken:

> [B]y **Art** is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) **which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall,** for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the *Soveraignty* is an Artificiall *Soul,* as giving life and motion to the whole body; The *Magistrates,* and other *Officers* of Judicature and Execution, artificiall *Joynts; Reward* and *Punishment* (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the *Nerves,* that do the same in the Body Naturall; The *Wealth* and *Riches* of all the particular members are the Strength; *Salus Populi* (the *peoples safety)* its *Businesse; Counsellors,* by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the *Memory; Equity* and *Lawes,* an artificiall *Reason* and *Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse;* and *Civill war, Death.* **Lastly, the *Pacts* and *Covenants,* by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that *Fiat,* or the *Let us make man,* pronounced by God in the Creation.**[xxxiii]

1.3.3 The Modern Dichotomy between the Aestheticisation of Politics and the Politicisation of Art

While the aestheticisation of politics provoked the Marxist response of the politicisation of art[xxxiv] in the post-Enlightenment era, a different pattern can retrospectively be observed in classical Rome, for then, as politics became the means for the *containment* of the normative truths which had hitherto been communicated through art - and this 'containment' took the forms of both the assertion of ideological 'truths' and the diversion, by way of *caricatures* of politics (for this was the nature of the bloody spectator sports in the arenas of imperial Rome), from the truths which art *might* still have expressed - art was concurrently *de*-politicised, in the sense that the function which it had had in the Thebes of which Lessing spoke, of imparting the beauty of its works to men, then came to be denied to it. And this contrast between the relationship of art and politics in modern Europe and of art and politics in ancient Rome may be understood in different ways. The circumstance, for example, that 'Christianity . . . concentrated and contracted the living presence of the human being into an intangible entity[, which was] alien to the physical body . . . and idealised this entity as the immortal soul or inner character,'[xxxv] had as its corollary the departure from the justification of the political enterprise with the idea that '[m]ankind . . . was an object of contemplation for the Olympian Gods;' with the advent of Christianity, therefore, it was no longer the *spectacle* of men's military adventures which was thought to merit divine approbation, but its *rationale,* and the Hegelian sensation to conception paradigm[16] which structured his theory of the history of art hence was confirmed also by this trend in the practice of politics, once it had assumed the character of art, whereas the aforementioned equivocation in Christian exegesis of civil disobedience with sin, whose hypocrisy was also already anticipated by the great Greek tragedians,[xxxvi] too vindicates this paradigm in that it represents the apogee of the pagan equivocation of *beauty* and virtue.

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[16]   For a statement of this paradigm see the long quotation in Appendix Four.

But while the simultaneity of the aestheticisation of politics and the de-politicisation of art in classical Rome becomes plausible before the background of this argument, it is also evident that the breakdown of the tacit collusion between faith and political pragmatism in the Enlightenment, and the reactionary appeal of the absolutist political elite to classical *forms,* had to bring to life then the dichotomy between the aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of art which could not exist at the time of the Council of Nicaea. And although the transition from polytheistic anthropomorphism to monotheistic anthropomorphism in the centuries which preceded the Council of Nicaea, and the changing nature of politics, that is - in particular - of the relationship between the rulers and ruled, during the same period, were developments which partly stimulated and accelerated one another, for their relationship was such that the new religion provided a conducive climate of public opinion to the 'new' (imperial) politics, and *vice versa*, it has to be noted at the same time that these trends towards new perceptions of religion and of politics were nonetheless occurring also on account of their own momentum alone; that is to say that neither did religion actually transform the character of politics all by itself, nor was religion a passive structure that was merely 'shaped into Christianity' by politics for the mere opportune ends of its principal human agents in the relevant period.

The same applies also to the status of art in society during those centuries: Art too facilitated, with its own, intrinsic patterns of 'evolution,' the wider cultural sea change by which it itself was affected between the fifth century before Christ and the third century after Christ, while it also remained a clearly autonomous force, and its relative decay already in the age of Pericles, which was not acknowledged by the Enlightenment because it sought in that art standards for its own day, came from within itself. The demise of tragedy, for example, was certainly not 'engineered' by Constantine or by Sylvester, but it arose, rather, from factors which pertained more narrowly to tragedy itself, while nonetheless those factors thus also, in keeping with one of the most fundamental functions which art has had throughout history, stated a profound truth about the culture in which this art form flourished. Thus Aeschylus's portrayal, in his **Prometheus Bound,** of 'man himself, risen to Titanic stature, creating civilisation by his own efforts,'[xxxvii] is clearly a wager, albeit an unwitting one on the artist's

part, towards the *Pax Romana* that was to come and in which the nerves of the state's soldier-citizens no longer needed to be cathartically steeled by tragedy, while of course, with the rise of Rome, there were also increasing numbers of citizens who were not soldiers. Sophocles, for his part, contributed to the decline of tragedy with the 'consummate perfection'[xxxviii] of his tragedies, which discouraged other tragedians even from endeavouring to attain the same standard, whereas (hence) Euripides 'brought the spectator onto the stage,'[xxxix] and he thus cast the luminous beam of instant comprehension on this art form, which had so far partly relied on anxiety and mystery for its impact. Similarly, the visual arts were not down-ranked only by the censure on the representation of the human body by the Christian church (which its disciples sought to enforce retrospectively[17]), but they lost *gravitas* on account of the frivolous choices of subjects which painters such as Pauson and Pyreicus made when there were no longer such laws as that of the Thebans which Lessing mentioned approvingly[xl] for '[i]t condemned the Greek Ghezzis, that [is, more specifically, their] unworthy artistic device through which a likeness is obtained by exaggerating the ugly parts of

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[17]   cf. McCormick, Edward Allen, translator, **Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry [by] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, and London, 1962, page fifty five: "Religion often represented . . . an external constraint on the classical artist. His work, destined for worship and devotion, could not always be as perfect as it would have been if he had had as his sole aim the pleasure of his spectators. But superstition overloaded the gods with symbols, and the most beautiful gods were not always honoured as such. . . . In the temple at Lemnos, from which the pious Hypsipyle rescued her father in the disguise of the god, Bacchus was represented with horns. No doubt he appeared this way in all his temples since the horns were symbolic and one of his necessary attributes. Only the free artist, who did not have to create his Bacchus for some temple, omitted this symbol; and if we find none with horns among the extant statues of him, we may perhaps take this as proof that none of them belongs among the consecrated ones under which he was actually worshipped. Besides this, it is highly probable that the wrath of pious iconoclasts during the first centuries of Christianity fell in great part on these latter. Only seldom did they spare a work of art, because it had not been desecrated by adoration."

the original[,] . . . [it condemned,] in a word, the caricature,'[xli] and it thus, more generally, limited the disservice to art of 'the connection between . . . [the] . . . extravagant boasting of artists and . . . [their] . . . fatal dexterity, which is not ennobled by the worth of the object.'[xlii]

In the context of this modern dichotomy between the aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of art a different picture again presents itself in Periclean Athens, for there - and this would be a specious characterisation if it did not at once say something about the period from which Periclean Athens was viewed in this way - there was, to state it very baldly, only a politicisation of art without an aestheticisation of politics. And the crucial significance of this circumstance for an analysis of the claims which the newly enfranchised bourgeoisie has made about its political ideals in the name of 'Enlightenment' two hundred years ago is that they in fact *concealed* the continuation of the positivist Roman tradition of politics by pretending to return to 'objective' standards, as they were alleged to have been given in classical Greece in an artistic beauty that was inspired by an uncorrupted faith, and which therefore could instil beauty in life - that is, in *political* life - overall. It was a concealment which could succeed also on account of the stigma which then attached to the Christian church for its long all too visible opportunism in its association with the feudal rulers, whose influence on the course of history was about to be tempered by the accession to political power by the bourgeoisie.

1.3.4 The Authentication of the Rational Idyll by Romanticism and the Redemption of the Crime of Socrates by Philosophy

But while these observations may explain the rise of aesthetics as a scholarly discipline in the eighteenth century, which in its turn, too, facilitated the coming, clandestine re-aestheticisation of politics (in the Roman tradition), they leave open the question about what took the place of that religious faith which had inspired beauty in ancient Greece, for Christianity could not perform this function for the two reasons that, firstly, it was no longer able to generate the faith which might have imbued any 'beauty' inspired by it with a solid normative weight, and that, secondly, it was in any event opposed to the notion that *artistic* beauty, even if it is motivated by piety, might shape worldly affairs. And in an answer to this

question it is therefore now appropriate to return to those ideas concerning the 'scientificness' of scholarly enquiry on which a few words have already been said in the sentences which began this introduction. The suggestion made there, that it was, namely, '*science,*' in which man's capacity for *faith* began to express itself at the time when the Ancien Regime was about to fall (and not only it, of course, but also the entire cultural-religious edifice in which politics and religion were deceptively separated, and united only in a feudal monarch who purportedly transcended the boundary between the worldly realm and the divine realm) is not merely *plausible* in the light of the renewed loss, then, of the numinous power of a society's object of faith, but there was indeed in the eighteenth century no other outlet for the *increased* need to believe in something, as Christianity's worthiness of faith had become undermined by the duplicity of its leaders.

This observation becomes even more compelling when it is further noted that the authority of metaphysics too began to be eroded in the eighteenth century, at least *apparently* so, and that this was a trend which some generations later was to manifest itself in the unbridled irrationalism of Nietzsche and Rilke, but which in Hegel's lifetime - in which the cultural heritage of antiquity had a more than just sentimental hold on the social elite's imagination for as long as the greatness of classical Rome's power had a continuing (albeit an increasingly nominal) political reality in the form of the Holy Roman Empire - still had to be harnessed and directed by *a faith.* 'Science,' therefore, in that mode of Rationalism and logical positivism into which it was moulded in the eighteenth century, became the ideological embodiment of the increasingly impatient and ultimately violent rejection of the 'judgement of time' - in other words: of history - and hence also of faith in its traditional, *religious* manifestations, since religion too asserts its validity with reference to *quasi*-historical truths, such as the glory of saints, and since it does so even more, as has been noted, at such times when (as in the eighteenth century) the veracity of myths needs to be defended for the sake of the survival of a religion *per se,* while their continuing life and growth needs to be resisted for the sake of a religion's political credence and influence. What Salvation was for religion, Progress and Reason became for science, and in this way science itself became a faith, though not a 'traditional, religious' one. The ideas of Progress and Reason availed themselves to the rising

bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth century as the philosophical auxiliaries, or alibis, by which it could make its own enfranchisement palatable initially to those from whom it wrested political power and subsequently to those whom it then excluded from its own hard-won privileges in that process of the nineteenth century (or - for a lack of an organised policy in its support - it should rather be called a *'tendency')* which has appropriately been seen as one of re-feudalisation.

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The simultaneous current of Romanticism, whose momentum also was augmented by the disaffection with feudalism of the economically and intellectually buoyant new class (the bourgeoisie), though it was so patently different and evidently opposed to the ideals of Reason and Progress, nonetheless shared with them a common foundation in the spirit of the Enlightenment, which sought to excoriate the present from the life-denying patina of the past: as much as Reason and Progress, in keeping with their purported affiliation with Fact rather than with Feeling, sought to emancipate the natural sciences from the overlordship of metaphysics in order to make them a pillar of its political enterprise, so did Romanticism elevate the Self and, albeit in characteristically 'romantic' ways, the Present above those normative parameters which existed in the social environment and in cultural traditions. However, just as modern science was partly born of a crisis in religion, so also was Romanticism partly born of a crisis in art; Romanticism *differed,* alas, from modern science in that it, firstly, did *not* assume the erstwhile function of art while, secondly, it *did* take over from art the language which art had always used.

And in this way Romanticism, in conjunction with modern science, re-committed the Socratic crime of 'corrupting the youth, and of despising the tutelary deities of the state, putting in their place other new divinities.'[xliii] Not long after this crime had *originally* been committed,

men sentimentally 'romanticised' Thebes as the land where nature imitated art,[18] for only art could then still be perceived as an authentic and (as yet) uncorrupted link between this world and the intangible world of its tutelary deities. And Hegel's observations on the end of art thus in a similar way stimulated - already in himself - the romantically ascetic ideal of pure conception, for whose realisation philosophy then seemed to offer itself as the most suitable vehicle. But even philosophy, like art in that Thebes which Ovid had idealised, was at Hegel's time only a substitute for those *ur*-mysteries, which - with the profanation of religion - had themselves been profaned, and philosophy too, therefore, was in Hegel's time a form of the imitation of art by nature, albeit then by the social and political nature of man. And Hegel's interpretation of the Theban Legend in general and of the Antigone myth in particular may be regarded as a paradigmatic example of this wager by imitation for a harmony of man's condition in the state with his origins in a pre-political Arcady.

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[18]   cf. the long quotation from Watts, A. E., translator, **The Metamorphoses of Ovid,** North Point Press, San Francisco, California, 1980, pages fifty three and fifty four, emphasis added, in Appendix Six.

2.   <u>Nature and Culture</u>

2.1   Hegel's Accretive Approach to <u>Antigone</u>

The Theban Legend's power to fascinate is fittingly manifested not only in the volume of research and interpretative comment which it has stimulated but also and particularly in the divergence of scholarly opinion on the nature of the Theban Legend's philosophical bequest to the afterworld. In the case of Sophocles's play **Antigone,** especially, there is a seemingly inexhaustible debate on the question of whether it essentially deals with *the folly of pride* by sketching the 'decline and fall'[19] of a so afflicted individual whom appeals to his reason fail to temper, or whether **Antigone** primarily addresses *the ideal of balance* between 'partial' forces of consciousness and the attainment of 'the stage of absolute knowledge, of "the spirit knowing itself as spirit,"'[xliv] by their merger. Supporters of the former kind of interpretation[xlv] not unexpectedly seek to deny the basis for interpretations of the latter kind, often on the ground that those impute to Sophocles views which are not characteristic of the period in which he was active but which, rather, are backward projections from the political culture of the periods in which interpreters of his art worked. This position is of course vindicated by the Thebans' final verdict on the fate of Creon: 'Grand words of proud men are punished with great blows.'[xlvi] However, to base on this evidence an implication that other messages of the play are secondary is somewhat problematic not only on the more obvious ground that the chorus itself is not consistent in its pronouncements on the conflict between Antigone and Creon, but also and more profoundly because there appears to be no firm basis (but only arbitrary judgement) for the further implication that analyses which claim significance for other aspects of the play are

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[19]   'Creon . . . rapidly declines in stature after his first speech.' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone</u>,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page seven)

not legitimate. Reservations about, for example, Hegel's 'remarkable views'[xlvii] on the play therefore have to be seen in this light. Hegel's notoriety in confusing the issue of whether **Antigone** is a problem play,[xlviii] his aptitude in 'finding a dialectical confrontation under every bush,'[xlix] is mitigated by the narrowness of some alternative interpretations of **Antigone** and by the fact that his own inauthentic accretions to Sophocles's thought have contributed to the play's *timelessness* as 'one of the most sublime, and in every respect most consummate works of art [which] human effort has ever brought forth.'[20]

While there is some substance in the claim that Hegel's 'remarkable views' on **Antigone** are testimony to a sedimentation of Enlightenment thought into Greek philosophy, this sedimentation may be considered legitimate in so far as it has catalysed later research on Sophocles which has brought new insights into the message of **Antigone.** In any event, the further substance **Antigone** has acquired over time could not be distilled out of modern perspectives on the play in order to 'take us back to the premiere of the drama . . . [and] . . . to the phenomenology of its purpose and impact in the 440s BC.'[1] In view of these considerations this analysis of **Antigone** will now be carried further in the direction of assessing its significance in the modern period.

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[20]   'Eines "der allererhabensten, in jeder Rücksicht vortrefflichsten Kunstwerke aller Zeiten."' (cf. Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page four, translated from Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Vorlesungen über Ästhetik,** quoted in Fritz, Kurt von, **Antike und Moderne Tragödie: Neun Abhandlungen,** Walter De Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1962) And 'Friedrich Hebbel, who regarded his own play **Agnes Bernauer** as "an **Antigone** for modern times," described Sophocles'[s] tragedy as . . . "the masterpiece of masterpieces, next to which there is nothing that can be set either old or new."' (cf. Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page four, translated from Hebbel's essay 'Mein Wort über das Drama!' ['(D)as Meisterstück der Meisterstücke[,] dem sich bei Alten und Neueren Nichts an die Seite setzen lässt')])

2.2   **Historical Note**

In having witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the evaporation of the ideology that has held it together, the present generation may be privy to a revelation of truths which are as epochal as those that have made feudalism untenable two centuries ago. It is intriguing that Hegel should have posthumously inspired one modern philosopher to interpret these recent developments - the 'unabashed victory of . . . liberalism'[li] (albeit by default of the contending ideology) - as corroboration of the thesis that history has ended with the truths of 1789. It is the very essence of Hegel's conception of history that it is a dialectical process which yields absolute knowledge *not* by perfecting ideology, as 'the vanguard of humanity' in the French Revolution had attempted to do,[21] but by *transcending* it. Hegel's 'poignant, painful longing'[lii] for the Greece of Sophocles's **Antigone,** as an approximation of an ideal political system where 'political liberty and religious faith [are] concordant,'[liii] arises out of his perspective on history as an open-ended succession of stages of emancipation *from* ideology. And when Hegel wrote - at the time of the Battle of Jena (the event which his aforementioned exegete designated as the watershed between the period of 'history' and the period which succeeded it) - his sentiment arose out of his acute perception that the spirit of 'rationality' and of 'progress' (as propagated by Claude Henri Comte de Saint-Simon and his followers), to which Christian orthodoxy had given way, was merely a new corruption of divinely[22] inspired ideas for sectional political ends, just as the latter had been.

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[21]   '[T]he basic *principles* of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon . . . [after they had been] . . . actualised . . . [by] . . . the *vanguard* of humanity . . . [in] . . . the French Revolution.' (cf. Fukuyama, Francis, 'The End of History?,' **The National Interest,** Summer 1989, page five, original emphasis)

[22]   See the section headed 'Religion and Ideology' for a discussion of religion as a factor in Hegel's interpretation of **Antigone.**

In Hegel's perception the political order of the Thebes of **Antigone** shared with pre-revolutionary France the potential for a fruitful development along the teleological path which he projected and on whose course human knowledge would be furthered. Whereas in pre-revolutionary France the actualisation of God's purpose on earth was foiled by the aristocracy's ruthless usurpation of power and by its manipulation of Christian teaching for the purpose of entrenching the feudal hierarchisation of society, the Thebes which was portrayed by Sophocles inspired Hegel in that its order *suggested* the perfect balance between the state and the Kingdom of God, between culture and nature, between civil law and divine law, and - more generally - in that it suggested the constructive complementarity of seemingly disparate moments, which was the essence of his philosophy. Thebes suggested these virtues of statehood as it was in the process of losing them, that is, as it began to break down as a viable state under 'the strain imposed by the novel assertion of individual rights and interests.'[liv][23] In this, too, a parallel can be drawn between Creon's Thebes and Louis XVI's France in that in the latter the circumstance that a principal power of the state, the power of subjectivity, as the will with the power of ultimate decision, which rested in the monarch, became grounded in his own particular will and in the wills of his functionaries, and they hence eroded the unity of the monarchy - a system which Hegel considered to be good in principle.[lv] And just as from the 'end of history' perspective there was a continuity between Nicholas II of the Romanov dynasty and Lenin, in that both clung to an atavistic form of statism,[24] there was for Hegel a different but equally significant continuity between the *Ancien Régime* and the new order that issued from the revolution: Both harnessed a 'mere belief'[lvi] in ideologically distorted

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[23] 'A true self-surrender to the state power gives the latter its own individual will, makes it a monarch' (Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit by G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 559) - hence if some arrogate to themselves privileges which are discriminatory versus others, *who also partake in the franchise,* they thereby destroy the character of the state as an abstract *individual,* in whom *everybody's* aspirations are epitomised.

[24] Nicos Poulantzas (see Bibliography) - though of course he writes from a different ideological perspective - comes to similar conclusions about Russia.

ideas - that is, in religion and in an idealised future respectively - in their pursuit of legitimacy. In this way, both orders were sectional as they served the interests of those who had the privilege of power. Because profane political opportunism was therefore the underlying principle before *and* after 1789, the utilitarian current which thus conjoined the outgoing monarchy and the incoming new government belied the political advance that it purported to have achieved. Hegel observed that (in the words of one of his interpreters) '[u]tility is a bad word for faith, sentiment, and speculation, but it expresses the ultimate truth of enlightenment - endless[,] restless oscillation from one thing to another,'[lvii] and Thebes could serve him as a model of a state where worldly sovereignty was limited in its potential claims and scope by resting on pillars of legitimacy which were outside itself, because there God did not rule the state *through* someone who was seen as his divinely sanctioned representative. Thebes, in other words, was not an arbitrary replication of an imagined divine order, and because of this Hegel regarded it (with much scholarly licence) as the first exemplar of the modern secular state towards which he beckoned in his philosophy.

2.3 The Family and the State as the Settings of Culture

2.3.1 The Idea of a Balanced Polarity

It was Aristotle's premise that 'the state is prior in nature to the family and to each of us individually, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part,'[lviii] which provided the foundation for Hegel's argument that 'everything that man is, he owes to the state,'[lix] and which in turn led Hegel to the conclusion that '[h]e has his being only in it . . . [and that] . . . [a]ll the worth which the human being possesses - all spiritual reality, he possesses through the state.[lx] And it is not only by accident of linguistic convention that the woman does not appear in this equation. Rather, her omission makes sense in the light of the image of religion as the 'nurse of free men' and the state as 'their mother;'[lxi] the woman hence is the mediator of religion, and love, the

idealistic bond on which the family thrives, is her means.[25] Through love, therefore, religion actualises itself on earth, the woman realises herself as an individual, and the family achieves its internal coherence. Hegel's conception of the family is akin to Plato's, who also saw it as the institution which serves individuals as a passage from nature to civilisation and so prepares them to be responsible citizens, a conception which, in other words, makes a connection between sexual maturity and political maturity (and on which, in **Antigone,** Creon impales himself in a casuistic blunder). However, since Hegel was concerned to overcome the particularity of the state in its feudal mode in which it existed as 'a network of relations under God,'[lxii] represented on earth by a monarch, he showed that the ideological and organisational unity to which this system aspired could in fact not be attained by it precisely *because* it allowed 'each *particular* interested class or faction . . . [to] . . . possess a different notion about what God commands' [lxiii] (and this circumstance was at the root of the 'individual sovereignties'[lxiv] that existed under the *Ancien Régime* to its eventual detriment). In keeping with one of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy, that the institutions of the material world are, literally, embodiments of ideas, Hegel therefore integrated the function of the family in the state and *vis-à-vis* the state into his own paradigm of antithetical relationships between partial and hence opposed forces of consciousness - forces which are partial forces in consequence of their origin in the process of *diremption*[lxv] of the ethical world into 'on the one hand . . . the hard reality of a world of culture, and on the other hand . . . the inner reality of a world of faith and insight.'[lxvi]

But by reviving Plato's image of the family as the institution which launches individuals into their role as responsible citizens and by at once designating the family as the sanctuary of the 'inner reality of a world of faith and insight' - a perspective on the family in which it is portrayed as an enclave of nature within the state, a '*staatsfreier Bezirk,* a domain

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[25]   By way of contrast, the role of the man, which is addressed in the section headed 'Gender and Power,' is to act in the state as the protagonist of its law - internally - and of its might - externally - which are the manifestations of human will that make the state a symbol of humanity's constructive break with nature.

free from the absolute authority of the state . . . [within] . . . the ethical sphere,'[lxvii] which, however, is necessary to the state[lxviii] - Hegel places the family into an ambivalent position. Conceptually, the family is a distinct and autonomous realm of human relations, but its existence in reality is assured only under the umbrella of the state's legislative framework and military protection. The family therefore owes cooperation to the state in the maintenance of civic order. But conversely the state does not intrude into the sanctity of the family's inner space as it recognises that it is continuously reconstituted by the family through the natural process of procreation, which - in the religious ethics of both Greek antiquity and the Enlightenment era of Hegel's philosophy - was not properly within the reach of the state's jurisdiction, because 'the state will "concede divine honours" to the domestic, ethically private dimension of existence.'[lxix]

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

Hegel's aforementioned idea (or perhaps it would more appropriately be termed 'principle') of *diremption* consistently structures his reading of **Antigone**, and all the dialectical confrontations which Hegel finds under every bush[lxx] are derivative of one root-diremption: '[M]an's . . . "scission from nature" [Entzweiung mit der Natur].'[lxxi] While the division of the forces of man's consciousness which follows from his 'scission from nature' is reflected in discord and strife between individuals such as Antigone and Creon it at once bears within it the potential for an advance in the understanding of man's situation. This potential is not given in the state of nature because man's freedom to determine his identity and to express his individual will consists in his capacity to recognise his separateness from nature and to make it viable. The essence of 'man's scission from nature' hence is that it constitutes at once an opportunity, an imperative and an authority for positive action that distinguishes itself by purpose and appearance from submission to the forces of nature. However, Hegel postulates that man's actions can have meaning only within a social context because the idea of 'meaning' *can only arise* in regard to the individual's action in the hard reality of a world of culture. In this perspective Hegel aligns himself not only with Aristotle, however, but also, of course, with

Sophocles, as the words which *he* gave his character Creon bear out: '[I]t is our country that preserves us, and it is only while she remains upright, as we sail upon her, that we make our friends.'[lxxii] The state is therefore the practical form in which the world of culture manifests itself, and for human beings their break with nature necessarily involves their accommodation as political beings in a state.

There is thus a complex and finely balanced interdependence between the family and the state wherein each, through being partially subsumed in the other, injects meaning and vitality into the whole. In Hegel's triadic pattern this fruitful integration of contending realms of being would correspond to the synthesis in which the *apparent* conflict between thesis and antithesis is resolved on a higher level of knowledge. Consequently the political system envisaged by Hegel, by resting on distinct and semi-autonomous foundations, achieves a unity that is not possible in the feudal state in which diverse human aspirations are projected onto a single institution.

2.3.2 Antigone and Creon as Insane and Immature Representatives of the Family and the State

CREON: 'One of these *girls,* I think, has just shown herself *insane,* and the other has been so since birth.'[lxxiii]

Sophocles, **Antigone**

CREON: 'It is impossible to gain full knowledge of any *man's character, mentality and judgement* until *he* is seen practised in rule and law-giving.'[lxxiv]

Sophocles, **Antigone**[26]

However, this schematic and somewhat legalistic representation of the family-state relationship fails to capture the full substance of the sentiments that forge the family and of the ideals upon which the state is built. Moreover, the symmetry in the construction of this model distracts from important unique aspects of the nature of the family and the nature of the state which do not correspond to one another as the mirror-like juxtaposition of family and state may suggest. Whereas the state does not cease to exist through the loss of citizens, the family can be brought to the edge of ruin, spiritual and physical, by the death of only one of its members. This can be understood before the background of the differences in function and character of the state and the family which are concealed by the superficial resemblance of their internal hierarchies. In Thebes, the challenge to Creon does not emanate *directly* from the death of Eteocles and Polynices, that is, the death of two of the state's soldiers, albeit of prominent lineage, one loyal, the other a traitor, is not in itself a blow which Thebes cannot survive. However, in the incomplete family of Antigone, the death of her two brothers becomes a destructive trauma to her. But this, again, is not the *immediate* consequence of her brothers' deaths; it becomes a destructive trauma to Antigone only, firstly, because of the coincidence of the concentration of different family roles, mother and sister, due to the early death of her parents, Oedipus and Jocasta, in her person at a stage of her life when she has not reached the *maturity* of a responsible citizen (for as a woman, she could never have achieved the *status* of a citizen in Thebes), and - secondly - because the state transgresses into the realm of her already punctured family structure to settle an account with the deceased Polynices. There are two

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[26]   [W]hat do . . . epigraphs prove? Surely they do not answer an appeal to authority since few of us now accept the same authorities. Do they evoke a mood, declare a theme, insinuate a conclusion? Possibly. Yet, coming at the start, they do nothing that the text itself will not confirm or deny. Thus epigraphs become a kind of preparation for failure. (Hassan, Ihab, 'The New Gnosticism: Speculations on an Aspect of the Postmodern Mind,' **Paracriticisms,** University of Illinois Press, 1975, pages 121 to 151, quoted in Waugh, Patricia, editor, 'Postmodernism and Literary History,' **Postmodernism: A Reader,** Edward Arnold, Dunton Green, Sevenoaks, Kent, 1992, page sixty one)

problems - one for the family of Antigone (which, in the play, is condensed in Antigone herself, although the conflict is not one that is necessarily specific to her character - that is, the roles of the family in the state and the woman in the family are over-accentuated in the play through being combined in the character of Antigone), the other for the state of Thebes (which in its turn, in **Antigone,** is epitomised in the persona of Creon). But the essence of each problem is that its immediate source is the impulsive action of an individual who, through lack of preparation for his responsibility, trespasses into the realm of the other sphere - the state and the family respectively.

Hegel's contention that the individuality of human beings can be meaningful only when it is set against the context of a whole is therefore confirmed by the interaction of the various characters of the play. Antigone, foremost among them, initially personifies notions of moral freedom, personal judgement and fearless self-assertion. These are traits which inspire respect, but it is a respect which is in a sense conditional: The individual's action must prove itself as virtue by its consideration for the integrity of the state in which it takes place; the circumstance that it is the state which enables the individual to rise above nature endowes him with his identity and worth as a human being, and the state thus gives meaning to the individual's action *as a citizen.* Where consideration on the part of the individual for the integrity of his state is not evident, the individual concerned in effect disqualifies himself from the privilege of citizenship; he conforms to Hegel's image of the 'beautiful soul' as a person who is at one with nature and who is hence necessarily condemned to be in conflict with the state, 'because it is only as *citizen* that he is actual and substantial . . . [; therefore] the individual, so far as he is *not* a citizen but belongs to the family, is only an unreal impotent shadow [*in the state].* [lxxv] In the play this circumstance is graphically symbolised by Antigone's expulsion from the state to an enclosed tomb in which she will 'descend'[lxxvi] 'into the universality of death.'[lxxvii] But the significance of this destiny is not in Antigone's death itself, since it is the object of the family (for which Antigone stands in the play) to complete the passage through 'a long succession of separate disconnected experiences' [lxxviii] to a destination that is 'the calm of simple universality,'[lxxix] death. The significance *to her,* rather, is in the punishment that she has to 'descend' 'into the universality of death' before 'the due term of . . . [her] . . . life has come'[lxxx]

and before she has performed another divine mission, 'the raising of children'[lxxxi] into 'the unrest and change of life'[lxxxii] (this is also an instructive irony when explored from a utilitarian perspective). By deliberately choosing the destiny of statelessness Antigone assumes for herself a status that is 'low in the scale of humanity:'[lxxxiii] She shows herself to be 'by nature unsocial'[lxxxiv] and as such, like her fallen brother Polynices, 'also [as] "a lover of war."'[lxxxv] This is the lesson of Antigone's fate to the people of Thebes.

For real life relationships between individuals Hegel postulates a process whereby a person can recognise himself, that is, can find his own identity, through interaction with another person. For example, Hegel speaks of the husband-wife relationship as a 'case of immediate self-recognition in another consciousness.'[lxxxvi] This principle can here also be applied to the interaction between Antigone and Ismene, as it is indeed the experience through which Antigone passes in her exchanges with Ismene at the beginning of the play and through which she passes again later as she and Ismene are presented to Creon. Ismene, when viewed from the Hegelian perspective, has two principal functions in the play. Firstly, by providing contrast to the character and the situation of Antigone, Ismene gives firmer contours to Antigone's personality, and she facilitates a deeper insight into Antigone's predicament of having to suffer for placing her loyalty to Polynices above her loyalty to Thebes. Ismene's meekness in her attitude to the need to give expression to familial piety (which has divine sanction and is hence conceptually subsumed in divine law) in the face of a proscription which addresses the fate of a corpse and which does not question *as such* the divine authority for actions of familial piety allows both Antigone and divine law to gain purchase in their separate quests for individual self-assertion and for precedence (of one system of law over another) respectively. Since the portrayed action is fictitious, a secondary aspect[lxxxvii] is that the real conflict conveys itself through the substitutive participation of the reader of the play, which thus assumes its character as a literary tragedy, for 'this is what happens in tragedy[,] where language ceases to be narrative and where self-conscious human beings are the spokesmen, behind whose mask actual actors are present.'[lxxxviii] Secondly, by her obsequious demeanour

vis-à-vis the authority of the state, Ismene exposes (to Antigone and to the reader) her own shallowness, that is concealed by her apparent 'civic consciousness,'[27] and she hence adds further nuances to the plot. Ismene cannot match the moral stature of Antigone, and by a logic of association the system of law which Ismene propagates is defiled, for '[i]f the deed is merely self-interested, if to act is only to "busy oneself," "others will hasten to it as flies ['hasten'] to a freshly set out bowl of milk" [and] (. . . [this is the] . . . image with which . . . Ismene seems to enter the argument).'[lxxxix] Divine law, which Antigone claims as her authority, is thereby given greater weight.

Creon, too, like Antigone, has a formidable stature on account of his narrative alone, but his character also achieves greater depth in the perception of the reader through the contrast that is provided by the character of a close relative - his son Haemon. And whereas the *personalities* of Antigone and Creon are elucidated by their interactions with those of Ismene and Haemon respectively, the *loci of their legitimate activity* are asserted and defined by their interactions with one another. Antigone's *function* is in the family, Creon's is in the *state,* and while the two women give different views on the family, the two men correspondingly give different views on the state. Both Antigone and Creon explore the extent of their authority, and they discover its appropriate focus in their confrontation with one another. Creon and Antigone, as an antagonistic pair, are therefore human manifestations of Hegel's abstract concepts of thesis and antithesis. 'Since when do I take my orders from the people of Thebes?'[xc] is Creon's rhetoric question that expresses his axiom as the ruler of Thebes (which Louis XIV was to express in just those words some centuries later): 'I am the state.'[28] The

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[27]   This is a rather too modern term to be quite appropriate in an analysis of ancient Greek culture (and even in an interpretation or an analysis of it), but it is used here to denote a kind of law abiding that is informed by Hegelian considerations.

[28]   cf. in this context this extract from an interview of Theodore Roosevelt̄ about a court case: "*Query:* 'How did you know that substantial justice was done?' - ROOSEVELT: 'Because I did it, because . . . I was doing my best.' - *Query:* 'You mean to say that, when you do a thing, thereby substantial justice is done.' - ROOSEVELT: 'I do. When I do a thing, I do it so as to do substantial

institution 'state' is not a matter of citizens' opinions - it exists through its ruler alone. Hence the idea of rule by consensus is one that springs from a confused mind - it is contrary to the principle of the state that 'belongs to its ruler.'[xci] Yet Haemon is not suggesting to his father that Thebes should be governed 'democratically,' at least not in the sense that it would match the prominent modern portrayal of the democratic state as a political weathervane that shifts with the erratic currents of public opinion. This idea emerges only in so far as Creon implies it inadvertently by his suspicion that his son seeks to dilute his authority.

Because his authority *as ruler of Thebes* commands less obedience than he vainly would like to see, Creon has to bolster it not only by emphasising his gender and age (which, by convention, are accorded greater weight than the female sex and youth), but also by slighting those who challenge him. In his confrontation with the guard, with his son Haemon, and with the prophet Tiresias, Creon implies the existence of a standard of state conduct which these cannot grasp and which they are only likely to subvert if they surrender to the powers of love and of money instead of keeping 'their necks properly under the yoke.'[xcii] But it is ultimately Creon's self-conceit which prompts his anxious anticipation of challenges to his absolute authority and his consequently prejudiced and increasingly agitated responses to the submissions that are made to him in the matter of Antigone.[29] And by this self-conceit Creon

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justice. I mean just that.'" (Pringle, H. F., **Theodore Roosevelt,** page 318, quoted in Carr, E. H., **The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 - 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,** Papermac, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1939, page seventy eight)

[29]   In a well-known article [of 1934 - 'Haimon's Liebe zu Antigone,' - which is included in Fritz, Kurt von, **Antike und Moderne Tragödie: Neun Abhandlungen,** Walter De Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1962], Kurt von Fritz argues vigorously that *no* private, *erotic element enters into Haemon's plea for Antigone. . . .* Any such element would gravely trivialise and compromise the moral-political thrust of Haemon's debate with Creon. It is in the course of this high polemic that Haemon 'loses his father.' Having failed to cut down the tyrant at the mouth of the tomb, Haemon has nothing left but suicide. It is precisely Haemon's *disinterestedness,* his freedom from personal passion, which make of him one of 'the comeliest figures' in Sophocles. The celebrated choral ode to Eros (lines 781 ff.) relates to the

himself emphasises the contrast that exists between his aspiration to be a ruler who transcends sectional interests and his actual fallibility that reduces him to the level of an ordinary citizen. Because of this pretence that he acts in the interest of a higher good when he is in fact *more* concerned with his personal image than the guard, Haemon and Tiresias,[30] Creon indicates the true extent of his *legitimate* power within the overlapping settings of the play, which are the web of blood bonds (unified in Antigone) and Thebes, which may be seen as a web of elective bonds (unified in Creon, the king).

2.4   Law, Phoney Law, Vanity and Freedom

2.4.1 The Historical Function of Law

Hegel's allusion to the answer of the Pythagorean to the father who was in search of 'the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct' [was]: *Make him a citizen of a state with good laws.*

Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Anatomy of an Argument**[xciii]

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situation of Antigone and Haemon solely by virtue of vulgar misunderstanding. It underlines, once again, the myopia of the Theban elders and the spiritual solitude in which the protagonists suffer their destinies. (Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pages 151 and 152, emphasis added)

[30]   CREON: 'I will not make myself a liar *before the city;* I will kill her. . . . . Thus the appointed rules must be upheld, and *we must on no account be beaten by a woman.'* (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, pages seventy five and seventy seven, emphasis added)

Just as in Hegel's perspective **Antigone** represents a portrayal of society as a terrain contested by the family and the state, so the play *also* portrays law as an arena to be delimited between contrary wills. Both images convey a sense of potential conflict, and they therefore suggest the desirability of a reconciliation, but both images, of course (in Hegel's view), are also erroneous, and hence the sentiments of conflict and reconciliation, though real, are at the same time subjective, and they do therefore not reflect the true nature of society and of law (but only - to use once again a term from the contemporary sociological vocabulary - the incomplete socialisation of individuals). As conceptual categories 'society' and 'law' also share with one another their capability of being viewed in terms of Hegel's paradigm of *diremption.* As has already been shown, society rests upon the pillars of the family and the state, which in their turn are partial edifices, expressing forces of consciousness which are at once opposed and attracted to one another,[31] and which have their roots in the diremption of time into night and day, of gender into female and male, of being into life and death, and of life into the modes of procreation and war. Whereas the reconciliation between the family and the state is achieved, *in consciousness,* through a recognition of the partiality of their function in the whole and their consequent need for one another, law comes to life as a vehicle for the actualisation of a universal aspiration, human freedom, in particular portions of time and space, that is, in definable periods and cultural formations. Law thereby is capable of contributing to the meaningful patterning, *in consciousness,* of dominant practices in a chronologically and geographically (or demographically) demarcated polity, and it so assumes its capacity of harnessing specific and transitory individual wills for the attainment of a teleologically conceived destiny - an extension of consciousness which ultimately is to command absolute knowledge. Although, however, this historical function of law is inherent in its nature, it is not the *essence* of law, that is, it is not *the* aspect of law which gives it its character of being law and its *raison d'être as law.* Law derives its central, formal role in the polity not from these

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[31]   'Beide Seiten suchen sich und fliehen sich.' (Both sides seek each other and flee from each other.) (Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,' quoted in Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,** Clarendon Press,

functions, which are subjectively projected onto it, and which it may also have in fact, *but only coincidentally;* [32] rather, the foundation of law - on which its claim to obedience is grounded - is, once again, 'man's scission from nature,' as it is the event which gave men their freedom to proceed from their mastery of nature to the erection of their own, distinctly human, world of culture. While the state *is* the world of culture through which human existence assumes its identity separate from nature, law is the instrument of the state by which 'the will of independent men . . . [is executed] . . . in such a way that [it allows] their pursuit of private ends to reinforce . . . their personal and collective adherence to public values,' [xciv] and it is this practical, socially integrative function from which absolute authority accrues to law *directly.*

But these observations make evident that law in its essential and contingent features (whose relationship with one another is comparable to that between reason and convention [xcv]) constitutes another thicket of intersecting concepts which cannot be fully mapped out here. It is only possible to pose some of the more obvious questions which might be explored to this end. For example, returning in this context to Hegel's notion about 'meaning' in the social setting, there is in his conceptions of freedom and individuality of course a rich ambiguity which is only insufficiently identified by questions such as: In what sense can an individual consider himself 'free' when he is conscripted into *citizenship* at birth and when his subsequent choices are circumscribed by *law?* And in what sense, furthermore, could such a person be considered an 'individual' other than in the somewhat statistical sense that he is a constitutive *unit* of the state? A partial answer may be that the apparent absoluteness of law is tempered on the one hand by the prospective fulfilment of its purpose - to advance the attainment of absolute knowledge - in time (even if this possibility is never realised *fully)* and on the other hand by individuals' subjective notions of morality, virtue and duty and their thus informed actions.

Oxford, 1986, page twenty three)

[32]   'The observing consciousness sees such laws as sensuously present in the particulars it observes, which would however, make them *merely contingent* and *not genuine laws at all.'* (Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit by G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page . . . , emphasis added)

Where individuals' transgression of the law is motivated not by vanity but by earnest passion, the injury thus done to the law is <u>sublated</u> by the incremental advance to absolute knowledge which is achieved by it.[33]

2.4.2 <u>Antigone and Creon as Delinquents</u>

Antigone served Hegel as an illustration of some nuances in the nature of the adjustment between particular and universal, between individual and collective. Unlike other interpreters of **Antigone,** Hegel viewed the predicament of the two protagonists as arising from the fact that both represented a position which was legally admissible and that in this sense 'both were right[; . . . yet, at the same time . . . i]n the view of *eternal* justice both were *wrong,* because they were *one-sided[.]*[xcvi] **Antigone** therefore highlights both the *principle* of law, which is abstract and which is therefore not subject to qualification by specific circumstances, and the principle of *temporality,* which allows for the performance of *individual laws* to be assessed by the actual conditions of their application. Since the 'performance' of a law is determined by the extent to which it is in tune with "a people['s] . . . stage of historical development"[xcvii] (and also with 'the particular national character of a people [. . . and] the whole complex of relations connected with the necessities of nature'[34xcviii]), and since it hence has validity, in part, on account of its function to express the 'values, aspirations, customs, outlook upon life'[xcix] of people in a given situation, the possibility for the 'invalidation' of

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[33] In the confrontation between master and slave Hegel challenged one of the most fundamental assumptions of classical thought: the superiority of theoretical over practical reason, and above all, of thought over work. In the second round, between hero and valet, he struck even more deeply, by asserting the superiority of passion over reason. For as he was to note later, '*nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passions.'* (Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's <u>Phenomenology of Mind,</u>** pages two hundred and 201, emphasis added)

[34] The former aspect is not explored in **Antigone;** the complexity of the conception of nature in the context of law is acknowledged elsewhere in this analysis.

particular laws logically and potentically exists, as this argument shows. But which form may such a rejection of a particular law take in practice? Can the repeal of a law be accomplished by the challenge of an individual, and - in this case - could he accomplish it without popular backing or only with popular backing? And would the sanction of a different system of law, with uncertain jurisdiction in the political setting in which the questioned law has effect, give legitimacy to such a challenge? Rousseau, for example, who worked when absolutism in his native France was in its final years, when one of this system's characteristic features - the parallel existence of separate bodies of law applicable to different classes of Frenchmen (who, with the possible exception of the *noblesse d'épée,* were not 'citizens' in the sense in which Hegel understood the term) - was about to be swept away by the revolution of 1789, certainly doubted this. His concept of the 'general will' has informed Hegel in his stipulation that 'in order for a statement to be law . . . [it] should [among other qualities have that of being] . . . universal [, that is,] it should . . . prescribe a general rule of conduct which applies without exception to all the members of society.'[c]

In Thebes there is a dilemma in consequence of the evident irreconcilability between the desires of an individual which have a *prima facie* quality of reasonableness and the collective will of Thebes which its ruler is required to express and to enforce. Antigone's quest for the burial of her brother - and her own preparedness for sacrifice in the pursuit of this objective - arouses sympathy with her stance and with her person, and this makes Antigone's challenge to the state more formidable. But Creon's principled and unfaltering dedication to his purpose and his duty as the head of the state at a time when he is beset from many quarters by emotional pleas to yield also commands respect. Yet this is only a *dilemma,* that is, *subjective* reality, and as such it cannot serve as a basis for judgement on the rightness of the principles involved. And although Antigone and Creon represent principles - or, to say it in Hegelian parlance, 'ethical orders' - they do so *only* by virtue of their roles in the setting of civic society into which they are placed by the play. The circumstance, therefore, that Antigone's and Creon's individual interests coincide with the requirements of the roles that are assigned to them in their respective ethical orders and that they hence willingly identify themselves with

their roles does not qualify them *as individuals* to deny or affirm the applicability of individual laws to themselves.

In the case of Antigone this is more obvious because the legitimacy of her challenge to the law is doubtful on several counts. Firstly, Antigone is not a fully enfranchised citizen of Thebes because she is both a woman and a minor. Whereas the complexity of the issue of gender does not permit an analysis *in passim,* Antigone's status as a minor arises from the fact that she has not completed the passage from the realm of nature to the realm of civilised life within her own family and that she has not achieved the maturity of adulthood and hence the *capacity* to be a responsible citizen that she would have been *deemed* to have achieved through marriage.[35] (These of course are criteria for full enfranchisement in Thebes which are nowhere in the play expressly stated and which therefore have to be inferred from the narrative.) The circumstance of Antigone's merely partial enfranchisement in Thebes does not mean that her claims against the country's laws are not valid, but it does mean that she has no standing to make these claims herself. Antigone's avenue to obtain the retrospective sanction of the state for her action therefore is to be heard by proxy, that is, to have her case presented by fully enfranchised citizens of Thebes. But although this possibility does exist for Antigone in the (admittedly equivocal) chorus, in Haemon and, arguably, in Tiresias, she insists on speaking and acting *personally.* In doing so Antigone confirms her incapacity to respect existing laws as an expression of rational will;[ci] she exposes herself as 'incapable of communal life . . . [and therefore as] . . . either a beast or a god,'[cii] and she hence cannot enjoy the right to be *judged as a person in terms of the laws* of Thebes (though she remains liable to be *tried as a criminal by the court*[36]). Yet nonetheless she not only presumptuously claims for herself the dignity of this citizens' privilege of being *judged,* but she even claims the punishment exclusively for herself

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[35]   The *status* of a citizen, of course, was unattainable for women in Periclean Athens (on which Sophocles modelled the Thebes of **Antigone)**, as has already been pointed out on page . . .

[36]   In the Thebes of **Antigone** the *function* of the court is performed jointly by Creon and the Chorus though of course they do not aim to *resemble* a court.

as a 'right.'[37] And by this irreverent fixation on a principle of law which - by convention, because she is not a citizen - is inapplicable to her protestations about the king's verdict on her case, Antigone obsessively and offensively compounds her undignified isolation in the public life of Thebes:

CHORUS: Here comes Ismene, weeping
In sisterly sorrow; a darkened brow,
Flushed face, and fair cheek marred
With flooding rain.

CREON: You crawling viper! Lurking in my house
To suck my blood! Two traitors unbeknown
Plotting against my throne. Do you admit
To share in this burying, or deny all knowledge?

ISMENE: I did it - yes - if she will let me say so.
I am as much to blame as she is.

ANTIGONE: No.
That is not just. You would not lend a hand
And I refused your help in what I did.

ISMENE: But I am not ashamed to stand beside you
Now in your hour of trial, Antigone.

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[37]   The injury, the penalty which falls on the criminal is not only morally implicity just - as just it is *eo ipso* (original emphasis) his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his *right* (emphasis added).' (Knox, T. M., translator, **G. W. F. Hegel: <u>The Philosophy of Right,</u>** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952, quoted in Plant, Raymond, **Modern Political Thought,** Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Oxford, 1991, page 293)

ANTIGONE: Whose was the deed, Death and the dead are witness.
I love no friend whose love is only in words.

ISMENE: O sister, sister, let me share your death,
Share in the tribute of honour to him that is dead.

ANTIGONE: You shall not die with me. *You shall not claim
That which you would not touch.* One death is enough.

ISMENE: How can I bear to live, if you must die?

ANTIGONE: Ask Creon. Is not he the one you care for?

ISMENE: You do yourself no good to taunt me so.

ANTIGONE: Indeed no: even my jests are bitter pains.

ISMENE: But how, O tell me, how can I still help you?

ANTIGONE: Help yourself. I shall not stand in your way.[38]

ISMENE: For pity, Antigone - can I not die with you?

ANTIGONE: You chose; life was your choice, when mine was death.

ISMENE: Although I warned you that it would be so.

ANTIGONE: Your way seemed right to some, to others mine.

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[38] cf. the translation of this line by Andrew Brown (see Bibliography): 'ANTIGONE: Save yourself. I do not begrudge you your escape.'

ISMENE: But now both in the wrong, and both condemned.

ANTIGONE: No, no. You live. My heart was long since dead,
So it was right for me to help the dead.

CREON: I do believe the creatures both are mad;
One lately crazed, the other from her birth.

ISMENE: Is it not likely, sir? The strongest mind
Cannot but break under misfortune's blows.

CREON: Yours did, when you threw in your lot with hers.

ISMENE: How could I wish to live without my sister?

CREON: *You have no sister. Count her dead already.*^{ciii}

While Antigone's action has the veneer of virtue, it is in fact mere misguided sentiment, motivated only by personal vanity. But whereas this is only a *failing* on the part of Antigone, a failing which can be excused in cognisance of her background as an orphan who has been 'thrown in at the deep end' of civil society, Antigone's <u>romantic</u> idealisation of a *role* and her arrogant claim for its unconditional precedence without regard for its function in the whole is *criminally* fanatic. Antigone becomes guilty of acting 'alone among mortals by . . . [her] . . . own law.'[39] She therefore forfeits her legal reality within Thebes,[40] and she

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[39]   '[Y]ou *alone* among mortals will descend by your own law . . . .' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page eighty nine, emphasis added)

[40]   '[W]e do not say that a man who takes no interest in the affairs of the city is a man who minds his own business . . . [;] . . . , we say that he has no business here at all.' (Pericles quoted by Thucydides, quoted in turn by Goldhill, Simon, **Reading Greek Tragedy,** Cambridge University Press,

remains 'alive [*only]* to the house of H<u>ade</u>s.'[civ] Thus Antigone is also not entitled to challenge Thebes on the second count of having exercised her *negative* freedom to withdraw, and this is given <u>*de jure*</u> acknowledgement by the state in her banishment from Thebes. (Ironically, moreover, in taking this fate upon herself, Antigone vicariously sought the punishment that the laws of the real Thebes would have imposed on her brother.

It was evidently normal practice, [namely,] at Athens and elsewhere, to forbid burial on their native soil to men convicted of treason or sacrilege. In such cases, however, the body would be cast outside the borders, rather than left in a place where it could cause pollution to the city.[cv]) By comparison, the grounds for doubting that Creon's statements *in support* of the law have the force to corroborate its validity are less evident, but they are not therefore necessarily less significant. Creon's relationship with the law is of course made contradictory by his dual role as citizen and as king. As citizen he has to respect the law as the instrument which implements his individual will in and through the state, but as king he also has to pronounce the law, independently of the people but binding on them, and it is not to 'please' him exclusively.[41] It certainly is an invidious position to be in, and perhaps no ruler could do full justice to it, but it seems conceivable that rulers, though they cannot succeed in their task, may nonetheless retain the right to *endeavour* by acting 'in good faith,' and on that score Creon clearly fails. Like Antigone, he is new to his 'm<u>étie</u>r;' he yet has to 'be tried [i]n the practice of authority and rule.'[cvi] To safeguard the freedom and welfare of the people of Thebes, as it is expressed in the law of the land, is the responsibility which is entrusted to him in his position as the king of Thebes. And although, as the king, he has the 'power of subjectivity,'[cvii] through which the notion of positive law as the means for the actualisation of human freedom is symbolised in his person, Creon lacks the judgement to exercise it wisely. By his rigid insistence on his right to enforce the law Creon fails the test to which he has submitted himself:

Cambridge, 1986, page ninety two)

[41]   'CREON: "Must I rule this land to please anyone but myself?" - HAEMON: "It is no city that belongs to one man."' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page eighty three)

He reduces himself to the status of a mere *operator* of the law, and he therefore does *not* rule. Creon's wilfulness may be seen as a betrayal of his subjects, which entails the forfeiture of his mandate and which hence makes him a tyrant, and he compounds his failure by seeking to justify his action with appeals 'to circumstances [age, [42] gender], to deductions from presupposed conditions which in themselves have no higher validity [the wishes of Eteocles[43]],'[cviii] to divine law (although he does not recognise it as justification for Antigone's action), and to notions of honour which, being subjective, are mere vanity ('CREON: "I will not make myself a liar before the city."'[cix]).

Since in Hegel's conception, furthermore, law does not derive its force from the comprehension or approval of it by those to whom it applies,[44] Antigone's and Creon's reasoned appeals to 'the law' as the justification for their action - and their therein implied 'probing'[cx] of the law - make them guilty of what Hegel called the 'blasphemy of knowing,'[cxi] which in its turn, and consequently, makes them unworthy of the law. Through this attitude, and through their intransigence of seeking to impose their individual wills, Antigone and Creon are subversive of the state and therewith of the parameters of civil society through which rituals such as burial and punishment are imbued with significance. Ultimately, therefore, the price Antigone and Creon have to pay for their narrow autonomy is purposelessness and defeat - a fate which is indeed borne out by the play.

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[42]   'CREON [referring to Haemon]: "Shall men of my age be taught wisdom by one of his?"' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page eighty one)

[43]   'CREON [to Antigone]: "Why do you pay a tribute which is *dis*loyal in *his* sight?"' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page sixty three, original emphasis)

[44]   The harmonisation of this notion with the aforementioned correlation of law with its historical and cultural environment is an aspect of the problem which has already been hinted at.

2.5   Religion and Ideology

2.5.1 The Political Expediency of Faith

Although this might seem to be implied in the somewhat unreflective references to religion in the preceding pages, it is by no means a fixed - and known - landmark in the grid of 'meaning' within which this essay has attempted to locate the family and the state, and law. On the contrary, the peculiarly *private* dimension of religion not only contributes to its many-faceted character, and to its conceptual elusiveness on this account, but it also contributes, seemingly paradoxically but not really so, to its *public* impact and its therefore pivotal political character which is based upon this. It is therefore now appropriate to make some comments on religion as a factor in the action of **Antigone** and in Hegel's interpretation of **Antigone.** This, of course, is an endeavour which is fraught with additional difficulty by the quite fundamental differences between the religious experience of the ancient Greeks, in which the 'heritage' of paganism[45] was still discernible, and the religious experience of the generations which came under the sway of the Enlightenment. These, certainly, are profound differences, but since, as a matter of fact, there were also profound differences in religious experience *within* historical periods, such as, for example (and especially), within the Enlightenment - differences, moreover, which cannot solely be attributed to differences between individuals in their response to the religious message of their time[46] - one is in danger

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[45]   Since paganism proper originated in twelfth century Burma, it is not unproblematic to speak of the influence of its 'heritage' in an earlier period; however 'paganism' is used here synonymously with 'zoomorphism,' that is, in this wider sense of 'animal worship,' which it has acquired in subsequent historical writing.

[46]   The possible correlation of types of religious sentiment to political background, which is implied here, would seem to be a peculiar enterprise if it were not actually suggested by the circumstance that the Three Estates system in eighteenth century France divided the French clergy and thus replicated within the French ecclesiastical establishment the politico-economic polarisation that existed in French

of not seeing 'the wood for its trees' if one allowed these differences, rich in meaning though they are, to conceal the continuity of religion *per se* and of its significance in the political realm. Since there are indeed significant affinities between the intellectual apprehension of religion *per se* in ancient Greece and the manner in which the eighteenth century *philosophes* engaged with this theme, the idea of seeking to make sense of the bearing which religious sentiments had on political culture in ancient Greece from an Enlightenment (or even from a modern) perspective ultimately does not seem altogether far-fetched.

The wisdom that the Enlightenment entailed the displacement of religion by 'rationality' has become so commonplace that its very triteness raises doubts about its truth. Similarly one must view with some reserve the *only slightly* more sophisticated observation, which has already been hinted at earlier, that the true stimulus of the *philosophes'* challenge to religion was their aspiration to political influence, and its true aim, therefore, the weakening of the opportunistic bond that existed between church and state in eighteenth century France. Rather more crucial, however, are truths which are obscured by such all too impressionistic notions. Whereas namely there was indeed, in the decades which straddled the year of the French Revolution, a general change in the perception of the political character of religion (which coincided with an increase in the perception of the political character *per se* of religion), the vogue for the separation of religion and politics which ensued from this is delusive in several telling respects. It is delusive, firstly, because the separation of religion and politics which it propagates is trivial in relation to a quite fundamental separation of religion and politics which is *not* rooted in a mere 'vogue' but in the *essential nature* of religion and politics and their respective conceptualisation in philosophy, and secondly (which follows from the first proposition), because as a vogue it propagates something as 'new' which in this case is not new. In other words, it is only the normative idea of a separation between religion and politics which is new, and by this sense of newness, cultivated by the ideology of rationality (which in fact is the phenomenon that is genuinely new), a false break is suggested between the pattern of

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society as a whole.

political manipulation of religion that is familiar from the days of the *Ancien Régime* and the pattern of the accommodation of religion in politics that was established in 1789. For although religion was then apparently disestablished in the political realm, it was disestablished only *as ideology* (as which the *philosophes* had exposed it), whereas the principle of the mobilisation of consensus by ideology was not affected by the substitution of 'rationality' for 'religion.' It is therefore the thread of ideology which connects the *Ancien Régime* with the post-revolutionary order. What this argument however shows in the context of a modern analysis of the *ancient Greek* political experience is that the thriving of opposition between religion and philosophy in the eighteenth century and after is merely another round, a re-assertion, of an (in Hegel's view) artificial and untenable dichotomy between religion and philosophy which already was accorded plausibility by ancient Greek philosophers such as the 'heathen' Socrates.[47] It is therefore in this dichotomy wherein the parallel lies between Creon's Thebes, Louis XVI's France *and* the order that issued from the revolution of 1789, and it is in this dichotomy, moreover, wherein the conceptualisation of religion in thought and hence its transformation into a system of prescriptive rules, *an ideology,* is grounded - and this is the other important parallel between Sophocles's and Hegel's societies.

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[47]   Philosophy and religion come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God. Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is commonly called religion as such. What they have in common is that they are religion; what distinguishes them from each other is merely the kind and manner of religion we find in each. It is in the peculiar way in which they both occupy themselves with God that the distinction comes out. (Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,' quoted in Gray, J. Glenn, editor, **G. W. F. Hegel: On Art, Religion, Philosophy - Introductory Lectures to the Realm of Absolute Spirit,** Harper Torchbooks, New York, New York, 1970, pages 128 to 206)

2.5.2 <u>Antigone and Creon as Sinners</u>

In Hegel's lifetime the notion that 'positive religion is "for itself" . . . [and] . . . stands on its own basis'[cxii] had some currency. Its corollary was that

> [w]e do not question . . . [the] . . . doctrines . . . [of positive religion, but] . . . we respect them and hold them in honour; [whereas] on the other side stands reason, thought, which seeks to grasp its object intellectually, and these two are supposed not to come into relation; reason is not to interfere with these doctrines.[cxiii]

Hegel acknowledged this notion as a symptom of the defensive posture into which religion had been forced by the preponderance of 'rationalistic' sentiments after 1789, and as such as the 'maddest error'[cxiv] of his time. And before the background of the observations already made there is no difficulty in discerning in ancient Greece, too, a kind of absurd reciprocity[48] between the gods and men, albeit a reciprocity which had little in common with that which informed the Enlightenment conception of religion. It is only because the imagined reciprocity between gods and men in Sophocles's Thebes was of a *mechanistic* nature - that is, it supposed a straightforward *quid pro quo* relationship between gods and men - that it could serve Antigone and Creon as a means for their own accreditation to the metaphysical sphere as moral beings and that it could hence sanction their conduct. By this blasphemous presumption on the parts of both Antigone and Creon, in turn (which is blasphemous in a similar way as the previously discussed probing of the law, in regard to which Hegel spoke of the 'blasphemy of knowing'), the principle of the realisation of the individual's freedom through submission to a subjective will is reinforced *as an ideal* and, furthermore, the basis is given for the plausible but tenuous and deceptive connection between law *proper* and Divine 'Law' which the

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[48]   The imagined impasse between positive religion and thought, which Hegel addressed in his aforementioned lecture, and which was sustained by ideology, and the influence of Kant's‐ theory of the separation of nature and morality, which Hegel also criticised, suggest this idea of 'reciprocity.'

protagonists duplicitously exploit. The sense of submission to a subjective will which Antigone and Creon create for one another and which they find distressing to themselves, of course, is only their subjective and immature perception of religion, which exposes their lack of insight into the *true* essence of religion as the highest form of thought (and, in some interpretations, love), in which the particular and the universal, the immanent and the transcendent, are unified.

Antigone's and Creon's presumption to seek the realisation of this ideal *against* each other and on the basis of their own fallacious understanding of it makes them insincere worshippers and hence sinners. And while this is already plainly evident from Antigone's and Creon's casuistic imputations to the gods, it is ultimately made even more apparent by the doubts they express about the infallibility of the gods on the ground that they are not spared the humiliation and the defeat which they have brought upon themselves with their selfish singlemindedness. Thus Antigone, having solemnly proclaimed her allegiance to Zeus's 'unwritten and unfailing rules'[cxv] in preference to the 'decrees . . . [of] . . . a mortal,'[cxvi] and having declared her intention of not having 'to make atonement before the gods for breaking *these [Zeus's]* laws,'[cxvii] ultimately shows herself to be a Pharisee by first likening herself, as a mortal, to the daughter of Tantalus, a goddess, and by then doubting Zeus's laws when these do not save her from her fate: '[W]hat divine law have I transgressed? Why should I look to the gods any more in misery . . . when for my piety I stand convicted as impious? Well, *if this is good in the eyes of the gods . . . '[cxviii]* And Creon, too, is patently a hypocrite when, after having lectured Antigone and his secondary challengers on the proper interpretation of the gods' will, he finally dismisses it in regard to the burial of Polynices with impious shrewdness: 'I know well that no man has the power to pollute the gods.'[cxix]

But in ancient Greece, Hegel's concept of the unification of universal and particular, immanent and transcendent, cannot be applied without qualification because of the ways in which Greek religion of the fifth century before Christ is distinct from Christianity. Hegel idealised Greek religious life because it was to him an example of a *folk religion* at work. By a 'folk religion' Hegel understood a religion which is *genuinely* rationalistic (that is, not *deceptively* rationalistic, like the ideology of Progress which was launched into being by the

Enlightenment) in that it reinforces - and to that extent expresses - reason as the sole principle which guides human beings in the fulfilment of their foremost duty - moral action. Given therefore that Hegel saw true religious sentiment as the worship of reason and morality, which in the anthropomorphic Greek religion were personified in different 'godheads,' it is clear how Greek religion satisfied another 'condition' of Hegel for a true religion: It did neither

> force its teachings upon anyone, nor do . . . violence to any human conscience [because i]ts doctrines . . . [did] . . . not contain anything that *universal* human reason does not recognise . . . no dogmatic claims which transcend the limits of reason . . . [or i]ncomprehensible . . . mysteries . . . [which] . . . reason must repudiate.[cxx]

The philosophical message which Hegel gleaned from his reading of the religious claims of the protagonists in **Antigone** is therefore rooted in the connection he saw between the anthropomorphic religion of the Greeks and the Christian religion of his contemporaries in their common rationalistic *potential* and in their likewise common propensity to be defiled by *sin* (in ancient Greece conceptions of impiety took the place of sin). And the cardinal sin to Hegel, which he observed in both the Enlightenment and in Greek antiquity was the distortion of pure religious sentiment by dogma and its subjection to *particular* ends.

It is at this point, of course, where once again questions about the nature of morality in the political context must arise. In the light of Hegel's view that the state is the means by which human beings make their separation from nature viable in the world of culture it can be understood why Hegel took issue with those popular conceptions of morality which sentimentally idealise 'innocence.' To Hegel 'innocence' is a state which is only possible in nature and which, therefore, if it is claimed by the citizen of a state, is not constructive within the context of society: It compels the individual concerned to be *de facto* stateless as his aspiration to 'innocence' is in principle, and potentially in fact (as Antigone demonstrates), not reconcilable with the idea of the state. Hegel's idea of morality is thus in clear contrast to a common popular conception of morality (which Antigone represents) as a morality that exists

in the self-image of its bearer through a combination of woolly images of 'common sense,' equivocation of ignorance and innocence, and the subjective elevation to 'virtue' of his acceptance of defeat by higher powers. The mission of the state (but not of the monarch as an individual, as it was held to be in the feudal era) *is* religious in the sense that it is the realisation of divine will on earth, and through citizenship and responsible civic consciousness the state's subjects partake in the plot of history in keeping with divine will. The romantic notion of 'innocence,' therefore, bears within it a moral vanity and selfishness which makes it akin to the kind of 'poor man's virtue' already referred to above, which heroicises the acquiescence to the .... of those who have no alternative. The element of reluctance in this 'virtue,' its character of being imposed, underscores the fact that it is inherently subversive of the state and that it is thus sinful, because it tends to offend the divine purpose.

Apart from this argument, which rests upon inferences about how the divine purpose is realised on earth, a purely logical argument also points to the moral inadequacy of 'innocence.' This is so because the ability of human beings to reason and to be conscious of themselves sets them apart from nature, and it therefore compels them to make this ominous choice between 'innocence,' as a state of unity with nature, on the one hand,[cxxi] and 'culture' on the other hand. (It is a hypothetical choice in Hegel's reasoning, as he does not conceive of an alternative to the state as a form of organisation among humans; however, the choice which presents itself to the individual, though it is not real, is not therefore any less ominous in the individual's subjective perception.) Hegel argues that innocence is an illusory condition for human beings. Like morality, it can only be partly attained because human self-realisation becomes meaningful only in the context of a public world.[cxxii] But is is here where a contradiction in the assumption of human innocence becomes apparent: 'Innocence' derives its normative value only from the discourse by which meaning is conveyed in the world of 'culture,' but the world of 'culture' cannot provide the conditions for the state of 'innocence,' as this can exist only in nature from which the world of 'culture' is set apart both logically and by practical necessity. As Hegel reasons that human beings are compelled to organise themselves politically, and as he advocates the state as the form of political organisation which satisfies both temporal and eternal aspirations, religious probity for individuals necessarily consists in responsible civic

consciousness and in the striving for the judgement that - as citizens - they need in order to distinguish between good and evil and hence to achieve genuine moral insight.

2.6   Gender and Power

2.6.1   The French Revolution as a Reaffirmation of the Patriarchal Order

Before the background of the quest for an extension of the franchise to which the French Revolution is a historical monument, and in the light of the experience that the erosion of the social boundaries between the Three Estates was the condition which allowed an amorphous mob to emerge and to bring down a reformist and beneficent monarch, the concepts of exclusion and hierarchy as factors in the creation of political privileges assume a new intellectual appeal. Even if, as time passes, many privileges come to be proved illegitimate (and this observation may support the argument that privileges as such are illegitimate) their inherent divisiveness may on occasion be a fruitful stimulus which warrants their toleration by those who are excluded. Perhaps, after the bourgeoisie had been assimilated into the ruling class, women provided a substitute image of 'the ruled' and, as such, they could help to preserve for the political elite its sense - after which it has always hankered - of being ordained for its role by its inherent qualities. In short, when the class hierarchy had become discredited, the gender hierarchy, ancient though it was already then, took on a new political taint that was a characteristic element of the Enlightenment's bequest. And through Hegel's reading of **Antigone** the political foundation of this hierarchy was transformed from one of expediency to one of necessity. For Hegel saw his paradigm of diremption as extending also to the physical characteristics of human beings and as extending *from* these characteristics, in turn, to different perspectives of the world, subjective and objective. The hard reality of a world of culture is that of the man; the inner reality of a world of faith and insight is that of the woman.[cxxiii] While both realities may be experienced by men and women, each is made - or (as one might say in contemporary sociological parlance) *constructed* and *represented* by only one gender. The woman's medium of 'construction' and 'representation' is, as has been noted before, *love,* and

this entails an obligation to cultivate and to protect the physical bonds of *blood;* the man's currency of interpretation, on the other hand, is *law,* and to this corresponds his role in the creation and maintenance of *rationalistic relationships between citizens* (as opposed to emotional relationships between relatives), which are patterned by the abstract images of culture. The woman's sphere is the *intimate* realm of the family, and the man's sphere is the *social* realm of the state; her virtue is in attending to and in partaking in the essentially *private* moments in the life of a *man* - birth, conception, death and burial - and to be *his* ally and alibi in these critical moments of virtual humiliation which his vulnerable dependence on nature on these occasions portends, and she has to do so by forfeiting her own glory for the benefit of his. The woman, therefore, has to excel by not excelling, whereas for a man to excel inconspicuously is not to excel at all.[49] A woman's virtue lies in not claiming credit for her contributions to a man's achievements, and this virtue brings her close to being truly moral. But this kind of morality must of course be an essentially female attribute, and when it becomes the object of vanity it ceases to serve the public cause of civil society.

These contrasts have helped to lay a basis for further dichotomous associations which are understood to correspond to female and male respectively, namely night and day, life and death, procreation and war. Whereas the suggested correspondence of night and day to female and male seems unproblematic before the background provided above, the correlation of the other two pairs to female and male and also to each other is more intriguing. It is intriguing because it hints at the extent to which procreation and war are *sublated* by their eventual effects. In regard to procreation this is relatively obvious, but the regenerative quality of war, too, can be profoundly argued.[50] In the present context of the conceptual opposition of female

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[49]   cf. the long quotation from Loraux, Nicole, **Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman,** Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1987, pages two and seventy in Appendix Seven

[50]   A classical rendering of this argument in fiction is reproduced in Appendix Eight, and it is as such implied testimony to the recognition *in antiquity* of the cathartic powers of war, whereas the vitality of the same sentiments *in the Enlightenment* has found an outlet for example in the philosophical

and male, however, these observations corroborate Hegel's position (in which he found himself supported by **Antigone)** that '[n]ature, not the accident of circumstance or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other law; or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves an individual existence and actualise themselves in the two sexes.'cxxiv

Although in the special circumstances of birth, conception, death and burial, the functions of women and men become literally and symbolically fused, the exceptional nature of these moments in a man's life and their inherently unpolitical character - which is only *made* political by Antigone's 'uncivilised' conduct in Sophocles's play[51] - tend to validate the fundamental understanding that the biological differences between women and men are compellingly reflected also in their *political behaviour* and hence furnish the state with a logical basis for differential policies towards women and men.[52] Although Hegel's argument on gender roles in civil society is not historical, it is of course once again the historical parallel between ancient Greece and the Enlightenment, in this case in regard to the political status of

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discourse of Kant and Nietzsche, who have formulated similar ideas in persuasive words; cf. also the note . . . on page . . . [on rooting swine].

[51]   'In Plato's **Laws,** childhood and youth are the uncivilised part of life, which one must adapt by directing its strength toward the service of society as a whole.' (Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, **The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1986, page five; cf. page . . . [above])

[52]   The Greek city, that men's club, had included in its catalogue of opposites an exclusively feminine kingdom, that of the Amazons. Aristotle compares the domination of the soul over the body to that of the master over the slave, humans over animals, and the male over the female, and writes, moreover, 'even a woman or a slave can be good, although the woman is for the most part an inferior being, and the slave entirely so.' (Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, **The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1986, page five)

women, which enabled him to show that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were, after all, less revolutionary than they were generally portrayed and perceived.

2.6.2 Antigone and Creon as Transsexuals

Fallacious reasoning can be politically effective. On the other hand, it may not bear critical scrutiny as well as statements which are entirely absurd, such as some which are true by definition only, for example: 'Those who survive are the fittest' (the surprisingly resilient Spencer / Darwin ideology) and 'Orientals do not have the same qualities as Europeans.'[cxxv] These 'scripts,' which are characteristic of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century respectively, have their parallel in ancient Greece in the roles that were then assigned to women and men. At that time, people could either play the part that was appropriate to their sex, or they could play the part of the other sex. Thus it was possible in Thebes to determine a person's sex not only biologically but also *politically.*[53] Of course, this scheme did not resolve the contradiction that arose when a person's behaviour and sex did not correspond, but at least it ensured that such instances did not sap the vitality of the prevailing patriarchal ideology. And from the contrast between Sophocles's portrayal, conveyed through Creon, of Antigone's public stance on the burial of Polynices as an improper aberration from the behaviour fitting for her sex, and his portrayal of Creon as culpable in ways which were not expressly gender-specific, one may perhaps infer that Sophocles himself was not free from the influence of the predominant patriarchal worldview of his age. Creon certainly had no difficulty in reimposing and enforcing the patriarchal ideology and hence in containing Antigone *politically:* 'Waste no more time, slaves; take them [Ismene and Antigone] *inside.[*[54] From now on *they must be women,* and *not let loose.*'[cxxvi] Creon had this power at his disposal,

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[53]   The concept of 'gender' was apparently not yet at hand to reconcile the potential conflict between the criteria of biology and politics.

[54]   'A woman was allowed no accomplishment beyond leading an exemplary existence, *quietly* [emphasis added] as wife and mother alongside a man who lived the life of a citizen.' (see content note

however, only because established patterns concerning the political functions of women and men were not *generally* in doubt. Corroboration of this point may be seen in the 'exemplary' conduct of Ismene,[cxxvii] and it may also be seen, more powerfully, in that aspect of Thebes's cultural heritage which is pointed out by the chorus and which emphasises that 'neither wealth nor war can escape'[cxxviii] 'the power of fate'[cxxix] - which, to Hegel, 'is that which is stripped of thought, of the concept . . . [and] . . . in which justice and injustice disappear in abstraction'[cxxx] - as it also manifests itself in the accident of one's sex: Even a goddess may hence be rightfully 'assailed'[cxxxi] when she has violated the patriarchal order. Antigone's aspiration, therefore, to be of similar standing as a goddess is futile in any event, whereas, before this background, her aspiration to be heard alongside the king on equal terms are regarded as vain and vexing by Creon and his *confidantes* (and this sentiment also informed the order that Ismene and Antigone 'must be women').

From Antigone's perspective (which may in some ways be akin to a modern enlightened woman's perspective), however, the charge that she arrogantly presumed that what was proper for other women did not apply to her had no basis. The root of her predicament was that in the sexist political conventions of her time the probity of a woman was established by her record of *not* 'acting in defiance of the citizens.'[cxxxii] Antigone could have experienced herself as a sovereign person, as a *quasi*-citizen, only if her sentiments had concurred with those that had the approval of the political establishment. But Antigone's action of burying Polynices was one of 'translation . . . from "the night of possibility into the day of presentness,"'[cxxxiii] by which she ventured beyond the accepted boundaries of her gender. Although she could hardly have realised the essence of her womanliness more purely than in the love for her brother, because only this form of love - unlike the love for a husband - allows her to be a woman *by herself* and not *to a man,* in expressing this love for her brother she ceased to be a woman 'politically,' and she was hence not permitted to be one 'biologically:' She was treated as someone who was 'insane,' who was inhabited by a 'fierce spirit,' and who could

therefore neither be a woman in another important way - as a marriage partner - nor, indeed, be at all 'in the city,' as is symbolised by her ultimate entombment outside the walls of Thebes. - Of course, on the subject of Antigone's fitness for marriage one may also note the frequent references to her in the play as a 'child' and as a 'girl,' although these references are more significant in so far as they may be intended as a contrast to the possible image of Antigone as an 'unhappy virgin raised by her courage above her sex.'[cxxxiv] If Antigone is not dependent as a woman, like Ismene, then she must be dependent as a 'child' - in terms both of her age and of her being Creon's charge, since his brother, her father, has died - and again she cannot be a woman.[55] Ironically, Creon himself is not regarded as a man by the blind prophet Tiresias, to whom Creon's presumption to righteousness is as vexing as Antigone's is to Creon and who, by referring to Creon as 'my son,'[cxxxv] turns around Creon's argument to Antigone, namely that sexual maturity is a test of political maturity.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

CREON: 'It seems . . . [Haemon] . . . is fighting on the woman's side.'

HAEMON: '*If you are a woman.* It is you that I care for.'[cxxxvi]

Sophocles, **Antigone**

One cannot help but sense a contradiction in the evident preoccupation of Greek Tragedy with women in the light of their - alleged or actual - inferiority *vis-à-vis* men, whether inherent, such as their relative physical weakness (though this, too, is open to question), or

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[55]   '[T]o be a woman in the city is to be set in a range of *dependent* relationships.' (Goldhill, Simon, **Reading Greek Tragedy,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, page ninety one, emphasis added)

man-made, such as the political arrangements by which women were subjugated to the will of men. In a Foucaultian vein one might suggest that the extraordinary amount of mental energy that was invested in classical Greece in the *circumscription* of women's roles testifies to a *potency* of the female sex that men vainly sought to *control* and, through control, to acquire. The volume of attention accorded to women does indeed encourage definitions of 'manliness' in Greek society which are yielded by a method of elimination or contrasting - definitions, in other words, which designate as 'manly' that which is not 'womanly.' Perhaps the myth of manliness was also nourished by the intangibility of the very concept, which partly resulted from the circumstance that its meaning had been tested to a lesser extent by literary, scholarly and popular reflection than the meaning of 'womanliness.' - On what grounds, then, might one assert that Creon was not 'manly?' As in the case of Antigone, the answer to this question has two components, as it is concerned with Creon's 'unmanliness' by choice or default on the one hand, and on the other hand with his 'unmanliness' in consequence of his objective inability to conform to public expectations in a unique situation which cannot be evaluated in terms of established criteria.

The image of manliness that is implied in the above-quoted dialogue between Haemon and Creon is that which is associated with political responsibility and wisdom. In ancient Greece authority in the state was a derivative of authority in the family. The latter traditionally rested in the man on account of his normally greater age (and his hence greater assumed maturity) than that of this wife and his stronger physique, with which - in turn - his duty to protect his family was connected, and the fulfilment of this duty, too, strengthened his claim to greater authority. The man's military duty to the state is an extension of his duty of protection to the family, and although the family and the state are not comparable in their function, there are some parallels in their structure and their manner of operation; through these parallels the *political* significance of manliness is established. In both the family and the state there exists a kind of reciprocity, albeit an inequitable one, between - respectively - the family and its head, and the citizens and the king. Creon's 'unmanliness,' therefore is not only a superficial one that is evident in his 'vanity' of 'on no account [wishing to be] beaten by a woman . . . [and to] . . . be called [along with his *confidantes] women's* inferiors'[cxxxvii] (a trait which, in any case, is

only subjectively ascribed to women and which is therefore debatable as to its effeminacy), but also a profound and uncontestable one that follows from his breaking out of the essential reciprocity between himself and both the citizens[cxxxviii] and his family (which are conjointly symbolised by Haemon). By acting in this way Creon shows himself to be not so much effeminate but rather, like Antigone, eerily androgynous.

The notion of wisdom is another facet of Creon's role that bears on his example of manliness. Whereas in Greek society a man's presumed greater physical powers pre-ordained him for those public roles that entailed the use of armoury (whether for military purposes or for hunting purposes) as the physical symbols of *might,* the legitimacy of the imposition of his *judgement* on the affairs of the state was logically derived from his greatest maturity, in terms of age, within the family (since, by convention, men were older than their wives). But in the confrontation between Haemon and Creon it is suggested that greater wisdom need not invariably be a feature of greater age: 'CREON: "Shall men of my age be taught wisdom by one of his?" - HAEMON: "Nothing that is not right; and if I am young, you should consider my actions, not my age."'[cxxxix] Here again - as already previously, when he decreed the penalty for the burial of Polynices - Creon does have the opportunity to let the evidence of public benefit vindicate his standpoint that underlies his pronouncements - in the form of a law on the posthumous punishment of traitors earlier, and now in the form of an axiom on the relationship between wisdom and age. On both occasions the chorus, as the symbol of public scrutiny, is ready to back Creon's judgement and so to lend weight to it. However, on both occasions Creon, by his own inconsistent reasoning and conduct, reveals that his position on treason, and on wisdom and age, while it can be plausibly based on judgement *in general,* is based on his personal vanity in those particular instances in which it falls on him to rule and to lead. Just as the discrepancy between Creon's pretended and actual motives in his instructions on the treatment of Antigone gives away the hollowness of his qualification to rule, so, again, his dismissiveness of the aged Tiresias later undermines his claim to respect on account of his age. In each case the basis on which the people support the king is further eroded and with it, in this instance, are also eroded the popular faith in the connection between age and wisdom, and, by extension, in the entire edifice in which age, wisdom and manliness are correlated. From the

Hegelian viewpoint, this collective experience of the need for the modification of firmly held assumptions is a stimulus to progress - here in the direction of basing qualification to rule on a more solid foundation than manliness, which has in this analysis been shown to have no cogent basis itself. (And yet, ironically, the *myth* of manliness may have contributed to the longevity of this criterion for qualification to rule, for

> Bourdieu, the highly influential theoretical anthropologist, has argued that a stable society continues on its course precisely by *not recognising* the arbitrary limits and organisation of its own system of beliefs, which it determines as 'natural' and 'proper.' For Bourdieu, the establishment of what is thought [to be] 'natural' in each culture depends on such 'misrecognition' - which is how he terms the working of the unquestioned organisation of ideas [which are] inherent in a culture's attitudes and assumptions.[cxl])

3.   Dimensions of Death and Burial

3.1   The Compensations of Culture for the Ignominy of Death

[I]t is our common lot to die, and the gods themselves cannot rescue even one they love, when Death that stretches all men out lays its read hand upon him.[cxli]

Athene to Telemachus in Homer, **The Odyssey**

At Sophocles's time both folklore and language reflected the character of death as an experience that was *sui generis,* since as an event that affected the individual, the family and the state *differently* it defied straightforward conceptualisation. The contradictory circumstance, moreover, that the 'dread hand of Death' was beyond the power of the gods while it was itself a power of the 'beyond,' personified in the figure of Hades, contributed to this mystification, and so did also the imagery of the earth which made it at once an element of nature, a divine *symbol* and a god in itself.[56] Before this background it may be understood that the trauma of death was political in so far as it 'struck'[cxlii] at those pivotal concepts of culture and of civil society on which the *polis* was founded and to which ideology, as a kind of 'pragmatic religion,' attached itself. Each occurrence of death compelled the living to re-engage in the conceptualisation of the fundamental categories of death and life, nature and

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[56]   'CHORUS: " . . . the oldest of the gods, Earth the immortal, the untiring . . . "' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page forty nine); ' . . . the imperishable elementary individual, the earth . . . ' (Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit by G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 552)

culture, the 'here' and the 'beyond,' the present and divine truth, out of which citizens constructed the temporal justification for their rule. Definitional boundaries, therefore, that - having been negated by the universality of death - were threatened with erasure (and this image is analogous to the image of putrefaction that is applied to the process of the interaction between the elements, wild animals and evil spirits with human flesh after it has become separated from the bones) had to be newly raised in this process of conceptualisation lest the ideas that were confined within them should have escaped into general meaninglessness. And so the ritual significance of death lay in the *pretext* which it availed to society for a periodic reaffirmation of its fundamental values: As these *failed* to escape their ideological-definitional confines, the *polis* - both its inspiration and its manifestation - also 'failed' to suffer 'annihilation'[cxliii] 'in the dread name of Cruelty, of bloodthirsty Terror,'[cxliv] which were akin to 'unconscious appetites'[cxlv] and which, like these, destroyed culture. As much as the intense interaction[cxlvi] among the living that followed upon a relative's and citizen's departure functioned to channel emotional and political reflections on the event into established grooves, so that the ideological matrix was not obliterated, so the mound on the grave of one who had been loved by his family and who had been respected by his fellow citizens served as a stable representation of that which was undergoing the process of erosion,[57] namely the corpse of the deceased, which in life had contained the soul and the intellect and which had thereby in its turn been a 'stable' representation of another evanescent phenomenon - culture.

If it were true, therefore, that '[w]hen you're dead you're dead, and that's the end of you'[cxlvii] **Antigone** would have been bereft of a plot. But it is true, of course, only (and even this is arguable) for a person's organic shell. A person's mind and soul - which distinguishes him from the animals and which empowers him to erect his own, separate realm of 'culture' - does not die an organic death, yet, being tied through his body to nature, it has its period of active participation in the polity confined by the physical life-cycle. In that death thus

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[57]   S. C. Humphreys (see Bibliography) observes, emphasis added, 'the transformation of the decaying cadaver into a *stable* material representation of the dead (mummy, skeleton, ashes, tomb, monument, ancestral tablet, etc.)' as one object of burial.

concentrates in one moment the memories of a deceased's civic (that is, *cultural)* role in life it becomes a monument to him. A person's body dies, but his intellect and personality live on, and this mixed bequest of a deceased - pollution from his corpse but a memory of his share of action in the city's political life - presents itself to the afterworld as a contradictory imperative. As the corpse is perceived to be unclean it must be disposed of according to established rules which correspond to the particular nature of this uncleanness as it was differently perceived at different periods; but a person's memory, in contrast, must be revered, and in death a deceased thus has a more assured claim to being favourably acknowledged than in life. The former is a *duty* which falls to the family on account of its intermediary role between nature and culture, the latter is a *convention* which the state has *made* political. Since in ancient Greece only men had an acknowledged civic role, the public dimension of death is logically also a male dimension. And the exceptional nature of birth, procreation, death and burial in a *man's* life has already been pointed out above. They are 'the critical points of human life . . . when *man* is more exposed than at other times to the attacks of "power" or "the powers"[cxlviii] and which therefore are windows of vulnerability for the popular conception of manliness and for the patriarchal ideology which it supports. Only by giving these special events a taboo status, therefore, can their subversive character be managed.

Death is doubly taboo for it haunts not only manliness but citizenship as well. In as much as death renders '[t]he dead . . . [*man]* . . . an empty singular . . . at the mercy of every lower irrational individuality and the forces of abstract material elements, *all of which are now more powerful than himself [(]the former on account of the* life *they possess, the latter on account of their negative nature[)],*[cxlix] and thus obliterates one of the attributes, manliness, on which he rested his claim to political power in life, so death also makes 'all equal,' in terms of their political status, in another way. In death, namely, a deceased returns into the *private* sphere of the family, and he thereby forgoes the distinction of citizenship. And it is on this ground that death - as a feature of human experience which, like procreation, straddles the seam between nature and culture - is properly in the realm of the family. However, whereas the ultimate benefit to the state of supplying it with soldiers is merely *contingent* to procreation and

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hence admits of its conceptualisation as essentially private, death cannot be so neatly associated with *either* the state *or* the family.

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The theme of death in **Antigone** helps to define the foundations of both duty and convention, and it tests the justification of each to claim priority over the other. While the death of Polynices initially provides the pretext for a statement of the principal positions on behalf of the family and the state - of nature and culture - further reflections on it, and on aspects of death as punishment, mercy, sacrifice, absolution or prize, subsequently reveal the rich nuances of a predicament that as much breaks Antigone and Creon in their traditional roles as conscientious agents of the family and the state respectively as it portrays the formidable nature of the challenge to which they, and especially Antigone, aspire to rise - the challenge of attaining in their own person the synthesis of the partial forces which they represent with those which their gender compels them to oppose. Had either of them succeeded, then this potential synthesis of divine and human, day and night, family and state, nature and culture within Antigone *or* Creon could not have been what Hegel had meant it to be, but in *failing,* Antigone *and* Creon convey a sense of the sublime philosophical destiny which no individual can realise by himself but to which all can progress within an ideal political system where 'political liberty and religious faith [are] concordant.'[cl58]

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[58]   '[Antigone's] "ethical superiority," in respect of immediacy, of the primal character and purity of familial-feminine law, must both be made manifest *and* [be] destroyed by the law of the state.' (Lukacs, G., **Der Junge Hegel,** page 494, quoted in Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page thirty eight, emphasis added)

3.2 The Alliance of War and Hades

3.2.1 <u>Burial and Citizenship</u>

The idea that 'in death we are all equal' is a sentiment which had to be taboo not only in antiquity but also in Hegel's day, because it makes a mockery of the genuine political progress which the Enlightenment has foreboded (and which Hegel considered to have already been realised by the '"happy people" of <u>Periclean Athens</u>').[cli] For although we perceive our modern notion of citizenship to be most evidently rooted in the egalitarian sentiments which precipitated the fall of the Three Estates system in France, and while, in particular, we consider the principle of equality before the law as the most fundamental hallmark of citizenship, it is in the custom of burial, by a different thread, and somewhat more tangibly, connected to the ancient world of <u>Hellas</u>. In so far as the Enlightenment-inspired egalitarianism of 1789 nurtured the aspiration to equality before the law (an ideal which even after two hundred years of manipulation has not become an impotent <u>stereotype</u>) and to its practical implementation by way of a uniform citizenship, so did burial at Sophocles's time signify and, beyond that, effectively seal full membership of the community.[clii] By substituting a transformed and enlarged elite with a broader political base for the established elite, which - on account of demographic, <u>fiscal</u> and other trends - could no longer be kept in power by its too narrow political base, Louis XVI's government shifted lines of demarcation within France in order to safeguard the country's military vigour in an itself changed international setting, instead of allowing it to be consumed by internal discontent. But the bourgeois nationalism which thus replaced aristocratic elitism nonetheless still had in common with it the principle of exclusiveness, and in both the fifth century before Christ and the eighteenth century egalitarianism and exclusiveness were two sides of the same coin, a circumstance which is of course concealed by the different emphases which were given to these two aspects in the two periods.

It was thus the increase in the complexity of European societies in the millennia after Sophocles's generation which eroded the progressive *ancient* image of citizenship, because while the practice *then* of granting it to all men on account of their potential or actual role in the military consolidation of the *polis* (in which alone citizenship was meaningful ['CREON: " . . . it is our country that preserves us, and it is only while she remains upright, as we sail upon her, that we make our friends.'"[cliii]]) made citizenship appear not only as a *quasi*-right but as a right that was *universal* too (since the exclusion of women and slaves did not then attract effective critical attention), it was all the same already a *de jure* distinction at that time. However, it was only in absolutist France where the character of citizenship as a privilege became glaring, because there the continued application of the inherited ancient criterion of military qualification for citizenship had created the *noblesse d'épée,* an *estate* to which admission was gained only by a favour of the king. This modern development, therefore, had degenerated and mutated the *ancient* egalitarian impulse to such an extent that it furthered an opposite effect, and the egalitarian sentiment thus had to be reinvigorated with a new stimulus, a new aspiration. The aforementioned concept of *equality before the law* served this end.

And the notion of honour, too, had been caricatured by the *noblesse d'épée* in the manner of its ultimately arbitrary and parasitic existence. Yet, although an abstract idea may be distorted in practice, it is still possible to discern the continuity of its inspiration: hence the idea that honour may arise from a favour of the king is already suggested, in **Antigone,** in the chorus's acknowledgement of Creon's prerogative 'to apply any law, both for the dead and for . . . [those] . . . who live,'[cliv] while the egalitarian *principle* of equality before the law is likewise already present in the Greek *polis* in the state's involvement in the burial of its citizens *as a matter of course* (and the notion of honour arises not from the state's involvement *per se* but from the variations in the details of this involvement).

3.2.2 Death as a Synthesis of Nature and Culture

The relative geographical compactness of the ancient Greek city states, combined with the greater frequency of military confrontation in their age,[clv] a larger number of adversaries

(not in terms of individual soldiers confronting a state but in terms of 'fronts' of armies commanded by different hostile governments) and the less varied structure of their societies, ensured that the differentiation of warriors *from* other groups of society had a more immediate and a more patently evident significance to the survival of the state than the differentiation *between* other groups in Greek society. And the connection between the *vital* service which warriors provided to the state and the common *loss* of their own life in battle deflected from the death of soldiers the sentiment of pity which the death of others before the 'due term of . . . [their] . . . life . . . [had] . . . come'[clvi] generally attracted.[59] Instead, the death of soldiers was seen as a sacrifice of individuals for the state; it was seen as a sacrifice which mirrored in the life of a citizen the exceptional nature of war in the history of a state. Hence such 'public' death was imbued with that political connotation which made the link between burial and citizenship not only still more manifest but which, beyond this, compelled the state to further elevate its fallen soldiers in the esteem of the population and especially in the esteem of those who were yet to fight in future battles. (And to this idea of elevation in death corresponds Hegel's notion of the political necessity of demotion in life that is given, in peace-time, in the government's periodical need to reassert the communal spirit by 'shak[ing] . . . to their core by war'[clvii]

> those systems which tend to isolate themselves . . . and . . . [which] . . .
> thereby [threaten to] break . . . up the whole . . . . By this means [Hegel added]
> the government upsets their established order, and . . . [makes] . . . individuals .
> . . to feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death.[clviii])

It was thus that the link between burial and citizenship - a profound link, certainly, but one which did not *by itself* inspire the popular mind - came to be extended from citizenship to honour and that in this form it invited cultivation and reinforcement by the state by way of the posthumous bestowal of prestige on its battle dead. No custom was more suited to combine this

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[59]   At no period in Greek history are those who die defending their country counted among the *aôroi,[⎯]* doubtless so as not to discourage the virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice.' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page seventy seven)

political function with its already established religiously symbolic significance than *burial,* since burial, while affirming on the one hand the deference of the living to the gods of the nether world, on the other hand provided a distinct territorial and temporal focus (that is, the grave and the funeral respectively) which upheld the memory of mortals. Burial therefore momentarily permits the negation of its own 'critical'[clix] nature in the experience of human beings in that its ritualistic procedures substitute in the perception of the mourners positive images of new vigour, glory, homecoming, and so on, for the confrontation with the incisive and final character of death. Through the agencies of politics and the manipulation of ritual, death is thus transformed from a fate to be anticipated with awe to a moment of wonder in which those who, like Eteocles, died fighting for the *polis* are exalted to the status of heroes, who in Greek mythology are (almost) god-like and hence immortal, not dead. And obviously the image of death as the 'universal leveller,'[clx] as a trespasser from the world of nature in the world of culture, who can be vanquished by heroes of the upper world, is an expedient *representation* of burial as an event in which the sharpness of a deceased's transition from the world of culture to the world of nature is *potentially* not just effaced but even *denied* and which institutes burial as a symbolic - yet as all the while only a *potential* - gateway to immortality. It was through the shift of emphasis from the *un*political biological circumstance of death to the sentiments that - in the form of distinctive funerary customs and the mystification of Hades - were projected onto it that notions of 'a fine death'[clxi] and 'an honourable burial' could gain the purchase on men's vain minds which they had in ancient Greece.[60] And so the popular association of burial with prestige facilitated the transformation of a folklore of death, which in its archaic character suggested closeness to the world of nature, into a *politics* of death that was firmly rooted in the world of culture; it was the worship of Hades, the purest and most consistent embodiment of the ancient Greek *cult* of the dead, which allowed both the folkloristic and the political aspects of death thus to be reconciled, for 'secondary rituals obviously increase the room for manoeuvre in those aspects of funerary rites which are concerned with renewing, reorganising and re-legitimising relations between the living.'[clxii]

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[60]   [Add Plato quotation from Morris here (see preceding reference note).]

3.2.3 The 'Critical' Nature of War in the 'Life' of a State

> [Birth, procreation, death and burial are events of an exceptional nature
> in a *man's* life. They are] the critical points of human life . . . when *man* is more
> exposed than at other times to the attacks of 'power' or 'the powers.'

> Nilsson, M. P., **A History of Greek Religion**

It is evident that these popular and institutional responses to death made death palatable to those who, with partisan valour, had pleased the king. But indeed, in as much as the respect which was posthumously shown to fallen heroes was susceptible to gradation that could be reflected in the elaborateness of a funerary ritual, and while therefore this respect could hence have made the funerary ritual an object of vain vying among those who were thus to be honoured, so these civic conventions at the same time accentuated the bleak and indiscriminate finality of death for anyone for whom it was not to be honourable; in the possibility of their omission they portended shame for the families of such persons. In that thus the collective and public response to the death of a citizen directs honour to him *independently* of the 'honour-like' reverence that accrues to him from the individual and private impulse of piety, or - in other words - in that personal sentiment is displaced by a political ceremony which is superimposed upon it and in that its energy of grief is *dirempted* into pride and shame, the possibility of doubly dishonouring a deceased, by withholding both grief and burial[61] - and indeed of 're-killing' him - is mirrored in this notion.[62] While this observation is of course significant in itself it calls for special analysis in the context of the particular setting of the

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[61] [F]or the wretched corpse of Polynices . . . Creon has proclaimed to the townsfolk that no one may lay him in a tomb or mourn for him; they must leave him unwept, unburied, a delightful treasure-house for the birds which will gaze upon him as their welcome prey. (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page twenty three)

[62] 'TIRESIAS: " . . . Where is the prowess in *rekilling* the dead?"' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 105, emphasis added)

Greek city state and before the background of Hegel's evaluation of it. In the light of the references already made to the military aspects of burial and citizenship it seems appropriate, therefore, to enquire further into the theme of war, especially so as it, at any time, is one of the major causes of death and particularly of death which is *spectacular.*

Clearly inspired by Sophocles in this too,[63] Hegel said of war that it 'is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns,'[clxiii] and in thus contrasting war to the fancies of fashion he imputed to it, by implication, a providential and divine character that is as appropriately the subject of philosophy as it is the concern of policy. In noting that war has a divine character it is important, for the moment, not to proceed with this thought in the direction of a divine *justification* of war, for although there are ideas in Hegel's philosophy which could substantiate such a case, this is not the objective of the present argument. The divine *character* of war is not a 'fact' (in the sense that Hegel's argument *establishes* it as divine) like the divine character of the state,[clxiv] but it is *suggested* by the divine character of the state that is given by the state's mandate to provide for the self-actualisation of its citizens as political beings who are independent of the world of nature and transcend it. And because the individual freedom of citizens is subsumed in the independence and autonomy of the state, which in its turn is continually 'tested . . . in its ability to maintain sovereignty *vis-à-vis* other states,'[clxv] war as the *method* of maintaining sovereignty in given historical conditions becomes providential *in fact* but divine only in character, because it is arguable whether the conditions which necessitate it, which impose it on the state from without, are of divine making. In **Antigone,** the challenges to Thebes from abroad are certainly all but divine, and only on this basis does the message of the play and of Hegel's interpretation of it stand up to scrutiny. On the basis of this exposition it is clear that the function of war - as a means of the state which specific *temporal* conditions compel it to employ - is *historical.* In this sense 'war . . . [is] . . . the necessary discipline and highest

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[63]   For War is blind, O women, blind and   eyeless,

And like rooting swine *snouts up all evils.* (Sophocles, **War,** quoted in Lucas, F. L., **Greek Drama for the Common Reader,** Chatto & Windus, London, 1967, page 225, emphasis added)

function of *citizens*, [clxvi] whose status *as citizens* is in its turn temporal because it is conditional upon their commitment to serve the state in its making of history through war (and this conception of citizenship was closer to Hegel's thinking than those newer conceptions that had their roots in the Enlightenment *ideology* to which he was opposed).

Since, in war, it was the custom to 'return . . . the bodies of one's fallen enemies on the battlefield' [clxvii] and 'to forbid burial on native soil to men convicted of treason or sacrilege,' [clxviii] the corpse of Polynices came to be a curse to Thebes and to Creon personally. The curse to Thebes arose from the circumstance that established criteria for determining Polynices's status as a citizen were vitiated by his own action. On the one hand there was the notion of hereditary citizenship which gave Polynices a claim to the citizenship of Thebes on account of his 'lineal descent from the dead,' [clxix] a claim which in his case was above challenge on this count as he was the son of Oedipus, the former king of Thebes, who himself was unquestionably descended from Cadmus, the founder of the *polis*. Polynices's entitlement to burial on the soil of Thebes was firmly grounded in these facts, and the family - as both the custodian *and* the apotheosis of the hereditary principle - had the *public* sanction and duty to give burial to its kindred and, in this, not only to reaffirm its own status as the nucleus of the political realm but also to reinforce the symbolic continuity of the line of descent. Because in the act of burial the family 'makes . . . [the deceased] . . . a member of a community which prevails over and holds under control the forces of particular material elements and the lower forms of life' [clxx] and thereby 'makes . . . [him] . . . an *imperishable* presiding part of the Family,' [clxxi] it at the same time enables the state to define the principle of lineage as an abstract concept which, as such appropriated for the world of culture, itself rises above 'the corruption of worms and of chemical agencies,' [clxxii] and which thus lends the state its timeless character that allows it to present itself as being *prior* [64] to the family; this principle hence allows the state to legitimate political - that is, *military* - demands on its offspring. However, by fighting on the enemy's side Polynices made apparent that what was at his time commonly held to be *the*

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[64] ' . . . ' (cf. Plato, quoted in Currie, H. MacL., **The Individual and the State,** Dent, London, 1973)

foundation for an entitlement to citizenship, lineal descent from the dead, was in fact neither a direct nor a complete foundation for a right to this status. The factor which intervened between lineal descent from the dead and citizenship was *proven* loyalty to the state. (The qualifications of gender and of military service, whether they were actual or potential, may be left aside in this argument about the city state of classical Greece, for it is only from a modern perspective that they are recognised as instruments of exclusion; in Sophocles's day these qualifications were too obvious to be considered as variable conditions for citizenship at all.)

But whereas this requirement for proof had hitherto been perfunctorily and symbolically satisfied with *potential* military service for the state because the bond by which society cohered was thought to be an automatic result of lineal descent from the dead, Polynices exposed this model as a fallacy. By his action Polynices punctuated the image of a logical and therefore a *necessary* connection between lineal descent from the dead and citizenship, and he simultaneously implied the possibility of acquiring citizenship without the qualification of descent. Yet neither the inadequacy of the convention nor the possibility of a departure from it are unequivocally established in the action of the play, as the confrontation between familial sentiments and abstract claims of the state, respectively tempered by impulses of piety, is not resolved, a circumstance which is symbolised initially by the 'keeping here'[clxxiii] of 'one of those below, a corpse dispossessed, dishonoured, impure,'[clxxiv] and - after Antigone had 'consign[ed Polynices] . . . solemnly to the imperishable elementary individual, the earth'[clxxv] - by the 'thrust[ing] below [of] one of those above, [the] arrogant . . . lodging [of] a living creature in a tomb.'[clxxvi] The fate of Polynices, therefore, comes to be ominous not only to himself but also to the state *in the particular senses* that it draws a parallel between the role of death in life to the role of war in politics as being both 'taboo' and that it proves fallacy to be the same to law what decomposition is to life. In the person of Polynices it is thus shown that the state as an abstract entity cannot escape the individual's experience of life as a *temporary* leasehold in the world of culture: Through Polynices war is 'inverted'[65] and nature subdues

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[65] ' . . . ' (Nederman, Cary J., 'Sovereignty, War and the Corporation: Hegel on the Medieval Foundations

culture; this 'power'[clxxvii] is duly admitted in the dread of the 'mingling' of Thebes's soil with enemy blood[66] to which Creon's prohibition of the burial of Polynices is testimony.

3.3   The Folklore of Funeral and of Sacrifice and the *Status Quo*

> CREON: 'Did . . . [the gods] . . . bury . . . [Polynices] . . . because they held him in high esteem as a benefactor - a man who came to burn their colonnaded temples, their votive offerings and their land, and to scatter its laws to the winds?'[clxxviii]
>
> Sophocles, **Antigone**

3.3.1 The Gods as the Redeemers of the State

Through the Old Testament we are familiar with the motto 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' For centuries, this biblical maxim, nowadays more commonly expressed in the secular terms *quid pro quo,* has served as a pillar of theories of obligation and retribution. It is in this function in which the idea of a reciprocity between men and gods appears also in the

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of the Modern State,' **The Journal of Politics,** 1987, page . . .)

[66]   Seven heroes, fierce leaders of armies, took a bull

And cut its throat, and caught the blood   in a black shield,

And dipped their fingers in bull's gore, and swore an oath

In the dread name of Cruelty, of   bloodthirsty Terror,

Either to annihilate the city of the   Cadmeans,

Making her land a desolation, or *to die*

And with our soil mingle their blood. (Vellacott, Philip, translator, **Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound - The Suppliants - Seven Against Thebes - The Persians,** Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1961, pages eighty nine and ninety ['Seven Against Thebes'], emphasis added)

reflections on rights and duties which permeate **Antigone** and the other works in the genre of ancient Greek tragedy. The dialogues in **Antigone** testify to the existence of an *image* of a workable and plausible *modus vivendi* between the temporal realm and the divine realm, between culture and heaven, an image which entailed notions of 'bargaining' between the one and the other, and of a *partnership,* rather than of the hierarchy which the feudal theologians of the Enlightenment era sought to popularise. Whereas this latter hierarchy model portrayed the feudal order as divinely sanctioned on the basis of the supposition that this order was in keeping with 'God's universal plan on earth . . . [and] . . . that [hence] the hierarchy of feudal relations held its authority not by any will in the present world, but by the will of God,'[clxxix] the ancient Greek conception of the nature of divine providence was tied in with the belief that the legitimacy of the political order is a dividend of its 'accreditation' to the divine edifice. Unlike for example the monarchy of Louis XVI, therefore, the *polis* in the fifth century before Christ was neither viewed as a faithful reflection of an imagined order, that 'constituted [itself as] a network of relations under God . . . [, wherein] . . . God sat on the throne that would later be brought down to earth in the form of the absolutist monarch, [(]who would of course still claim divine right[)],'[clxxx] nor as an unconditional bequest from heaven. Rather, the city states of the antiquity were more generally ruled as though they were held *in trust* under the watchful eyes of the gods, and the good fortunes of the polity symbolised the blessing of the gods in return for *good husbandry* as much as the sacrificial gestures of men and their worship of the gods' 'votive offerings' (which, in **Antigone,** Polynices had set out to defile) were in the nature not just of pious pleas for divine favour but also of oaths that affirmed the sincere intent of men in regard to their mandate in the *polis.* The ancient Greeks' understanding of their relationship with the gods was also influenced by notions - characteristic of polytheism - of precedence among the gods and of the unreliability and indeed the mischievousness of the gods, traits that had to be tempered by acts of *atonement.*[67] Before this background the immense significance

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[67]   'ANTIGONE: " . . . I did not intend, through fear of any man's will, to make *atonement* [emphasis added] before the gods for breaking *these* [original emphasis] laws. . . . "' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page fifty nine)

of burial as both a symbol and an actual instance of a reciprocal transaction between men and gods becomes apparent, because

> Greek religion ensured that . . . [burial (and the cult of the dead to which it, in turn, gave expression)] . . . *was* a reciprocal arrangement . . . [:] . . . Expectation of good accruing to the living who discharged it punctiliously combined with fear of reprisals at the hands of the dead who were neglected made the cult an act of self-interest as well as piety. By uniting these two strands, by giving the living power over the condition of the dead and the dead a measure of control over the destinies of the living, Athenian eschatology re-inforced a view of the essential and enduring nature of family ties, of the reciprocity of obligation, and of our inalienable connections with those on the other side.[clxxxi]

But although ancient Greek folk religion depicted the boundary between men and gods as higher than any obstacle that men would encounter in their worldly pursuits, the perception of this boundary in this way did not at that time contradict the parallel belief that men and gods were separated from one another by only a few generations.[clxxxii] On the contrary, while on the one hand the ideas of redemption and reciprocity depended on the existence of different parties to a relationship or transaction which were demarcated between themselves in terms of their functions and objectives, the vitality of the symbolism of separation *and continuity,* its mythological appeal, on the other hand, had its very source in the potent ambiguity in the nature of this profound boundary that was ever-present but which would nonetheless elude any attempts to locate it *precisely* between either generations, or men and gods, or both.

As has already been indicated, in the tradition of burial a sense of awe (among other sentiments) at this set of awkwardly overlapping relationships between, respectively, men and gods, and generations, indeed, possibly even a hint of premonition of the destructive volatility of their enforced but untidy superimposition was expressed. While **Antigone** of course *also* relates the unique but all the same conceivable developments that would in fact lead to a

change of paradigm in a people's interpretation of its cultural heritage, the play at once illustrates the harmony that *may* be achieved in the unity of religion and pure consciousness, as it is founded on the *diremption* of culture into historical manifestations, the *polis,* and eternal manifestations, the gods, the former created by men, yet having a divine mission, the latter mysteriously and yet indubitably existing through and for humanity. This diremption avails itself to men as a potential consolation and indeed as a compensation for the humiliation of death in that it emphasises the timelessness of the soul's existence which is in its turn assured by the soul's passage from men into the world 'beyond,' a passage that the funerary ritual captures in its imagery of 'the bosom of the earth . . . the elemental imperishable individuality[clxxxiii] to which the deceased is 'wedded'[clxxxiv] in burial and which, like the *polis,* is divine. And the wisdom which Hegel extrapolated from his analysis of political culture in the *polis* shows that the ancient notion of pollution was *abstract,* that is, pollution was the effect of an obscuration of the diremption of profane and spiritual, of the *polis* and the 'imperishable elementary individual, the earth,'[clxxxv] and this obscuration was merely *symbolised* (but not actually *effected)* by the devouring of a human corpse 'by unconscious appetites'[clxxxvi] and by its decomposition through the agency of minerals. Consequently this abstract pollution had to be prevented by the correspondingly *symbolic* prevention of putrefaction, which could be achieved even in the absence of a corpse[68] or where a corpse could not be *sufficiently* protected against 'unconscious appetites and abstract agencies.'[clxxxvii][69] In society's 'management' of death the custom of burial expresses a specifically relevant interpretation of this diremption.

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[68]   [Athene to Telemachus:] '[I]f you learn that . . . [Odysseus] . . . is dead and gone, return to your own country . . . [and] . . . build him a mound with all the proper funeral rites . . . . ' (Rieu, E. V., translator, **Homer: The Odyssey,** Book Club Associates, London, 1975, page thirty two); '[. . . t]he importance of according the dead proper burial receives further confirmation from the fact that if the body for some reason could not be recovered, a fictitious burial took place and a cenotaph . . . was erected over an empty grave . . . ' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page 102)

[69]   ' . . . ' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page . . .)

3.4   Death as a Sickness of Society

3.4.1 Insanity, Deviancy, Trauma and Decay

The significance of the characteristic ancient concept of pollution has been seriously 'polluted' by the backward projection of modern notions of pollution in which it is seen in the context of *hygiene* rather than in the context of *spiritual welfare.*[70] It was the need for the latter, the objective to conserve people's composure, their mental balance, in the face of bereavement, as well as the need to conserve the state's image of immunity to the forces of nature, rather than the end of 'waste disposal,'[71] which the funerary ritual principally served in ancient Greece. Death as a fate against which no individual was immune 'was perceived as an external force, striking in at society and shaking its very roots;'[clxxxviii] it was a wedge that split the powerful

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[70]   From the beginning of the eighteenth century the ancient norm of burying the dead outside the city walls is cited with particular approval as a wise measure of hygiene: this is the period when medical concern over burial in city churchyards and churches begins to break forth . . . . Probably in relation to the same concerns, they note that multiple burials were rare in the ancient world . . . . (Humphreys, S. C., **The Family, Women and Death: Comparative Studies,** Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983, page eighty); . . . the pollution of death is not a reflection of a hygienic rationale, but [it] 'has to do with the gradual elimination of the social status of the deceased and the effect that that has on the status and self-conception of the living . . . (Hertz, R., **Death and the Right Hand,** 1907)' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page xii); . . . [e]qually illuminating is the omission [in Sophocles'(s) **Antigone**] of any reference . . . to the necessity for burial on utilitarian, hygienic grounds . . . . (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page 103)

[71]   'Sophocles [for example] directs all our thoughts to the sheer horror of treating a human being like a carcase . . . ' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page 103); '[. . . *however,]* the corpse *itself* inspired little horror. There are few references in Greek literature to the maggots and worms with which certain Christian theologians are so engrossed.' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death,** Duckworth, London, 1985, page 122, emphasis added)

alliance between body and soul, an alliance which - while intact - could dominate nature but which *was* dominated by nature as soon as the bond of life that held it together was claimed by Hades. The fateful separation of body and soul was to Hegel a folkloristic depiction of this diremption, which supported his view of the burial practices of ancient Greece as a practical en*act*ment of it as much as a symbolic *re*-presentation of the putrefaction of the human corpse,[72] which - in undergoing decomposition as a consequence of exposure to 'unconscious appetites and abstract entities'[clxxxix] - suffers the ignominious re-conquest by nature after its separation from the soul. And this background makes plausible how the funerary ritual served a therapeutic end: In harnessing it in order to *re*-present to itself the painful reality of death, society was able to acknowledge its own Achilles heel without shame. Having so been acknowledged, society's vulnerability to death could be managed, and the *irrationality* in its fear of death, which could have traumatised the polity, was contained.

This notion of death as a *political* trauma is supported in manifold ways by ancient accounts of burial rites and of the circumstances which preceded them, as well as by records of statements that reflected popular attitudes to those who 'have no portion of the earth or of earthly things.'[cxc] The relevant testimony is not only overt in that it constitutes the actual message of such records and accounts, but it is also conveyed unwittingly in their peculiar

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[72] [F]unerary practices are central ideological practices in that they are based on the type of three-stage argument which characterises ideology: 1) they take over certain pre-cultural biological and psychological phenomena in order to *re*present them, in this case death, sorrow, pollution; 2) this *representation* then incorporates these phenomena so that they appear homogenous with legitimate authority, the main manifestation of which is fertility; 3) authority is verified by appearing natural because on the one hand it incorporates the evident processes of biology and on the other it corresponds to deeply felt emotions. Ideology feeds on the horror of death by first emphasising it then replacing it by itself. (Bloch, Maurice, **Death and the Regeneration of Life,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, page 227, original emphasis, quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek City-State,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, page thirty three, original emphasis)

terminology that was rife with allusions to conditions of incapacity which were in both nature *and duration* characteristic of sickness rather than of death. (But Antigone, true to her temperament, does not cultivate this convention of euphemising death: ' . . . I shall have to spend *more time* pleasing those below than those here; for there I shall lie *for ever . . . .*'[cxci]) At the same time the testimony shows that the function of burial rites as a therapy for the living was complemented and reinforced by the latter's conscious administration of these *as a cure.* And as a cure (and obviously not as burial rites either) they were of course not *specifically* directed at the bereaved relatives who were in charge of the funeral, but the cure *encompassed* them as much as the 'sickness' itself did: The 'patient' was not *either* the deceased *or* his surviving kin, but *both* taken together, *and* society as a whole. While the *raison d'être* for the cure was the symptom, namely the injury to a kindred, living and dead, which the strike of death has caused on a particular occasion, its rationale was the restoration of health to society overall, and *its* health was impaired not so much by the death of an individual *per se* but by the attention to his posthumous 'interests'[73] which it demanded of his kin. Through - and during - its momentary preoccupation with the memory of the deceased a kindred itself has had 'no portion of the earth or of earthly things,' and therefore, while it was engaged in funerary folklore, it was in a special circumscribed relationship with the rest of society. Shortlived as this relationship was, it signified that from the perspective of the polity the mourners were part of both the symptom of death and its cure. As a therapy, therefore, ancient Greek funerary customs owed some of their effectiveness to the fact that they were not perceived *as* therapy for themselves by the mourners on whom the duty of burial fell, but - rather - as a pious farewell to the deceased, while *as a cure* they operated *for the polity;* the mourners were the *agents* of the cure (and its beneficiaries only *indirectly)* as they responded to the power of death and purged it from their midst.

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[73] The questions of whether these are honours accorded by convention or rights, and whether they are temporal or spiritual in nature, are too complex to be addressed here.

In **Antigone,** however, the 'sickness perspective' on death is ominously inflected in ways to which inherited conventions are not appropriate. Whereas, in the mythological ideal, it is the family which isolates the sickness of death from the state and which is in this process itself temporarily infected by it, at least in the imagery of the ritual, and whereas this model also serves to distinguish the ignominy of death *through* sickness - which, in antiquity, included insanity and old age[74] - from the glory of a departure in the service of the state, the death of Polynices, though inglorious, did not infect *his* family, that is, Antigone.[75] She was not 'struck down with deadly sickness,'[cxcii] and this was the case not only because she was condemned to die 'before the due term of . . . [her] . . . life ha[d] . . . come'[cxciii] (and the herein suggested possibility of an association between sickness and 'the due term of life' is intriguing here), but also because, in placing loyalty to Polynices above her loyalty to Thebes, she denied the funeral its public ceremonial-*ideological* function, and she thus established it, at least for the unique occasion of Polynices's burial, as an act of piety that exists on its own account. And as something that exists on its own account it cannot be a sickness (or a symptom or representation of sickness), but only - in the context of Antigone's challenge to Creon - a

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[74] 'CHORUS [to Creon]: "To us, unless we have been tricked by age, you seem to be speaking wisely in what you say."' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page seventy seven)

[75] One might argue, somewhat tenuously, that Ismene represented accepted norms and accordingly *was* infected and that this can be deduced from Creon's initial spontaneous suspicion and condemnation of her - and of Antigone - but since, as is shown below, Creon *himself* was infected by the sickness that ran in the family, his suspicion and condemnation of Antigone is, in a twisted way, a certificate of health for her. And as the '*wounded*-ness' of soldiers, too, was awkward in the context of glory and of the individual's dedication to the public purpose, it had no *political* impact either; it was, like insanity and old age, assigned to the *inconspicuous* care of the family, for '[t]he hero who died well had to look well in death . . . ' (cf. the references in Humphreys, S. C., **The Family, Women and Death: Comparative Studies,** Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983, page 145, to the discussion of <u>Tyrtaios</u>'[s] Fragment Ten in West, M. L., **Iambi et Elegi Graeci, Volume I and Volume II,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971).

'mode of health,' distinct from the normative idea of health which the state propagates. Hence, unlike in other burials, in the burial of Polynices it is not only the case that the family is *not* infected, but is is also the case that the state *is* infected. The burial of Polynices does not serve the state as an elixir of immunisation against *its* death because, in the unprecedented circumstances, it assumes this function, exceptionally, for the *family,* and the state is infected because the traditional panacea *fails* to work for it here *and* it at once invigorates, rather than pollutes, its internal foe - the family.

On the face of it, therefore, the prohibition of the burial of Polynices's corpse is a rational and essential act of self-preservation on the part of Thebes. The transgression of the king's law to this effect, however, is more than just a crime which, also for the end of self-preservation, requires retribution to undo its consequence, but it is also an act of insanity. But it is an act of insanity, of course, only *by definition,* because it is the model in which the state is prior to the family and in which in the state's will the individual wills of its citizens are subsumed, which allows Antigone's action so to be 'diagnosed' and portrayed. Such a *political* diagnosis and portrayal of a citizen's condition obviously serves the state as an alternative to its *defences* of prohibition and punishment which have already failed, and hence it need not be *medically* correct. In other words, in branding Antigone 'insane,' Creon equivocates insanity and *deviancy,* because he cannot call Antigone's deviancy by its proper name as this would allow Antigone's behaviour to be popularly perceived as having an equally rational foundation as the state's policy.

Antigone is certainly deviant, but in regard to the subject of insanity, if it is fair at all to apply this perspective, it has to be observed that Antigone is not alone in her kindred to be affected by this condition. Creon is made to observe that *the two sisters* appear to be insane: 'One of these girls, I think, has just shown herself insane, and the other has been so since birth.'[cxciv] Antigone, however, notes her conception in an 'incestuous embrace,'[cxcv] and Ismene points out how the peril of their fate has been passed on to them from the previous generation:

Alas! Think, sister, how our father perished, shunned and despised, when he had been driven by crimes that he himself discovered to strike his own two eyes with a self-punishing hand. Then his sister and wife, two names in one,[76] destroyed her life with a twisted noose. Thirdly our two brothers on one day, each miserably slaying his own kin, with hands raised against one another brought about their mutual death. And now, consider how we two, left all alone, shall come to the worst end of all . . . .[cxcvi]

The herein implied analysis is that the root of their present malaise lies in the sinful bond between their parents, and the insanity that springs from it is a symptom of the destruction of the principle of generational succession in time by the marriage between mother and son. And, tellingly, the thus mutilated system of heredity manifests itself, above all, in the insanity and eventual annihilation of *Creon* (which is made all the more painful to him by his apparent 'condemnation to *life*'[77]). On the one hand Creon is motivated to subscribe to the hereditary principle by frivolous vanity, and in accepting Eteocles treacherous bequest on this basis he makes himself guilty *vis-à-vis* Polynices as much as Eteocles himself had been. On the other hand, before the background of the defacement by Oedipus and Jocasta of the *notion* of hereditary lineage, Creon's claim to the crown because of his 'closeness of kinship to the

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[76]   Jocasta was Oedipus's *mother* and wife, and the sister of Creon, who inherited the crown from Eteocles.

[77]   CREON: *Aiai aiai,* [original emphasis] my spirit leaps with fear! Why has someone not struck me on the heart with a two-edged sword? Miserable that I am, *aiai,* [original emphasis] and steeped in miserable anguish! . . . . Let it come, let it come, let it appear, that fairest of fates for me, which brings my last day. Let it come, supreme fate, that I may never look upon another dawn. - CHORUS: *These things lie in the future.* [emphasis added] . . . (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: __Antigone,__** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, pages 129 and 131)

dead'[cxcvii] has no legitimating precedent in the immediate past, and it is hence rightly challenged by Antigone:

> O Theban land, city of my fathers, and o my ancestral gods, they are taking me away; the time has come. Lords of Thebes, behold me, *sole remnant*[78] of your royal house; behold how I am treated, and *by what manner of men,* for doing reverence where reverence was due.[cxcviii]

Consequently, on the basis of Antigone's argument, Creon's usurpation of power is all but wilful. The isolation from the state of its overt challengers, Polynices and Antigone, is therefore futile because it cannot remedy the disease which has been transmitted by Oedipus and Jocasta directly to the crown - rather than to its subjects - and which brings 'grievous sickness'[cxcix] *to the city* through the 'counsel'[cc] of its insane king. As much as 'one day the bad seems good to a man when a god is leading his mind to disaster,'[cci] so only 'the bloody knife of the gods below' and the 'cleansing foot'[ccii] of the gods above may *cure* a stricken *polis* when no humanly devised panacea can work.

3.5   The Alliance of *Love* and Hades

> Love unconquered in battle, Love, despoiler of wealth; you who pass your nights on a girl's soft cheeks, who range across the seas and through shepherds' lonely dwellings; *no immortal can escape you,* nor any among short-lived men; *and your possessor runs mad.*[cciii]

> Sophocles, **Antigone**

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78   This may either be a new criterion for entitlement to royal succession or the only way of reconciling convention with an exceptional situation.

[I]n that absolute *exemplum* of tragedy, **Antigone[,]** . . . familial *love, the holy, the inward, belonging to inner feeling, and therefore known also as the law of the nether gods,* collides with the right of the state.[cciv]

Steiner, George, **Antigone: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought**

3.5.1 Sentiment as the Root of Reason

'[T]he gods themselves cannot rescue even one they love, when *Death* that stretches all men lays its dread hand upon him,'[ccv] and it is consistent with this that love, too, as another power of *nature,* is beyond the control of the gods. It is this common characteristic of death and love which makes the latter as subversive of the state as the former. There is indeed only a short step from insanity to love, and as love is therefore equally capable of polluting the state as death, it is not surprising that it also invites tagging with the *label* of insanity by the state when the state shores up its ideological defences against private emotions which threaten to *infect* public affairs. One can hardly conceive of a more potent 'infection' of the state than one which emanates from a *combination* of love and death, and precisely this awesome 'disease,' hatched by Antigone, brings down Thebes; once it had assumed its momentum, this perilous force could not be thwarted by Antigone's death. For the state, hence, the containment of love by and within the family is as imperative as the like containment of death. The state's purpose in ensuring the *containment* of love within the family, however, is not the *destruction* of love, because love, as the sacred treasure of the family, is the energy of Eros, which brings nature and culture together'[ccvi] and which forges out of the immediate satisfaction of this union the foundation for fraternity, political activity and philosophical thought[ccvii] - those impulses which in their turn manifest themselves in the temporal impulses of the '*actual* state.'[ccviii] The aim of the *polis,* rather, is to *manage* love, as it manages death, for the end of cultivating the image of its own perpetuity, through which it comes to be perceived as *prior* to the family. And the verisimilitude of this image, which lends the state its legitimacy, is of course the reward of procreation, the family's service to the state that is carried on by the compulsion of desire, an

instinctive force that creates life as much as other instinctive forces - 'unconscious appetites'[ccix] - extinguish its physical remnants; '[t]he family . . . puts its own action in their place,'[ccx] that is, in the place *also* of desire, which it 'weds' to the sentiment of love just as it 'weds the blood-relation to the bosom of the earth.'[ccxi]

The state's legitimacy is thus built on the halo of culture, which the family - though it does not bear it itself - confers on its offspring in the 'action' of the procreative union; and it is therefore through the intermediation of youth, when it comes of age and is admitted into citizenship or entrusted with the responsibility of carrying forward the family's role in nurturing the *nuclei* of culture, that the authority of 'culture,' on which the state bases its claim to the loyalty of its citizens, is transmitted to the *polis*. The family, in other words, transfigures the links between nature and culture in that it absorbs within itself the stigma which the state's ultimate dependence on 'unconscious appetites'[ccxii] implies for the latter, but, *also,* the family *sublates* this circumstance in that it itself 'possesses in the community its substance and enduring being.'[ccxiii] It is the timelessness of the family's function, the regularity of its reproductive activities, on which the *idea* of the state as an *organism* that is complete in itself and that obeys its own rules is modelled, and it is hence only by derivation that the state can aspire to the image of being a self-validating fixture in the firmanent of culture. The state's lease in the world of culture is grounded in the 'work' which the family does on its behalf, because it is in fact the family which, by putting its own action in the place of nature,[ccxiv] demonstrates its supremacy over unpolitical, because indiscriminate, forces. As the place which the family thus asserts *for itself* in the *political* world of culture is given up to the state,[79] 'the family [in effect] interrupts the work of nature [and] the city completes that act of

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[79]   Human law . . . *maintains* itself by . . . absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates[⁻] . . . the Family is its element . . . the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the family . . . [it] . . . dissolv[es individual] self-consciousness into the universal. (Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit** **by G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, page 287, original emphasis)

denaturation. [And t]he object of this final ethical act is not designed to form an individual, but [it] has the community and *its* law as its aim.'ccxv

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By its allegiance to divine law, and in the logic of its existence parallel to the state, the family makes the state's character as a temporal and *particular* phenomenon manifest, and it hence denies the state its potential claim to the absolute rightness of its laws. Through this conspiratorial *propensity* '[t]he family . . . [becomes] . . . the internal foe of the antique State'ccxvi (and antique is here not to be understood as an evaluative epithet but, rather, as a label denoting the fifth century before Christ[80]), and the woman, as the living symbol of the family, becomes 'the concrete embodiment of crime.'ccxvii Yet the woman has safe sanctuary within the family as the 'actual state'ccxviii is no less inherently indictable than the family.[81] But 'regardless of its degree of imperfection, a state is such only in so far as it realises in its actual historical being the Idea, or the principle, of the state,'ccxix and it is in this *endeavour,*

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[80]   Kojève,⁻ like Hegel, does not see the family as the internal foe of the *modern* state, because the modern state deprives itself by its utilitarian ideology of this potentially constructive and invigorating antagonism to which, *as proxy* of the gods of the nether world, the family was a party in antiquity.

[81]   On more than one occasion Hegel reminds us that a philosophical treatment of 'the state' should concern itself with the *concept,* [original emphasis] or Idea, of the state, not with this or that state, nor with the conditions under which given states come into being. The *actual* [emphasis added] states of the world do not provide a model of what the true essence of the state is. On the contrary, if we cast a quick glance at the history of human society we can immediately show that any state is in some way defective or bad: 'The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects.' Yet regardless of its degree of imperfection, a state is such only in so far as it realises in its actual historical being the Idea, or the principle, of the state. (Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Anatomy of an Argument,** Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1984, page . . .)

therefore, which it realises in the assertion of the individual wills of its citizens - that is, its sovereignty (which, of course, is another form of particularity) - versus other states, wherein the actual state can root its claim that it has divine sanction without contradicting the fact that it is particular in relation to the divine realm, out of whose *popular* conceptualisation it derives its own *raison d'être* and legitimacy.[82] And the preservation of the family is of course assured by the state's recognition of its own dependence on the regeneration of its military-political resources by the family,[ccxx] on account of which 'the state, even in the moment of conflict, . . . [has to] . . . "concede divine honours" to the domestic, ethically private dimension of existence,'[ccxxi] and to tolerate the family as a '*staatsfreier Bezirk*'[ccxxii] within the sphere of its own jurisdiction.[ccxxiii]

3.5.2 The Dialectical Relationship of War and the Ancestral Pantheon

However, while the insight that the family is indispensable to, because constitutive of, the state *also* by virtue of its role in the care of its ancestors is less immediate in the force of its conviction than the recognition of the family's role in the socialisation of minors, it is all the same equally undeniable. The latter circumstance is undeniable on account of the patent evidence in the form of the family's offspring, and the former circumstance is a logical corollary of the latter. In the funerary ceremony the family renders to the state an ideological service by clothing its practical actions on the occasion of death in the guise of ritual and by hence permitting the state its pretension that its foundations are natural only in the representations of folklore and myth, but not in reality.[ccxxiv] In this ideological process the self-effacement of women for the glory of men[ccxxv] is thus paralleled in the family's escorting of the deceased to his final resting place and in the family's ritual *administration* of the separation of the soul from the body and of the flesh from the bones *on behalf of the state,* by

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[82] It was the *popular* conceptualisation of the divine realm in ancient Greece that underlay the happy concordance of heaven and state which Hegel observed there and that provided the basis for his own philosophical model of the relationship between religion and politics.

which the state is enabled to raise itself to the status of an abstract and universal entity whose principles permeate its constitutive elements, that is, also the family, rather than *vice versa*.[83] The family shoulders the inherent indictability of the state and makes it its own. The *ideal* of the state is made sacrosanct by a purging from it of its historic specificity, which is at once its imperfection, in that this is associated with its individual citizens at the time of their death and in that the care of their remains is unequivocally assigned to the family; and any public ceremonial in honour of a fallen soldier honours him as an individual and the limited historical end to which he gave his life only secondarily, whereas it primarily reaffirms the (Hegelian) ideology which portrays self-sacrifice for the state as coterminous with the interest of the individual concerned.

And just as the family thus mediates to the state the divine law in which it 'possesses . . . its power and authentication,'[ccxxvi] so it also parallels in the pattern of its own existence the function which war has for the state. While namely 'war . . . [is] . . . the necessary discipline and highest function of *citizens,*'[ccxxvii] wherein the state manifests its own cultural being *and* at once distinguishes itself from the 'mere . . . natural being'[ccxxviii] to which individual life *potentially* degenerates, so death is the foremost and ultimate obligation of a man in his family role in that it furnishes his kin 'with its ancestral pantheon, its household Lares,'[ccxxix] and - in doing so - death ensures the continuity of the kin. The ancestral pantheon is the final station of man, in which he, having made his contribution to the collective, political purpose, reverts to '*pure being, death*'[ccxxx] and is thus once again conjoined, through love, with the natural being of his family, which is the source of his individual life that he has actualised in the state. And by virtue of its existence through the '"work" which the individual . . . has undertake[n] . . . on its behalf,'[ccxxxi] that is, the assertion of the polity in war, the ancestral pantheon becomes for the family more than just a profane *source* from which it emanates in a mere causal and sequential sense, but it becomes a *symbol* of the family's divine function in the edifice of culture.

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[83]   '[T]he laws regulating the family and civil society are the institutions of the rational order that glimmers in them.' ([Mitias?], . . . , . . . , . . . , . . . , . . . , page . . .)

Correspondingly, war is not the mere causal and sequential *end* of the state but it is the *image* of its divine inspiration. Through the sentiment of familial love, war and the ancestral pantheon are brought into a dialectical relationship, hallowed by the rites of burial and hero worship just as the battle itself, that would otherwise 'be an intolerable slaughter,'[ccxxxii] blasphemous like the gory mangling of corpses by 'unconscious appetites.'[ccxxxiii]

3.5.3 Antigone's Passion and Ismene's *Kalkül*

Whereas thus at 'normal' times - that is, when no death has occurred - the *general sentiment* of love avails itself to the state as a *model* of an idealistic regime that, transposed to the public realm, inspires civic consciousness and, as its corollary, loyalty to the state,[84] so the emotion of love is harnessed for the release, unfettered by the norms of the collective purpose of the *polis,* of heightened affection for a loved one at the moment of his passing and of the impulse of pious 'duty'[ccxxxiv] which the death of a family member occasions. *Then,* when a blood-relation has died, the ever-present but undiscriminating[ccxxxv] current of love is bundled into a concentrated *and particular* force of grief, and it will as such be expressed in honour of the individual family member whom Hades has claimed. By the event of death, therefore, a potential is created for the 'improper' spilling over of the essentially private moment of love, through grief, 'into the city'[85] and for the substitution thereby of the 'alliance of love and Hades' for the Hegelian paradigm of 'the equipoise between kin and city'[ccxxxvi] that is founded upon the complete separation of the household and the polity[ccxxxvii] and which, in turn, underpins the concordance of faith and liberty.[ccxxxviii] The spectre of this *possible* substitution

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[84]   'CREON [to Haemon]: " . . . any man who acts rightly within his household will also be seen to do his duty in the city."' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page seventy five)

[85] 'MESSENGER [to the chorus, about Eurydice]: " . . . I nourish the hope that, on hearing of her son's pain, she will not think it proper to utter laments *before the city,* but [she] will set her *private* grief before her handmaids *indoors* . . . ."' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 123, emphasis added)

of a particular sentiment for a collective ideal is cultivated in the *image* of the family as living evidence for the fact that 'man's . . . "scission from nature"'[ccxxxix] is complete only in consciousness but incomplete in fact. While therefore the justification for public lament, which the state permits, in moderation, for fallen heroes, is that its display assures the state's soldiers of posthumous honour and their families of 'a glorious reputation'[ccxl] and that it thus functions as an incentive for the living for sacrifice in the service of the state (and in the ordinary course of events their prospective sacrifices will be *tangible* compensation to the state for its *symbolic* concessions to the family in the period of mourning), it has to be noted that this is only the more obvious aspect of the state's ideological exploitation of the family; the state's deeper rationale for its inchoate - and ultimately to be aborted - retreat from prominence at the time of death is of course that in this process the alternatives of nature and culture are re-presented to the citizens for the end of re-entrenching the *popular conceptualisation* of the *status quo* - as the supremacy of men's noble constructs over 'unconscious appetites and abstract entities'[ccxli] - and hence the pattern of political (rather than sentimental) loyalties - that is the loyalties of the mind rather than those of the heart - which uphold it. Through the family, and with divine sanction, therefore, the apogee of culture, nature, is brought into the heart of *polis,* and it is its palpable presence which keeps alive, in consciousness, the benefit of balance between nature and culture as it is ensured by the loyalty of men to their *political* arrangements. As long as the ascendancy of the particular over the universal in consequence of death, driven by love, remains a mere *contingency,* the delegation to the family by the state of the practical tasks which burial involves, and the state's therein entailed toleration of the concomitant revival of the family '*cult*'[ccxlii] is in effect a quasi-ritualistic, *collective* (and therefore political) probing of the ominous appeal of the family for the end of *deterring* individual sentiment from succumbing to it.

It is in the character of **Antigone,** of course, and Hegel's interpretation of the play emphasises this, that she exposes the limitations of conventional perspectives on the place of love in men's response to death. In the fictitious setting of Thebes both the family as the *locus* of love and love itself are symbolised by Antigone. As love between *living* relatives is impartial, it is the family as its *locus,* rather than love *as such,* which sets a policy parameter for

the state. But through death 'love as such' is made *partial* and brought into direct confrontation with the state; by the death of Polynices love is brought 'into the city:'[ccxliii] '[I]n that absolute *exemplum* of tragedy, **Antigone[,]** . . . familial *love,* the holy, the inward, belonging to inner feeling, and *therefore known also as the law of the nether gods,* collides with the right of the state (*Recht des Staats).* [ccxliv] The unique circumstances of Polynices's death, however, ensure that in this case this occurs not just in consciousnesss but in fact. In his death Polynices did *not* return into the private sphere of the family because he had not completed his political mission in life which he had been compelled to pursue *outside* Thebes by the treachery of his brother. By virtue of his claim to the throne of Thebes, grounded in his right to succeed his father, which he shared with his brother, and which was specifically acknowledged and reinforced in the two brothers' agreement on the alternation of their rule in yearly intervals,[86] Polynices *was* the state on a much more *constitutional* basis than Creon[ccxlv] and indeed than Eteocles, after *his* agreed lease on power in Thebes had expired. Antigone's familial love, therefore, which Polynices concentrated upon himself, combined in this unique situation with the civic duty - by which the glory of the state was upheld - of paying reverence to the deceased king,[ccxlvi] as this, indeed, was the *de jure* status of Polynices; and to the impractical partition of Oedipus's bequest between Eteocles and Polynices corresponds the destructive partition of their family's love for the two brothers on the one hand and on the other hand the defacement of both love and duty by Antigone and Ismene, their two sisters, in their actions.

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[86] The War of the Seven against Thebes is the name given to the war against ETEOCLES, one of Oedipus'[s] two sons. *The cause of the expedition was Eteocles'[s] failure to keep his promise to rule for a year and at its end to turn over his authority, also for a year, to his younger brother, POLYNEICES. In this way, the government of Thebes was to be carried on by each brother ruling for a year and retiring for a like period.* In order to defeat his father's curse that each brother should kill the other, Polyneices left the city of Thebes. When Eteocles refused to let him have the throne for his year, Polyneices appealed to ADRASTUS, king of Argos, for help. (cf. Picard, Barbara Leonie, editor, **The Encyclopaedia of Myths and Legends of all Nations,** Kaye & Ward Ltd, London, 1962, page 112, emphasis added)

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The love between brother and sister in life is exemplary of the *ideal* relationship between citizens in the state, because '[t]hey are the same blood which has, however, in them reached a state of rest and equilibrium. Therefore they do not desire one another, . . . [but] . . . they are *free individualities* in regard to each other.'[ccxlvii] And in as much as 'the law of the Family [of which the woman is the custodian[87]] is an implicit inner essence,'[ccxlviii] it inspires the normative principle of civic society as an association of independent and yet solidary members whose particular wills are building blocs of the ethical order, although 'the citizens do . . . not attain to *consciousness*'[ccxlix] thereof. The polity thrives, firstly, 'by . . . absorbing into itself the separatism of the P̲e̲n̲a̲t̲e̲s̲ . . . through . . . [which, in] interfer[ing] . . . with the happiness of the family, . . . [it] . . . dissolv[es individual] self-consciousness into the universal,'[ccl] but it also thrives, secondly, because 'love as such,' as 'a mere moment,'[ccli] is powerless to actualise itself *politically*. Hence, for as long as 'love as such' remains within the family it is not any particular action that it may inspire which is *by itself* offensive to the state, but it is the circumstance *that* it is inspired by love *rather than* by loyalty to the *polis* which the state cannot tolerate, as this undermines its public image as the sole ethical authority.

Antigone's motive for expressing her love for Polynices in the performance of her *duty* to him is of course quite different from Ismene's motive for acquiescing to Creon's f̲i̲a̲t̲. On the grounds already stated Antigone disputes not only that Creon's prohibition of the burial of Polynices has a rightful basis, but, moreover, she does not recognise that Creon has a claim to authority at all. From Antigone's perspective, therefore, her action is not *defiance* of Creon, as Ismene's action *potentially* is, since she regards him neither as a protagonist to whom she must endeavour to rise, nor as an individual whose utterings might provide the criteria for her own

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[87] '[T]he feminine, in the form of the sister, has the highest *intuitive* awareness of what is ethical.' (Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit** by **G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 274, original emphasis)

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decisions; to Antigone, Creon is *irrelevant,* because - being inspired by the mysterious eternity of Zeus's laws[88] and empowered by the irresistible enticement which gleams in her eyes and, by the grace of the goddess Aphrodite, enthrones her in power *beside* mighty laws[cclii] - she, like monarchy, assumes for herself the privilege of saying and doing what she will:[ccliii] Antigone is the prosopopoeia of '[c]onscience [, which] in its sublime majesty can put what content it wills into its knowing and its willing [, and as such she] is the moral genius which knows the voice of its inner intuition to be divine.'[ccliv] But it is the death of Polynices which makes Antigone *aware* of this, and through it, hence, her conscience ceases to be isomorphic with that of the citizens, as '[i]t [, galvanised by her *love* for Polynices,] determine[s]'[cclv] that her obligation to him 'overrides'[cclvi] her obligation to *Creon's* Thebes.[89]

The application of conventional perspectives therefore leads to absurdities in the unique case of the death of Polynices. Because of Polynices's exceptional political status in life, his death is the event which brings into focus the immediate temporal ends of the actual state - it precipitates the catharsis in which the state's ideological exploitation of the family is ineluctably exposed, as the power of love, which Antigone harnesses for the execution of her duty to Polynices, in transcending the boundaries of the realms of Zeus and Hades, lays bare the particularity of the (actual) state. And it is this unshrouding of its political end as one which is *purportedly* ethical (because it is really 'only' pragmatic and contingent), which the state cannot permit. Polynices's corpse offends the state in that it comes to symbolise the inversion

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[88]   ANTIGONE: '[I]t was not Zeus who proclaimed that edict [prohibiting the burial of Polynices] to me, nor did that right who dwells with the gods below lay down such laws for mankind; and I did not suppose that your decrees had such power that you, *a mortal,* [emphasis added] could outrun the gods' unwritten and unfailing rules. For *their life is not of today and yesterday but for ever, and no one knows when they first appeared* [emphasis added]. I did not intend, through fear of any man's will, to make atonement before the gods for breaking *these* [original emphasis] laws.' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page eighty seven)

[89]   'CREON: Is the city not held to *belong* to its ruler?'' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page eighty three, emphasis added)

of the principle that rationality is a sublimation of passion, because Antigone's action is a credible demonstration of the possibility of a fusion of love and duty on the one hand *and* of the reconciliation of the *ideal* of morality with its actual accomplishment through action on the other hand. The discomfiture of the state is of course compounded by the fact that the momentum for Antigone's defiance of the state, which constitutes this demonstration, is derived from the interference of her love in the public affairs of Thebes. It is noteworthy in this context, however, and this adds to the farce of Creon's demolition, that Antigone argues for her action not in terms of love but in terms of the *spirit* of law and of divine sanction, by which she claims to be not merely justified in her loyalty to Polynices but, in fact, *impelled* to place it above her loyalty to Thebes. The laws of Thebes are to her the laws of Creon, a mortal *individual,*[cclvii] rather than those of the citizens, who - though they are mortal too - endure beyond their individual deaths as a political *body.* (Although this is also true of the monarchy, Antigone holds that what has gone before has destroyed it, and Creon therefore has no office as monarch, but he is just a dictator who has usurped his position by guile.) It is hence no coincidence that the terms power, authority, law and decree are used interchangeably throughout **Antigone** by Creon's *subjects,* as Creon, in his conduct, does not make the distinction clear but, on the contrary, exploits the ambiguity that arises from their *seeming* proximity in meaning for the consolidation of his own might (to the obvious detriment of the standing of the *polis* as an institution). And Antigone, accordingly, can deride Creon's proposed punishment of her and Polynices by her oxymoronic description of their status in Creon's 'law' as 'guilty of a *righteous* crime.'[cclviii]

As the state is denied the exercise of *its* customary prerogative to interfere in the family, Creon's attempt to banish love from the sphere of the state is an appropriate element of his struggle with Antigone. But it is at the same time the sheer ludicrousness of Creon's propositions that Antigone might love her brothers '*when* . . . [she] . . . come[s] to the world below,'[cclix] not before, and that she might 'marry someone *in the house of Hades,*'[cclx] not 'in the house of' Zeus (to which Creon lays claim), wherein his notion of morality is emptied of meaning,[cclxi] because by his 'uncommunicating being-for-self in the face of . . . [Antigone's] . . . renunciation of the same, [he] denies the very nature of Spirit, which is master and lord over

every deed and reality . . . and can make any of them as if it had never been.'[cclxii] In other words, while at first it seems to be Antigone who represents Hegel's image of the 'beautiful soul,' it is revealed as the action progresses that it is in fact *Ismene* who matches Hegel's definition of the character, by her futile yearning for 'pure duty . . . [, that is, for] . . . actual existence, which is moral,'[cclxiii] which she dresses up in exalted consciousness.[cclxiv] As she 'passes off . . . [her] . . . cowardice as a wonderful piece of insight'[cclxv] - 'I have no means of acting in defiance of the citizens'[cclxvi] - she shows that her loyalty to the state is phoney because it is *Creon* whom she cares for[cclxvii] and along with whom (as the potency of his authority can be no greater than the quality of the 'love' from which it derives itself) she is therefore condemned to being 'a shapeless vapour fading into nothingness.'[cclxviii] In Homer's **Odyssey,** Circe - speaking to Odysseus - suggests that those who have no 'mind to reason with . . . are mere shadows flitting to and fro;'[cclxix] and Ismene's and Creon's minds, of course, are impaired by sentiment, not love. Hence Polynices's death has catalysed the degeneration of reason into sentiment in the doomed city of Thebes.

From a post-1789 perspective, therefore, one might view Antigone and Ismene in the context of the revolution of *consciousness* which the Enlightenment had brought; they can serve to exemplify, in this context, the moral vacuum in which the individual was left by the fundamental political change of the late eighteenth century. Ismene resembles the 'type' who is loyal to the *ancien régime,* in which she sees the embodiment of the 'Holy Legislator'[90] 'brought down to earth;'[cclxx] however, her virtue of obedience is foiled not only by Creon's vanity but also by her own lack of judgement. She therefore provided Hegel with the model of the 'beautiful soul,' by which he could express his disaffection with the naive faith in progress through individual reason that took root in the Enlightenment. But Antigone, by comparison, symbolised to Hegel 'the novel assertion of individual rights and interests'[cclxxi] over those of

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[90] This is Kant's conception of 'the one being for whom morality and pure duty are not a task but an accomplishment' (Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's <u>Phenomenology of Mind,</u>** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, page 184), which Hegel has made notorious by his criticism of it.

the collective, through which, *exceptionally* (as in Sophocles's depiction of Thebes and in the French Revolution), passion can become a catalyst of progress,[91] though it is also destructive of the polity in which alone individual interests can *normally* (and ultimately) be realised.

3.6 The Economics of Death

3.6.1 <u>Money: The Means to Casuistry</u>

The bourgeois challenge to France's last monarch was not a new phenomenon. Then, the increasing economic preponderance of Paris, combined with (and enhanced by) the fraternisation of artisans, landless nobles and intellectuals, demonstrated the atavistic character of the connection between authority, status and ownership of land *as a principle.* <u>Tocqueville</u> observed how the egalitarian appeal of money, by enchanting all who did not live by subsistence, was at the root of the sorry fact that 'the Condition of the French Peasantry was worse in some respects in the Eighteenth Century than it had been in the Thirteenth, notwithstanding the Progress of Civilisation,'[cclxxii] on the one hand, whereas on the other hand it had led to a concentration of publishing activity in the metropolis and hence to the augmentation of its intellectual sway over the *platteland* to the extent that eventually 'people . . . [in] . . . provincial town[s] . . . seemed not to dare even to form an opinion until they knew what was being thought in Paris!'[cclxxiii] Meanwhile the king is at the core of the polity and yet sidelined; his wisdom and noble purpose is put to the test of mundane reason. And Hegel's reservations about this aspect of the Enlightenment had a precursor in ancient Greece in the sentiment which Sophocles expressed through his character Creon's - albeit peculiarly twisted - address of Tiresias in **Antigone:**

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[91]   '[N]othing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passions.' (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, quoted in Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's <u>Phenomenology of Mind,</u>** page 201; cf. also note . . . on page . . .)

> I am not left untried even by the seers among you; no, by their tribe I
> have long been traded and treated as merchandise . . . .
> . . . .
> . . . . the whole tribe of seers is
> fond of money.[cclxxiv]

In short, Creon's message is that all reason is mere casuistry if it is employed for sectional ends, as it indeed is when it is paid for by 'such [an] evil currency as money . . . [which] . . . subverts honest characters.'[cclxxv] Against this stands the 'impartial power of particularity' of the monarch (an oxymoronic concept which Hegel made plausible in his model of the state wherein . . .) that is invested with supreme legitimacy by its divinely inspired task of arbitration between conflicting interests. And the significance of this notion is of course not impaired by Creon's *personal* inadequacy in his role or by his erroneous assumption of Tiresias's suborned particularity. It is true of course that neither Tiresias nor indeed Antigone - though she was at least partly motivated to ensure that she would have 'a great name handed down to her'[cclxxvi] by her ancestors (which, in keeping with the custom of her period, was to have been signified by the mound for the corpse of Polynices[92]) - had much

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[92]   There can be several explanations for Antigone's apparent preference of Polynices over Eteocles and her therein implied assumption that his mound would add more to her honour than to that of Eteocles. One possible explanation is that she regarded Polynices as the *de jure* king (see page . . . [above]) and Eteocles as the traitor; alternatively, she may have been motivated by the idea of a duty to Polynices and the prospect of being cursed by him from the grave if she fails him, whereas she regarded the family's duty to Eteocles as already being discharged by his other relatives; finally, her concern with honour may only have been secondary as her principal preoccupation was the love for her brother that was not influenced by his former political status and his crimes against *Creon's* Thebes ('ANTIGONE [to Creon]: "It was a brother who died, not a slave. . . . . It is not my nature to join in hatred, but in love."' [Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster,

in common with the bourgeois subverters of the eighteenth century, but the resonance which Sophocles's play had in Hegel's thought is in fact grounded in this *semblance* of incomparability between the opponents of the state in the two periods. It is the 'rationality' inspired by material interests that undermined Louis XVI's authority, which Creon already suspected in Antigone and Tiresias, and wherein Hegel saw his views on the limitations of 'rationality' corroborated. And in this context Creon's *aspiration* to represent a moral standard that is not informed by fleeting material temptations has a significance which is not diminished by his ultimate fate of obscurity. Creon's message, which also inspired Hegel's normative model of monarchy, was in the distinction which he implied between the symbolic *character* of material goods and their actual *value.* By their former aspect material goods serve to integrate the *polis* into the divine edifice and hence to raise it above particular concerns; accordingly, the construction of 'colonnaded temples'[cclxxvii] in honour of the gods, to whom they were perceived to belong, as much as the ritual sacrifice of 'fattened livestock,'[cclxxviii] to reaffirm it as the property of the gods,[93] were the wordly evidence of the gods' favour on which the *polis* and its citizens depended for their material survival. But the actual value of temporal goods inspired the *rational* impulse of measurement, an end to which the 'evil currency of money'[cclxxix] availed itself. Money was an evil currency because it fuelled the raw emotions of pride and greed which 'lay . . . cities waste, . . . expel . . . men from their homes, . . . subvert honest characters to set themselves to shameful acts . . . and . . . teach . . . men to practice villainy and to be familiar with every deed of impiety'[cclxxx] and which hence are the cloven hoof of individualism that destroys the polity and its consensual ideal. It was, namely, the *unsocial* nature of individualism, so it was held in ancient Greece, the hope of gain[cclxxxi] at the expense of others, that not only showed itself in 'dishonest acquisition . . . [by which, therefore] . . . more men are ruined than preserved,'[cclxxxii] but which moreover, and consequently, made acquisition as such suspect.

Wiltshire, 1987, pages sixty three to sixty five])

[93] [make a reference here to the holy cows in Homer's **Odyssey]**

There was a presumption of sacrilege in the notion that the material symbols of culture in which the state manifested itself, since they were taken to be *only entrusted* to men by the gods, could be 'traded as merchandise.' The king was of course the supreme manifestation of culture, but as thereby he was at once man and state, subject and authority, a mortal man and a divine *persona,* he straddled in his person the fateful faultline between culture and nature as much as a corpse which was neither thing nor spirit. And this juxtaposition of king and corpse is indicative of the state's shedding of its temporal particularity *on* both the divine realm and the family. However, it is of course only the family on which in this ideological representation of culture the image of particularity is projected. The material treasures of culture are not in themselves particular; they only imbue men with the stigma of particularity in the course of *their* selfish designs on the *control* of property, that is, not only in the avoidable (and hence, from an ideological viewpoint, unproblematic because exceptional) practice of thievery but also and most significantly in the process of the reassignation of control over property on an occasion which cannot be shirked, namely death. The occurrence of *change* in men's relationship with the material symbols of culture, therefore, is an aspect of the potential pollution of the *polis* through death; and to preserve the image of the state, the precipitants of such change are accordingly portrayed as being without its sphere, that is, on the one hand, in war, an *international* phenomenon, and, on the other hand, in the family, a *private* realm.

War, of course, is the means by which the state establishes itself in culture, by which it makes itself 'actual' in the two senses of making itself extant and tangible, firstly, and secondly, 'not ideal.' And being actual in the latter sense, any state can pursue gain through war without loss of credence,[94] because in this it brings the prestige of property to its citizens. From the perspective of *ideology* there is no real contradiction in the state's disassociation of itself from 'money,' despite the clear connection of money with war. As '[n]either finely roofed houses, nor the stones of well-built walls, nor even canals and dockyards make up the

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[94]   'TIRESIAS [to Creon]: "[The tribe] . . . of kings loves dishonest gain."' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 109)

polis . . . [,] . . . but men,'[cclxxxiii] it *is* possible for the state to be both concept and reality, ideal and actual, and thus to transcend the shortlived material interests of individuals *by* 'deal[ing] . . . in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns,'[cclxxxiv] through war, which is its end, and yet, in this, to serve its citizens as a vehicle for the realisation of the 'good life,' of their sovereign existence in civic society; this is the state's recompense to the family for the ideological service which *it* provides by making itself, through its attachment to property, a historically specific component of the political edifice and by therein enabling the state to *sanctify* its own material-temporal embodiment through sacrificial offerings to the gods.

As a concept, the ideological symbiosis[◇] between family and state dovetails into the aforementioned notion of reciprocity between men and gods, which of course the family replicates and corroborates in the custom of burial. In Hegel's conception, therefore, the function of funerary rituals for the state is to formalise (that is, politically neutralise) expressions of private grief, because gestures of piety are *not just* irrational, arbitrary and impulsive flashes of personal sentiment of which the state stands aloof - if they were, the state would be *particular,* in this case not on account of its historical specificity, but on account of its apparent *partisan* character, on account of its *separateness* from its citizens. (The *actual* state is historically specific whereas the family *institution* is assumed to be ahistorical, but through ideology, as is shown here, the opposite is suggested.) The state depends on 'the sinews of war' in the pursuit of its end, and this cacophemistic metaphor pointedly acknowledges this, yet ultimately money gives *the citizens* a stake in the present through their property, and this is *their* end, which allows them to 'enjoy a sense of personality,'[cclxxxv] that in turn they infuse into the state:

> A person has as his substantive *end* the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul [*only] from his will.* This is the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all 'things,'[cclxxxvi]

and 'hence it is the duty of the state to respect the right of the citizen to his property.'[cclxxxvii] It is in the sentiment by which citizens are attached to their personal property wherein 'culture' germinates, and because the state is the epitome of 'culture' - and is distinguished by it from 'the bestial in the systematisation of things'[cclxxxviii] - '[r]espect for property . . . is, for Hegel, inseparable from religious belief.'[cclxxxix] The state therefore protects with its laws the private property of citizens as they express their will through it and as it gives content to and helps to structure their relationships with one another in civic society.

In this context it can be seen that burial customs are more than merely formalised reflections on the experience of *separation* at the time of death. Apart from the folkloristic purpose of the funeral of emphasising the anodyne notions of passage and continuity, and of family re-union in the nether world, and apart from its concomitant pious function, the funeral also, quite specifically, serves the state's policy objective of re-regulating property relations when, at the time of death, these temporarily become the solely private matter of the family into which the state does not venture. This process of re-regulation addresses several distinct factors in men's relationship with their property, namely, in particular, the *chronological* factor of the timespan within which this re-regulation takes place; the *ideological* factor of the fate of the property itself - that is, whether it is re-allocated or destroyed, and what this suggests for its political significance; and the *functional* question of who is involved in the process and who has a title to the deceased's estate. The chronological factor underscores the need in civic society for a culturally appropriate definition of death which encompasses not just the absence of (natural) life but also the absence of a stake in the polity. This factor hence takes account of the incongruity of social death and physical death, and it thus sets the death of human beings apart from the death of other creatures;[ccxc] the sentiments which *link* human life to property, to culture, and to the state are thereby emphasised. The idea that the re-regulation of property relations needs time, that it takes place within a time*span* which is somehow demarcated, corresponds to the distinction between social death and physical death. In connection with the political and religious significance of property, therefore, there arises the imperative to make sense of the divergence between the termination of a citizen's political *activity* and 'the *calm* of simple universality'[ccxci] into which he 'raise[s] . . . himself out of the *unrest* of the accidents of

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life,'[ccxcii] namely political activity, in death: The two have to be *harmonised.*[ccxciii] And so the basis for the concept of liminality as the chronological passage between the different manifestations of death, or for the idea that a citizen may successively experience primary and secondary 'deaths,' is given.

3.6.2 The Ominous Ephemerality of Culture

Allusions to the idea that 'mere' physical life has no place in the polity because it has no legitimate links with the material symbols of culture abound in **Antigone.** Antigone herself appears to accept that she has no standing in the citizens' deliberations about her punishment for the burial of Polynices: 'Take courage . . . [she says to her sister Ismene] . . . you live, but *my spirit has perished long since, so that I might serve the dead.'*[ccxciv] In saying this Antigone corroborates the understanding that human life is *cultural* life, because it embodies itself *through 'spirit'* in material symbols (but there is also a suave irony in Antigone's agreement to exit from the polity on *this* ground, as she therein shrewdly disregards her exclusion on the *conventional* ground of her gender). Later, Creon concurs with her when he says about her to Ismene: 'Do not speak of her as present. She no longer exists.'[ccxcv] And to this 'social death' of a living person corresponds the 'social *life'* of the dead, as one might call the 'power' which they were deemed to have not only in the close proximity of their graves but also in the days and weeks after their death, specifically upon their surviving relatives.[95] The process of re-regulating property relations, therefore, was an essential corollary to the political re-adjustment that also had to follow upon the death of a citizen and which principally had as its object the preservation of the principle that the citizens *were* the *polis*[ccxcvi] and that there could be no incongruence between their *individual* wills and their collective *political* will, a

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[95]   'ANTIGONE: ' . . . Ah, my brother, maker of a fatal marriage, in your death you have destroyed me while I yet live.' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: Antigone,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page ninety three)

principle that was potentially undermined by the posthumous *individual* interests of a deceased citizen as, in death, he had returned into the orbit of the family.

To conjure, therefore, a person's presence whe he has died or his absence when he 'yet lives'[ccxcvii] is a characteristic emotional reaction to death, which however, in **Antigone,** does not confirm the dominant paradigm that assigns emotion to the family, rationality to the state, and matter to nature, but its 'spirit' to the divine realm. Since during the liminal period the family, by its preoccupation with the deceased's estate, to which it lays claim in honouring him, emphasises the fragile unity of society by demonstrating its own partiality *vis-à-vis* the state, the funerary ritual ordinarily transfigures the break between the living and the dead and so serves society as the invigorating tonic which society needs at such a time. Polynices, however, having been banned from Thebes, has no estate that could after his death add to the 'stock' of the *symbols* of culture. Being without the state, he and all that may represent him after his death - in **Antigone** this is his corpse and the mound which Antigone is determined to raise for him - is in the category of 'bloodthirsty terror' or of 'unconscious appetites' or, in short, of nature rather than of culture: It is bestial rather than divine, and it is the state's *pious* duty to demarcate itself from (and to elevate itself above) the pollution of Polynices in order not to defile the divine edifice which the state is seen to constitute. The desire on the part of the state, therefore, to actually ensure that Polynices corpse is 'mangled by the dogs'[ccxcviii] is grounded in the *ideological* need to validate and affirm this association of Polynices with the most primitive manifestations of nature, an association that is intended to humiliate as much as the custom to serve 'prime cuts' of beef to victorious warriors[ccxcix] was aimed to underline the supremacy of the state over nature for which they risked their lives.[96]

But Antigone's love for Polynices 'despoils'[ccc] this contingent relationship of culture and *wealth,* which this ideology espouses, even more than familial love for ancestors precisely

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[96]   'The hunt represents both man's break with nature and his savage part.' (Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, **The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World,** The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1986, page three)

because Polynices had no wealth but only a title, yet this title was 'worth' more than the actual control of the city which Eteocles had enjoyed and which Creon had usurped from him. And the dubious character of Creon's claim, in turn, was underlined by Antigone's attention to the *honour* rather than to the *power* of Polynices of which he had been defrauded. Moreover, Antigone's posthumous reverence to Polynices deviates from the norm also in that it has a place in both the private sphere of the family and, because of Polynices's unprecedented status, the international realm of war. For Creon there is no answer to this predicament that will permit him to claim legitimacy for his rule of Thebes. In so far as Antigone, while she also attends to her familial duties at the same time, rightfully represents the state as proxy of Polynices, who has been deprived of the throne, in the higher synthesis to which she aspires, Creon - notwithstanding his *de facto* position as ruler of Thebes - exemplifies the particular and hence the subversive orientation of the family through his sentiment for Eteocles that is ultimately flattering only to himself. Accordingly, the 'finely roofed houses' of Thebes are no more than the 'pleasures'[97] of an individual, and ones which have been obtained by theft at that, so that consequently Creon's condemnation of Antigone is not justice but murder.

Creon, however, commutes his sentence of death to entombment not only in order to escape the guilt that would otherwise destroy his sanity, but also because he cannot allow Antigone's death to add to the posthumous honour of Polynices.[98] (Antigone, for her part, asks for her *dis*honour to be likewise posthumous: 'Oh, this is mockery! Why, by the Gods of our fathers, do you insult me not when I am dead, but to my face?'[ccci]) It is however in the nature of

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[97]   MESSENGER: ' . . . when a man forfeits his pleasures, I do not count him as living; I regard him as a breathing corpse. Amass great wealth in your house if you will; live in the style of a king; but if happiness is gone from these tghings, then beside that pleasure I would not buty the rest from a man at the price of a vapour's shadow.' (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 117)

[98]   [cf. Forster, Anthony, translator, **<u>Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman</u> by Nicole Loraux,** Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1987: (A woman's death adds to the honour of a man.)]

the unique situation that even Creon's guileful manoeuvers can neither compensate for his own inadequacy nor establish in the case of Polynices the plain meaning and purpose of retribution and justice that these concepts otherwise have. Had Polynices survived his assault on Thebes, then the citizens' sense that they have defended themselves on the basis of provident right against aggression from abroad could have been restored to them by the means of punishment. And had, on the other hand, Eteocles survived, then he might have posthumously made good his own past perfidy *vis-à-vis* his fallen brother without offending the citizens (and, in particular, their idea of piety[99]) by magnanimously permitting the burial of the corpse; the convention would not have been profaned by this exceptional departure from it, because it is *through* the convention of leaving fallen traitors unburied that in such a unique situation this gesture of posthumous magnanimity might have become possible and *as such* justifiable.

But, perhaps more than piety, it was human awe of Hades, 'who "overlooks everything with his recording mind,"'[cccii] and of Zeus, whose power no 'human transgression can check,'[ccciii] which made the belief that '[o]ne generation does not release another'[ccciv] a holy truth which did not merely deter from the possibility of discretion in the administration of burial rites but that clearly made the idea of discretion as such so sacrilegious that it was not entertained in the first place. Creon's contention 'that it is wasted labour to rever that which is in Hades'[s] keeping'[cccv] clearly fails the test of Antigone's better judgement which, though she does not save herself by it, demonstrates (also, incidentally, in the fact that 'perhaps . . . [her] . . . ordeal is the payment of a debt from . . . [her] . . . father'[cccvi]) - and it is Tiresias, the seer, who 'rationalises' Antigone's intuition - that the gods do not 'accept sacrificial prayers'[cccvii] from those who have offended against divine providence. And beasts which 'have consumed a stream of dead man's blood,'[cccviii] too, are a futile sacrifice when, because they have done so, the city which they were intended to legitimate in their sacrifice has been polluted. Having not been 'paid out with the wages of the sword'[cccix] and 'shar[ing] . . . the fate of demigods in life and afterwards in death,'[cccx] Antigone establishes a new ethical standard.

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[99]   [add here the words of Creon or Tiresias concerning the 'altars']

This, however, is at once an apocalyptic$^\Diamond$ impasse between nature and culture, and only a sacrifice of the king's own blood, 'an offspring from . . . [his] . . . own loins, a corpse in exchange for corpses,[cccxi] therefore, can atone for what went before and resurrect the ideal of the city, because Creon, its personification, has become 'a man whose existence is *nothing!*'[cccxii]

Conclusion

Tragic guilt - monarchy; poetic justice - republic? nemesis & hubris; the role of Eurydice; . . .

Glossaries

Glossary of Proper Names

Achilles . . . Greek hero of the **Iliad** [*q. v., the epic poem which has been*] attributed to Homer [*q. v.*]. He was the son of Peleus, [who was the] king of the Myrmidons in Thessaly. His mother, the sea nymph Thetis, rendered him invulnerable, except for . . . [his] . . . heel by which she held him, by dipping him in the River . . . Styx. He killed Hector in the . . . Trojan War, and [he] was himself killed by Paris with a poisoned arrow in the heel. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page seven, column two)

Adrastus . . . Son of Talaus, king of Argos. Being expelled from Argos by Amphiaraus, he fled to Polybus, king of Sicyon, whom he succeeded on the throne of Sicyon, and instituted the Nemean games. Afterwards he became reconciled to Amphiaraus, and [he] returned to his kingdom of Argos. He married his two daughters Deipyle and Argia, the former to Tydeus of Calydon, and the latter to Polynices [*q. v.*] of Thebes [*q. v.*], who had been expelled by his brother Eteocles [*q. v.*], although Amphiaraus foretold that all who should engage in the war should perish, with the exception of Adrastus. Thus arose the celebrated war of the 'Seven against Thebes [*q. v.*],' in which Adrastus was joined by . . . [six] . . . other heroes, . . . [namely] . . . Polynices [*q. v.*], Tydeus, Amphiaraus, Capaneus, Hippomedon, and Parthenopaeus. This war ended as unfortunately as Amphiaraus had predicted, and Adrastus alone was saved by the swiftness of his horse Arion, the gift of Hercules. Ten years afterwards Adrastus persuaded the . . . [six] . . . sons of the heroes who had fallen in the war . . . to make a new attack upon Thebes [*q. v.*], and Amphiaraus now promised success. This war is known as the war of the 'Epigoni' or descendants. Thebes [*q. v.*] was taken and razed to the ground. The only Argive hero . . . [who] . . . fell in this war was Aegialeus,

the son of Adrastus: the latter died of grief at Megara on his return to Argos, and [he] was buried in the former city. The legends about Adrastus and the two wars against Thebes [*q. v.]* furnished ample materials for the epic, as well as [the] tragic, poets of Greece . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page eight)

Aeneid

Aeschylus . . . [()c[irca] 525[BC]-[ ]456 BC()]. Greek dramatist. Born near Athens [*q. v.],* he came of a noble family; [he] fought against the Persians at Marathon . . . [in] . . . 490 BC . . . , and [he] wrote nearly . . . [ninety] . . . plays between 499 [BC] and 458 BC. He twice visited the court of Hiero, king of Syracuse, and [he] died at Gela in Sicily. . . . The earliest of his seven surviving plays is **The Suppliant Women[,** which was] performed about 490 [BC]. There followed **The Persians** . . . [in] . . . 472 [BC] . . . , **Seven Against Thebes** [*q. v.* in] . . . 467 . . . and **Prometheus [*q. v.]* Bound** . . . [in] . . . about 460 . . . . Then came the trilogy of the **Oresteia** which won the first prize at the festival of Dionysus [*q. v.]* in 458 [BC]; the three plays . . . **Agamemnon, Choephori,** and **Eumenides** [*q. v.]* . . . deal with the curse on the house of Agamemnon which was eventually resolved by the action and [the] suffering of Orestes. . . . Aeschylus became famous for the majesty of his language, the boldness of his speculation upon problems of religion and human destiny, and the grandeur and simplicity of his plots and characters. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page fifteen, columns two and three)

Alcaeus . . . (fl. early . . . [sixth] . . . century BC, Greek poet, born at Mitylene. Of aristocratic birth, he was a fierce democrat who vigorously opposed both the tyrant Mysilus and the popular ruler Pittacus. He wrote odes in the Aeolic dialect, using the measure which bears his name. Fragments of these appear in **Alcaei fragmenta**

by E. Lobel, 1927. The Alcaic was a favourite metre with Horace, and [it] has been imitated by Tennyson in 'O Might-mouth'd inventor of harmonies . . . ' *Bibliography:* C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides,* . . . [second] . . . ed[ition] . . . 1961. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman**'s **Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume one, page 192, column two)

Alexandrian

Amazon . . . in Greek mythology, a member of a group of legendary female warriors living near the Black Sea, who cut off their right breasts [in order to be able] to use the bow more easily; their queen, Penthesilea, was killed by . . . Achilles [*q. v.*] at the siege of Troy. The term has come to mean a strong, fierce woman. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page thirty eight, column two)

Amazons . . . see **Amazon.**

Ancestral Pantheon . . . see Pantheon.

Ancien Regime . . . see French Revolution.

Antigone . . . the daughter of Oedipus [*q. v.*] . . . , king of Thebes [*q. v.*] in Greek legend, was also the heroine of one of Sophocles'[s *q. v.*] . . . greatest dramas. According to the legend, when Oedipus [*q. v.*] blinded himself after his marriage to his mother was revealed to him, Antigone shared her father's exile near Athens [*q. v.*]. After his death, she returned to Thebes [*q. v.*] and attempted, with her sister Ismene [*q. v.*,] to reconcile her quarreling brothers Eteocles [*q. v.*] and Polynices [*q. v.*]. Both brothers were killed, but her uncle Creon [*q. v.*], now king, forbade the burial of Polynices [*q. v.*] because he had betrayed Thebes [*q. v.*]. When Antigone secretly buried her brother against the edict of her uncle, she was executed.

According to another version of the legend, she escaped and married Haemon [*q. v.],* the son of Creon [*q. v.].* . . . Sophocles [*q. v.]* used the plot and character of this legend in his tragedy **Antigone** (440 BC). The plot revolves around Antigone's devotion to her brother and her defiance of Creon's [*q. v.]* edict in order to obey a higher law of devotion. As the play opens, her two brothers, Polynices [*q. v.]* and Eteocles [*q. v.]* have just killed each other as the result of Polynices'[s] [*q. v.]* rebellion against Eteocles [*q. v.],* the successor king of Thebes [*q. v.].* Creon [*q. v.],* the new king, forbids Polynices'[s *q. v.]* corpse to be buried. Antigone conducts a funeral service despite the ban and is then imprisoned by Creon [*q. v.]* in a vault where she hangs herself before Creon [*q. v.]* undergoes a change of heart. The play has often been interpreted as a justification for civil disobedience and as a vindication of the unwritten laws of conscience. . . . ***Bibliography:*** O'Brien, Joan, **A Guide to Sophocles**'**[s *q. v.*] Antigone** (1977). Whitman, Cedric H., **Sophocles [*q. v.]*: A Study of Heroic Humanism** [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms] (1951). (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume one, page sixty two, column one)

Aphrodite . . . in Greek mythology, the goddess of love . . . ; [she was] said to be either a daughter of . . . Zeus [*q. v.]* (in Homer [*q. v.])* or [to have] sprung from the foam of the sea (in Hesiod). She was the unfaithful wife of . . . Hephaestus, the mother of Eros [*q. v.],* and [she] was awarded the prize for beauty by . . . Paris; centres of her worship were Cyprus . . . and Cythera. [A] . . . statue [depicting Aphrodite is] in [the] Naples Museum . . . [; it] . . . bears the epithet Kallipygos, 'of the beautiful buttocks . . . .['] Swans and pomegranates are two of . . . [Aphrodite's] . . . emblems. Her lovers included Anchises, [who was] the father of Aeneas . . . and Adonis. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page fifty seven, column three)

Arcady

Argos . . . city in ancient Greece, at the head of the Gulf of Nauplia. In the Homeric age the name [']Argives['] was sometimes used instead of [the name ']Greeks.['] It was once a cult centre of the goddess . . . Hera. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page sixty nine, column three)

Aristotle . . . 384 . . . [to] . . . 322 BC. Greek philosopher. Born at Stagira in Thrace, he studied at Athens [*q. v.]* under . . . Plato [*q. v.]*, became tutor to . . . Alexander the Great, and in 335 opened a school in the Lyceum . . . at Athens [*q. v.]*. He walked up and down as he talked, hence 'peripatetic school . . . ,['] and his works are a collection of his lecture notes. When Alexander died he was forced to flee to Chalcis, where he died. He is sometimes referred to as 'the Stagirite . . . .['] . . . Of Aristotle's works some . . . [twenty two] . . . treaties survive, dealing with logic; metaphysics [*q. v., Glossary of Scholarly Terms]*; physics, astronomy and meteorology; biology; psychology; ethics; politics; and literary criticism. . . . Aristotle maintained that sense-experience is our only source of knowledge, and that by reasoning we can discover the essences of things, that is, their distinguishing qualities. The essence of a thing he regarded as real, but not as capable of existing apart from it. He conceived of all being as potentiality and actuality, in the physical order represented by matter and form; God alone is all actuality. Change consists in bringing the potentiality of a substance into actuality. All change is caused, the Supreme Cause being God, the Unmoved Mover. . . . Aristotle held that all matter consisted of a single 'prime matter . . . ,['] which was always determined by some form. The simplest kinds of matter were the four elements, earth, water, air and fire, which in varying proportions constituted all the things we know. Aristotle saw nature as always striving to perfect itself, and [he] first classified organisms into species and genera to show how they subserve this purpose. . . . The

principle of life he termed a soul, which he regarded as the form of the living creature, not as a substance separable from it. The intellect, he believed, can discover in sense-impressions the universal, and since the soul thus transcends matter, it must be immortal. In his works on ethics and politics Aristotle suggested that man;s happiness consists in living in conformity with nature, according to reason and moderation. He derived his political theory from the recognition that mutual aid is natural to humankind, and [he] refused to set up any one constitution as unversally ideal. Art embodies nature, but in a more perfect fashion, its end being the purging and ennobling of the affections. The essence of beauty is order and symmetry. . . . In the Middle Ages [*q. v.*] Aristotle's philosophy first became the foundation of Islamic philosophy, and [it] was then incorporated into Christian theology; medieval scholars tended to accept his vast output without question. . . . (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, pages seventy, column three, and seventy one, column one)

Arius . . . c[irca] . . . 256 . . . [to] . . . 336. Egyptian priest whose ideas gave rise to . . . Arianism, a Christian belief which denied the complete divinity of Christ. Born in Lybia, he became a priest of Alexandria in 311. In 318 he was excommunicated[,] and [he] fled to Palestine, but his theology spread to such an extent that the emperor Constantine called a council at . . . Nicaea to resolve the question. Arius was condemned[,] and he and his adherents were banished, though later he was allowed to return. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page seventy one, column two)

Athena . . . in Greek mythology, the goddess . . . of war, wisdom, and the arts and crafts, who was supposed to have sprung fully-armed from the head of . . . Zeus [*q. v.*]. Her chief cult centre was Athens [*q. v.*], where the Parthenon was dedicated to her. In Rome a statue

of her (the 'Palladium'), allegedly brought by . . . Aeneas from Troy, was kept in the temple of . . . Vesta. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page eighty seven, columns one and two)

Athene . . . see **Athena.**

Athens . . . see Periclean Athens.

Bacchus

Battle of Jena . . . see Jena.

Benjamin

Bourdieu

Cato . . . Marcus Porcius[,] 234 . . . [to] . . . 149 BC. Roman statesman. [He was a]ppointed censor (senior magistrate) in 184, [and] he excluded from the senate those who did not meet his high standards . . . [he] was so impressed by the power of Carthage, on a visit in 157, that he ended every speech by saying 'Carthage must be destroyed.' His farming manual is the earliest surviving work in Latin prose. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 236, column one)

Cadmus . . . in Greek legend, son of the Phoenician King Agenor and brother of Europa. When Zeus *[q. v.]* carried off Europa Cadmus was sent to bring her back[,] but [he] failed. The Delphic oracle bade him give up his quest, follow a cow he was to meet, and build a city where she lay down. He followed her from Phocis to Boeotia, and [he] founded Thebes *[q. v.],* the acropolis being called the Cadmeia. Cadmus then slew a dragon, and at Athena's *[q. v.]* command [he] sowed its teeth, from which sprang armed men, Sparti ([‘the S]own[‘]), who

fought together until only five remained and from whom the Thebans claimed descent. Athena *[q. v.]* appointed Cadmus King of Thebes *[q. v.],* and Zeus *[q. v.]* gave him as wife Harmonia, [who was the] daughter of Ares by Aphrodite *[q. v.].* She bore him a son, Polydorus, and four daughters . . . . Cadmus was also said to have introduced into Europe, from Phoenicia, a . . . [sixteen] . . . letter ALPHABET. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman**'**s Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume two, page 603, column one)

Chapman . . . George 1559 . . . [to] . . . 1634. English poet-dramatist, who was associated with . . . Marlowe, and [who] collaborated with Ben . . . Jonson. His translations of Homer *[q. v.]* ([which he] completed [in] 1616]) were celebrated, and [they] were later the subject of a sonnet by Keats. His plays include the comedy **Eastward Ho!** ([which he wrote jointly] with Jonson and Marston) . . . and the tragedy **Bussy d**'**Amboise.** (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 249, column three)

Claude Henri Comte de Saint-Simon . . . see **Saint-Simon.**

Comte de Saint-Simon . . . see **Saint-Simon.**

Constantine the Great . . . 274 . . . [to] . . . 337. [The f]irst Christian emperor of Rome [Constantine I], and [the] founder of Constantinople. [He was b]orn at Naissus ([which is now] Nish, Yugoslavia), [and] he was the sone of Constantius. He was already well known as a soldier when his father died at York in 306[,] and he was acclaimed by the troops there as joint-emperor in his father's place. His authority over Britain and Gaul was at first recognised by the other emperors, but a few years later Maxentius, the joint-emperor at Rome (whose sister had married Constantine the Great), mobilised his armies to invade Gaul. Constantine the Great won a crushing victory outside Rome at the Milvian Bridge [in] 312.

It was during this campaign that he was said to have seen a vision of the cross of Christ superimposed upon the sun, accompanied by the words . . . 'In this sign conquer . . . .' By the Edict of Milan [of] 313 he formally recognised Christianity as one of the [legally permissible] religions . . . in the Roman Empire, and in 314 [he] summoned the bishops of the western world to the Council of Arles. Since 312 Constantine had been [the] sole emperor of the West, and by defeating Licinius, the emperor in the East, he became [the] sole ruler of the Roman world [in] 324. He set to work to consolidate and [to] reorganise his empire. He increased the autcratic power of the emperor . . . [; he] issued legislation which tied the farmers and [the] workpeople to their crafts in a sort of caste system, and [he] enlisted the suppport of the Christian Church. He summoned . . . and presided over . . . the first general council of the Church at . . . Nicaea [*q. v.]* in 325. Constantine moved his capital to Byzantium on the Bosporus in 330[,] and [he] renamed it Constantinople. In 337 he set out to defend the Euphrates frontier against the Persians, but [he] died at Nicomedia in Asia Minor. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 308, column one)

Coriolanus . . . Gaius (Gnaeus) Marcius, hero of an early Roman legend. His original name was Gaius or Gnaeus Marcius[,] and he was surnamed Coriolanus because of his bravery at the taking of Corioli from the Volsci. Banished from Rome by the commons in 491 BC, he fled to the Volsci, whose king, Attius Tullius, made him general of their army. In 489 [BC] he advanced to within a short distance of Rome, but [he] turned back at the request of Veturia, his wife, and Volumnia, his mother. One version of the story says that he lived in exile among the Volsci till his death; another . . . [version of the story says] . . . that he was put to death as a traitor on his return. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume three, page 618, columns one and two)

Council of Nicaea . . . see Nicaea, Council of.

Creon . . . Son of Menoicus, and brother of Jocaste [*q. v.* (Jocasta)], the wife of Laius. After the death of Laius, Creon governed Thebes [*q. v.]* for a short time, and [he] then surrendered the kingdom to Oedipus [*q. v.],* who had delivered the country from the Sphinx. After the death of Eteocles [*q. v.]* and Polynices [*q. v.],* the sons of Oedipus [*q. v.],* he again assumed the reins of government at Thebes [*q. v.].* His cruelty in forbidding burial to the corpse of Polynices [*q. v.],* and his sentencing [of] Antigone [*q. v.]* to death for disobeying his orders, occasioned the death of his own son Haemon [*q. v.].* . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 171)

Crocale

Darwin . . . Charles Robert 1809 . . . [to] . . . 1882. British scientist; founder of the modern theory of . . . evolution . . . and discoverer of the principle of . . . natural selection. He also made important discoveries in many other areas, including the fertilisation mechanisms of plants, the classification of barnacles . . . and the formation of coral reefs. [He was b]orn . . . [in] . . . . Shrewsbury, [and he was] the grandson of Erasmus . . . Darwin[. H]e studied medicine at Edinburgh and theology at Cambridge. As naturalist of the surveying voyage of HMS **Beagle** [from] 1831 . . . [to] . . . [18]36 . . . he made many observations, especially in South America and the nearby Galapagos Islands, . . . [and these observations] . . . led to his theory of modification of species. Having married his cousin Emma Wedgwood in 1839, he settled in Downe House, Downe, Kent, for the rest of his life. By 1844 he had enlarged his sketch of ideas to an essay of his conclusions, but [he] then left his theory for eight years while he studied barnacles. In 1858

he was forced into action by the receipt of a memoir from A[.] R[.] Wallace, [which] embod[ied] . . . the same theory. In 1859 Darwin published **On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection[,] or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life[,]** which set out the huge amounts of evidence [which] Darwin had collected [in order] to show that evolution had occurred, and [which] explained the principles of natural and sexual selection. It refuted earlier evolutionary theories, such as those of . . . Lamarck. Inevitably, the book aroused bitter controversy because it did not agree with the literal sense of the Book of Genesis. Darwin himself played little part in the debates, but his **Descent of Man** [of] 1871 added fuel to the theological discussion[,] in which T[.] H[.] . . . Huxley and Haeckel took leading parts. Darwin then devoted himself chiefly to botanical studies till his death. He had inherited . . . [forty thousand pounds] . . . on the death of his father, and Darwin's own estate at [*his*] death was valued at £282.000. He was buried in Westminster Abbey. Downe House is maintained as a museum by the Royal College of Surgeons. Darwinism is not enough to explain the evolution of sterile worker bees . . . or altruism. . . . Neo-Darwinism, the current theory of evolution, is a synthesis of Darwin and genetics[, which is] based on the work of . . . Mendel. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 348, columns one and two)

de Saint-Simon . . . see Saint-Simon.

Diana

Dionysus . . . in Greek mythology, god of wine (son of Semele and . . . Zeus), and also of orgiastic excess (an animal, or on occasion a child, being torn to pieces alive and eaten). He was identified with Bacchus [*q. v.],* whose rites were less savage. His festivals, the ***Dionysia,*** were particularly associated with Athens . . . .

Attendant on him were wild women (*maenads)* and goatlike men (*satyrs)* with pointed ears, horns and a tail. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 373, column three)

Eclogues

Elysian . . . adaptation to adjective form of Elysium [*q. v.].*

Elysium . . . or the **Elysian Fields.** In classical mythology, an afterworld or paradise (sometimes called the Islands of the Blessed) for the souls of those who found favour with the gods; it was situated near the river Oceanus. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 417, columns three)

Enlightenment . . . French SIÈCLE DE LUMIÈRES (. . . ['] . . . Age of the Enlightened . . . ['] . . .), German AUFKLÄRUNG, a European intellectual movement of the . . . [seventeenth] . . . and . . . [eighteenth] . . . centuries in which ideas concerning God, reason, nature, and man were synthesised into a worldview that gained wide assent and that instigated revolutionary developments in art, philosophy, and politics. Central to Enlightenment thought were the use and the celebration of reason, the power by which man understands the universe and improves his own condition. The goals of rational man were considered to be knowledge, freedom and happiness. . . . . The power and uses of reason had first been explored by the philosophers of ancient Greece, who discerned in the ordered regularity of nature the workings of an intelligent mind. Rome adopted and preserved much of Greek culture, notably including the ideas of a rational natural order and natural law. Amid the turmoil of empire, however, a new concern arose for personal salvation, and the way was paved for the

triumph of the Christian religion. Christian thinkers gradually found uses for their Greco-Roman heritage. The system of thought known as scholasticism, culminating in the work of Thomas Aquinas, resurrected reason as a tool of understanding but subordinated it to spiritual revelation and the revealed truths of Christianity. . . . . The intellectual and political edifice of Christianity, seemingly impregnable in the European Middle Ages [*q. v.]*, fell in turn to the assaults made on it by humanism [*q. v.*, Glossary of Scholarly Terms], the Renaissance, and the Protestant Reformation. Humanism [*q. v.*, Glossary of Scholarly Terms] bred the experimental science of Francis Bacon, Nicolaus Copernicus, and Galileo and the mathematical rigour of René Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, and Sir Isaac Newton. The Renaissance rediscovered much of classical culture and revived the notion of man as a creative being while the Reformation, more directly but in the long run no less effectively, challenged the monolithic authority of the Roman Catholic church. For Luther as for Bacon or Descartes, the way to truth lay in the application of human reason. Received authority, whether of Ptolemy in the sciences or of the church in the matters of the spirit, was to be subject to the probings of unfettered minds. . . . . The successful application of reason to any question depended on its correct application - on the development of a methodology of reasoning that would serve as its own guarantee of validity. Such a methodology was most spectacularly achieved in the sciences and [in] mathematics, where the logics of induction and deduction made possible the creation of a sweeping new cosmology. The success of Newton, in particular, in capturing in a few mathematical equations the laws that govern the motions of the planets gave great impetus to a growing faith in man's capacity to attain knowledge. At the same time, the idea of the universe as a mechanism governed by a few simple (and discoverable) laws had a subversive effect on the concepts of a personal God and individual salvation that were central to Christianity. . . . . Inevitably, the method of reason was applied to religion itself. The product of a search for a

natural - rational - religion was deism, which, although never an organised cult or movement, conflicted with Christianity for two centuries, especially in England and France. For the deist a very few religious truths sufficed, and they were truths [which were] felt to be manifest to all rational beings: the existence of one God, often conceived as architect or mechanician, the existence of a system of rewards and punishments administered by that God, and the obligation of men to virtue and piety. Beyond the natural religion of the deists lay the more radical products of the application of reason to religion: skepticism, atheism, and materialism *[q. v.].* . . . The Enlightenment produced the first modern secularised theories of psychology and ethics. John Locke conceived of the human mind as being at birth a tabula rasa, a blank slate on which experience wrote freely and boldly, creating the individual character according to the individual experience of the world. Supposed innate qualities, such as goodness or original sin, had no reality. In a darker vein, Thomas Hobbes *[q. v.]* portrayed man as moved solely by considerations of his own pleasure and pain. The notion of man as neither good nor bad but [as] interested principally in survival and [in] the maximisation of his own pleasure led to radical political theories. Where the state had once been viewed as an earthly approximation of an eternal order, with the city of man modeled on the city of God, now it came to be seen as a mutually beneficial arrangement among men aimed at protecting the natural rights and [the] self-interest of each. . . . The idea of society as a social contract, however, contrasted sharply with the realities of actual societies. Thus the Enlightenment became critical, reforming, and eventually revolutionary. Locke and Jeremy Bentham in England, Jean-Jacques Rousseau [q. v.], Montesquieu and Voltaire *[q. v.]* in France, and Thomas Jefferson in America all contributed to an evolving critique of the arbitrary, authoritarian state and to sketching the outline of a higher form of social organisation, based on natural rights and functioning as apolitical democracy. Such powerful ideas found expression as reform in England and as

revolution in France and America. . . . The Enlightenment expired as the victim of its own excesses. The more rarefied the religion of the deists became, the less it offered those who sought solace or salvation. The celebration of abstract reason provoked contrary spirits to begin exploring the world of sensation and emotion in the cultural movement known as Romanticism. The Reign of Terror that followed the French Revolution [*q. v.*] severely tested the belief that man could govern himself. The high optimism that marked much of Enlightenment thought, however, survived as one of the movement's most enduring legacies: the belief that human history is a record of general progress. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Four, page 504, columns one and two)

Eros . . . in Greek mythology, boy-god of love . . . son of . . . Aphrodite [*q.v.*], and armed with bow and arrows; he fell in love with . . . Psyche. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 430, column three)

Estates . . . see Three Estates.

Eteocles . . . Son of Oedipus [*q. v.*] and Jocasta [*q. v.*]. After his father's flight from Thebes [*q. v.*], he and his brother Polynices [*q. v.*] undertook the government of the city; but disputes having arisen between them, Polynices [*q. v.*] fled to Adrastus [*q. v.*], who then brough about the expedition of the Seven against Thebes [*q. v.*]. Eteocles and Polynices [*q. v.*] perished in single combat. . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 213)

Eumenides . . . (kindly ones) or Semnai (revered ones), deities worshipped at the foot of the Areopagus at Athens [*q. v.*], at Colonus and even outside Attica. Their cult was similar to that of Ge (Earth), and they were probably pre-Hellenic spirits concerned

mostly with fertility; but the fact that they came to have certain moral and social functions caused them to be wrongly identified, at least from the time of Aeschylus *[q. v.]* . . . , with the ERINYES, from whom their name must be considered [to be] a euphemism. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman**'**s Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume four, page 702, column one)

Euripides . . . 484 . . . [to] . . . 407 BC. Greek dramatist. His influence on later drama was probably more important than either of the two other great tragedians . . . Aeschylus *[q. v.]* and Sophocles *[q. v.]*. [As a] realist, he was bitterly attacked for his unorthodox 'impiety' and sympathy for the despised: slaves, beggars, and women. His plays reflect his concern with individual passions and [with] social issues, [in that they] deal with ordinary people rather than [with] the idealised heroes and [with such] higher principles [which] were felt at the time to be appropriate subjects for tragedy. He went into voluntary exile from Athens to Macedonia at the end of his life. He wrote more than . . . [eighty] . . . plays, of which . . . [nineteen] . . . survive . . . [;] . . . the most famous . . . . [are] . . . : *Alcestis* [of] 438 BC, *Medea* [of] 431, *Andromache* [of] 420, *Trojan Women* [of] 415, *Electra* [of] 413, *Iphigenia in Tauris* [of] 413, *Iphigenia in Aulis* [of] 405, *Bacchae* [of] 405. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 435, column three)

Eurydice . . . in Greek legend, wife of ORPHEUS. She was bitten by a serpent while fleeing from Aristaeus. Orpheus descended to Hades *[q. v.]* after her, and with his music [he] persuaded Pluto to let her follow him back to the upper world, on condition that he did not once look behind him; but he did, and Eurydice was snatched from him again. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman**'**s Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume four, page 730, columns one and two)

Foucault . . . Michel[,] 1926 . . . [to] . . . 1984. French

philosopher, one of the generation that came to maturity in the 1950s . . . and who rejected . . . phenomenology and . . . existentialism. His work is concerned with how forms of knowledge and forms of human subjectivity are constructed by specific institutions and practices, and [it] is largely historical in character. Foucault was deeply influenced by . . . Nietzsche [*q. v.*], and [he] developed a novel analysis of the operation of power in modern society[, in which he] us[ed] . . . Nietzschean [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms] concepts. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 473, column two)

France . . . see French Revolution.

French Revolution . . . the forcible abolition of the *Ancien Régime[*'s q. v.]* 'old order of things' (feudalism [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms] and absolute monarchy) [in the period from] 1789 . . . [to] . . . [17]99. . . . ***1789*** 5 May[: T]he States General (an assembly of the three 'estates . . . ,[' *q. v.]* . . .) met at Versailles, bent on establishing a new constitution; 17 Jun[e:] National Assembly formed by the Third Estate . . . ; 14 Jul[y] . . . . Bastille was taken by the mob when . . . Louis XVI [*q. v.]* attempted repressive moves . . . . ***1791*** 20 Jun[e: F]light of the royal family to Varennes; 14 Sept[ember:] Louis, brought back as a prisoner, accepted the new constitution. . . . ***1792*** 20 Apr[il: W]ar declared on Austria, which threatened to suppress the revolution; 10 Aug[ust:] royal palace stormed by the French mob; 21 Sept[ember:] First Republic proclaimed. . . . ***1793*** 21 Jan[uary:] Louis XVI [*q. v.]* executed; 2 Jun[e:] overthrow of the moderate . . . Girondists by the . . . Jacobins; rule of the dictatorial Committee of Public Safety; 5 Sept[ember:] the mass executions of the . . . Terror began. . . . ***1794*** 27 Jul[y:] (9 Thermidor under the Revolutionary calendar) fall of Robespierre and end of the Terror; the Directory (a body of five directors) established to hold a middle course between Royalism and Jacobinism. It ruled until . . . Napoleon seized power in 1799.

(Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 485, column one)

Galton . . . Francis[,] 1822 . . . [to] . . . 1911. [A] British scientist . . . [who was] born in Birmingham, England. After discovering the existence of . . . anticylcones, he turned from metereology to [the] study [of] the inheritance of physical and mental attributes in humans. He traced family trees and 'proved' that genius was inherited . . . and [that it] was concentrated in the British. He was an advocate of . . . eugenics. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 494, column three)

Gargaphië

Ghezzis . . . A term given to caricaturists. Count Pierleone Ghezzi (1674 - 1755) was a Roman painter and engraver of caricatures who was well known in Lessing's [*q. v.]* time. (McCormick, Edward Allen, translator, **Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry [by] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing** [*q. v.],* The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1984, page thirteen)

Goethe . . . Johann Wolfgang von[,] 1749 . . . [to] . . . 1832. [The] German poet, novelist, and dramatist, [who is] generally considered [to be] the founder of modern German literature. [He was b]orn at Frankfurt-am-Main, [and] he went on to study law. He was inspired by Shakespeare, to whom he was introduced by . . . Herder, to write the play *Götz von Berlichingen* [which was published in] 1773, and [he] became the leader of the romatic [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms]. His works include the autobiographical *The Sorrows of the Young Werther* [of] 1774, which made him a European figure, and his masterpiece[,] the poetic play *Faust* [of] 1808, [for which he] completed . . . a second part in 1831. He was prime minister at the court of Weimar [from] 1775 . . . [to] . . . [17]85. A visit to Italy

[from] 1786 . . . [to] . . . [17]88 inspired the classical dramas
Iphigenie auf Tauris [of] 1787 and *Tasso* [of] 1790. Also memorable
are the *Wilhelm Meister* novels[, which he wrote between] 1796 . .
. [and] . . . 1829. He was a friend of . . . Schiller. Many of his
lyrics were set to music. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson
Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 519, columns one and
two)

Goldmann

Gothic

Greek Tragedy

Hades . . . in Greek mythology, the underworld where the spirits of
the departed went after death, usually depicted as a cavern or [a]
pit underneat the earth. It was presided over by the god Hades or
. . . Pluto . . . . He was the brother of Zeus [*q. v.],* and [he] married
. . . Persephone, [who was] the daughter of Demeter and Zeus [*q. v.].*
She was allowed to return to the upper world for part of the year,
[in order to] bring . . . spring with her. The entrance to Hades was
guarded by the three-headed dog . . . Cerberus. . . . *Tartarus* was
the section where the wicked were punished, for example **Tantalus** [*q.
v.].* (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**,
Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 544, column two)

Haemon . . . Son of Creon [*q. v.]* of Thebes [*q. v.],* [who] was in
love with Antigone [*q. v.]* . . . and killed himself on hearing that
she was condemend by his father to be entombed alive. . . . (Blakeney,
E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J.
M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 239)

Hegel . . . Georg Wilhelm Friedrich[,] 1770[ ]-[ ]1831. German
philosopher, author of **The Phenomenology of Spirit** [(]1807[)],

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [(]1817[)], and **Philosophy of Right** [(]1821[)]. He was professor of philosophy at Heidelberg [from] 1817 . . . [to] . . . [18]18, and at Berlin [from] 1818 . . . [to] . . . [18]31. Hegel conceived of consciousness and the external object as forming a unity . . . in which neither factor can exist independently. Mind and nature are two abstractions of one indivisible whole. Thus the world is the unfolding and expression of one all-embracing absolute idea, an organism constantly developing by its own internal necessity so as to become the gradual embodiment of reason. Each system by its own development brings about its opposite ([that is, its] antithesis), and finally a higher synthesis unifies and embodies both. As a rightist Hegel championed religion, the Prussian State and the existing order, but leftist followers [(who] include Marx[)] . . . used Hegel's dialectic to attempt to show the inevitability of radical change, and [they] attacked both religion and social order. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 560, columns one and two)

Hellas

Henri Comte de Saint-Simon . . . see **Saint-Simon.**

Hypsipyle

Hobbes . . . Thomas[,] 1588 . . . [to] . . . 1679. [An] English political philosopher, [who was] tutor to the exiled Prince Charles. [He was t]he first thinker since Aristotle [*q. v.]* . . . [who] . . . attempt[ed] to develope a comprehenisve theory of nature, including human behaviour. His political thinking was much influenced by the anarchic age in which he lived[,] and he is best remembered for *The Leviathan* [of] 1651, in which he advocates absolutist government as the only means of ensuring order and security. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia,**

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Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 575, column one)

Homer . . . (fl. . . . [ninth] or . . . [eighth] . . . century BC?, Ionia?), presumed author of the **Iliad** [*q. v.]* and [the] **Odyssey** [*q. v.],* the two greatest epic poems of ancient Greece. . . . . Virtually nothing is known about the life of Homer. Scholars generally agree, however, that he was probably an Ionian who lived in the . . . [ninth] . . . or . . . [the eight] . . . century BC. In the judg[e]ment of most modern scholars, he composed (but porbably [he] did not literally write) the **Iliad** [*q. v.],* most likely relying on oral traditions, and he at least inspired the composition of the **Odyssey** [*q. v.].* Ancient Greeks esteemed these epics as symbols of Hellenistic unity and heroism and as sources of moral and practical instructions. Since that time the **Iliad** [*q. v.]* and [the] **Odyssey** [*q. v.]* have had a profound influence on Western literature[,] and [they] have been translated into modern languages countless times. Their value lies chiefly in the poetry itself, which often moves from sublime passages dealing with gods and heroic exploits to passages expressing deep human emotion. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Six, page twenty four, column three)

Hyale

Household Lares . . . see Lares.

Isis

Ismene . . . daughter of Oedipus [*q. v.]* and Jocasta [*q. v.],* and sister of Antigone [*q. v.]*. . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London,

1910, page 285)

Jena . . . Battle of, also called BATTLE OF JENA-AUERSTÄDT (Oct[ober] . . . 14, 1806), military engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, fought between 122,000 French troops and 114,000 Prussians and Saxons, at Jena and [at] Auerstädt, in Saxony (modern Germany). In the battle, Napoleon smashed the outdated Prussian army [which he had] inherited from Frederick II the Great, . . . [and this] . . . resulted in the reduction of Prussia to half its former size at the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807. . . . Frederick William III of Prussia prepared for war after signing a secret alliance with Russia in July 1806. In early October the Prussian-Saxon army, under Charles William Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick, moved slowly westward through Saxony in an attempt to threaten Napoleon's communications to the west. Napoleon advanced northward rapidly through the eastern end of the Thuringian Forest to cut the Prussians off from the the Elbe River and [to] engage them before their Russian allies could join them. The Prussians had to face about to meet this attack from their rear. Frederick William III placed 63,000 men under Duke Charles William Ferdinand at Auerstädt and about 51,000 under Prince Friedrich Ludwig of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen on a . . . [fifteen] . . . mile (. . . [twenty four] . . . kilometre) front between Weimar and Jena. . . . Shortly after dawn on October 14, Napoleon, employing only about 54,000 of his 96,000 troops, struck Friedrich Ludwig's 38,000 troops at Jena. By 3[:00] PM he had swept them and . . . [thirteen thousand] . . . reinforcements from the field. About . . . [thirteen] . . . miles (. . . [twenty one] . . . k[ilo]m[etres]) to the north, at Auerstädt, the secondary French force of 26,000, under Louis-Nicolas Davout, encountered Charles William Ferdinand's main Prussian army. The duke dissipated his vastly superior strength in piecemeal attacks, enabling Davout to stand firm for six hours. After the duke was mortally wounded, Frederick William III took command. The Prussians' attack slackened when they heard the news of the French victory at Jena. Davout moved up his artillery to rake

the entire Prussian line, and by 4[:00] ᴘᴍ the Prussian army had disintegrated. Davout was later made Duke d'Auerstädt for his extraordinary victory. The double victory of the French cost them about . . . [twelve thousand] . . . casualties to about 24,000 Prussian and Saxon casualties and about . . . [twenty thousand] . . . more captured. Napoleon completed his conquest of Prussia within six weeks, before Russia could act to aid its ally. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Six, page 528, column one, and page 529, column three)

Jocasta . . . wife of Laius . . . and mother of Oedipus [*q. v.].* . . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 290)

Jupiter . . . or **Jove** in mythology, chief god of the Romans, identified with the Greek . . . Zeus [*q. v.].* He was god of the sky, associated with lightning and thunderbolt, protector in battle and bestower of victory. He was the son of Saturn [*q. v.],* married his sister Juno, and [he] reigned on Olympus as lord of heaven. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 657, column one)

Kant . . . Immanuel [(]1724[ ]-[ ]1804[)]. German philosopher. Born . . . [in] . . . Königsberg, he attended the university there, and in 1770 [he] was appointed professor . . . [of] logic and [of] metaphysics [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms]. Best-known of his works is the **Kritik der reinen Vernunft** . . . [(]**Critique of Pure Reason[)** of] 1781, which was followed by the **Prolegomena** [in] 1783, **Metaphysik der Sitten** . . . [(]**Metaphysic of Ethics[)** in] 1785, **Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft** . . . [(]**Metaphysic of Nature[)** in] 1786, **Kritik der praktischen Vernunft** . . . [(]**Critique of Practical Reason[)** in] 1788 and **Kritik der Urtheilskraft** . . . [(]**Critique of Judg[e]ment[)** in] 1790. Kant

argued that our knowledge of the world cannot be the mere aggregate of impressions impinging on our consciousness from our senses([, which was] roughly the view of . . . Locke), but that it is dependent upon the conceptual apparatus of the human understanding – which is not itself derived from experience. In ethics, Kant stressed that the right action is objectively determinable and [that it] must conform to a moral law [which] he called 'the Categorical Imperative . . . ;['] feelings and inclinations [he further argued] are not a basis for moral decisions. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 661, column two)

Kojève

Lamettrie

Lares . . . The lares were Roman household gods who represented the spirits of the founding ancestors of a family. Each household had its own lar, to whom a portion of each meal was offered. Family lares were often represented by statues of a youth with a drinking horn and cup. Public lares were patrons of the state who presided over the major corssroads of the city. (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume twelve, page 207, column one)

Lenin . . . Vladimir Ilyich. Adopted name of Russian politician Vladimir Ilyich Ulyano 1870 . . . [to] . . . 1924. Born . . . [in] . . . Simbirsk (. . . [later . . . named] Ulyanovsk), he became a lawyer in St Petersburg (. . . [later . . . named] Leningrad). [He was s]ent to Siberia for revolutionary Marxist propaganda [from] 1895 . . . [to] . . . 1900, [and] he then edited the Social Democratic paper **Iskra** ('The Spark') from abroad . . . [;] . . . he visited London several times . . . . In [his book] **What is to be done?** [of] 1902, he advocated a professional core of party activists to spearhead the revolution in Russia, a suggestion [which was] accepted by the

majority (**bolsheviki)** at the London party congress in 1903. [Having been a]ctive in the 1905 Revolution, Lenin had again to leave Russia when it failed, settling in Switzerland in 1914, from where he attacked Socialist support for World War I as for an 'imperialist' struggle, and [he] wrote **Imperialism** [in] 1917. On the renewed outbreak of revolution in Mar[ch] 1917, he returned to Russia. With the overthrow of the provisional government, he became president of a Soviet government, concluded peace with Germany . . . and organised a successful resistance to 'White' (pro-Tsarist) uprisings and foreign intervention. [When c]ommunism [had] prov[ed] . . . inadequate to put the country on its feet, he introduced a private enterprise New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 ([it was] reversed by Stalin in 1929). He had founded the Third (Communist) International in 1919, but his health declined following injuries in an assassination attempt in 1918. His embalmed body is a tourist attraction in a mausoleum in Red Square, Moscow. He married in 1898 *Nadeshda Konstantinova Krupskaya* (1869 - 1939), who shared his work . . . and [who] wrote **Memories of Lenin.** (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 704, column two)

Lessing . . . Gotthold Ephraim[,] 1729 . . . [to] . . . 1781. German dramatist and critic. [He was b]orn at Kamenz in Saxony, [and] he studied at Leipzig . . . [;] . . . he subsequently lived in Berlin, Leipzig, and Hamburg. His dramatic masterpieces include *Miss Sara Sampson* [of] 1755, [which is] the first German tragedy of ordinary life; *Philotas* [of] 1759[, which is] a one-act prose tragedy; the comedy *Minna von Barnhelm* [of] 1767 with a Seven Years' War background; the domestic tragedy *Emilia Galotti* [of] 1772; and the verse play *Nathan der Weise* [of] 1779, which treats the theme of religious tolerance. As a critic he decisively influenced the course of German literature with *Laokoon* [of] 1766[,] in which he analysed the functions of poetry and [of] the plastic arts; and with the *Hamburgische Dramaturgie[,* which he wrote from] 1767 . . . [to] .

. . [17]68, in which he re-interpreted Aristotle [*q. v.]* and attacked the restrictive form of French classical drama in favour of the freer approach of Shakespeare. His many theological and philosophical writings include *Ernst und Falk* [from the period] 1777 . . . [to] . . . [17]80, . . . [wherein he advocates] . . . tolerance and understanding in human affairs. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 707, column three)

Louis XVI . . . 1754 . . . [to] . . . 1793. Grandson of Louis XV; king of France from 1774. He was dominated by his queen, . . . Marie Antoinette, and the finances fell into such confusion that in 1789 the States General had to be summoned, and revolution began. Louis lost his personal popularity in Jun[e] 1791, when he attempted to flee the country ([this episode became known as] the [']Flight to Varennes[']) and in Aug[ust] 1792 the Parisians stormed the . . . Tuileries and took the royal family prisoner. [He was d]eposed in Sept[ember] . . . [and] . . . tried in Dec[ember. He was] sentenced for treason in Jan[uary] 1793 . . . and guillotined. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 730, column three, and page 731, column one)

Mars

Menenius . . . Lanatus, Agrippa, consul B. C. 503. It was owing to his mediation that the first great rupture between the patricians and [the] plebeians, when the latter seceded to the Sacred Mount, was brought to a happy and peaceful termination in 493 [BC]; and it was upon this occasion [that] he is said to have related to the plebeians his well-known fable of the belly and the members. . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 335)

Middle Ages . . . a term used from the [seventeen]th century for the

period of European history between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance. It is usually regarded as beginning in the . . . [fif]th century and [as] ending in the . . . [fifteen]th [century]. Among its distinctive features were the unity of Western Europe within the Roman Catholic Church; the feudal organisation of political, social, and economic relations; and, in . . . medieval art, the use of painting and sculpture almost exclusively for Christian ends. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 792, column one)

Mithras

Mnemosyne

Nephele

Nether Gods . . .

Nicaea, Council of . . . [the first ecumenical council of the] Christian church[. It was] held at Nicaea in 325, [having been] called by the Emperor Constantine [*q. v.],* [and] in . . . [it] . . . . Arianism was condemned as heretical[,] and the doctrine of the . . . Trinity was established under . . . Athanasius as the . . . Nicene Creed. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 853, column two)

Nicholas II . . . (1868[ ]-[ ]1918), the last Russian Tsar, first cousin of King George V of Britain, son of ALEXANDER III, whom he succeeded in 1894. He had considerable personal charm and natural intelligence, and [[he] loved his family and [his] country, but he was reactionary in his outlook and of a weak and irresolute character. In reply to an address on his accession by the Tver Zemstvo he spoke of 'senseless dreams of the participation of Zemstvo representatives in the affairs of internal

administration[,]' and [he] stated his resolve to maintain the principle of authocracy. However, he was forced by the Revolution of 1905 to grant a constitution providing for a legislative assembly . . . . The main events of his reign in external affairs were the strengthening of the Franco-Russian alliance, the convening by Nicholas (on the initiative of Witte) of the Hague conference in 1898[,] which set up the International Court of Arbitration, the occupation of Port Arthur in 1896 and of Manchuria in 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War of [the years] 1904 . . . [and] . . . [19]05. Soon after the beginning of the First World War Nicholas dismissed his uncle, the Grand Duke Nicholas, and [he] himself became commander-in-chief of the armed forces, leaving the government of the country to the Empress . . . and in fact to Rasputin. At the beginning of the February Revolution in 1917 he immediately followed the advice of the Duma leaders and [of] the military commanders to abdicate. He was at first confined to the palace at Tsarskoye Selo . . . [and] . . . then banished to Tobolsk in Siberia. After the Bolshevik seizure of power Nicholas was brought to Ekaterinburg and, together with his family, [he] was shot by the Cheka on the orders of the local soviet . . . . ***Bibliography:*** R. Charques, *Twilight of Imperial Russia: the Reign of Tsar Nicholas II,* 1965; R. K. Massie, *Nicholas and Alexandra,* 1969. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume eight, page 680, column one)

Nietzsche . . . Friedrich Wilhelm [(]1844[ ]-[ ]1900[)]. German philosopher. Born . . . [in] . . . Röcken, Saxony, he attended Bonn university, and [he] was professor of Greek at Basle [from] 1869 . . . [to] . . . [18]80. He had abandoned theology for philology . . . and [he] was influenced by the writings of . . . Schopenhauer and [by] the music of . . . Wagner, of whom he became both friend and advocate. Both these attractions passed, however, and ill-health caused his resignation from the university. He spent his later years in . . . [northern] . . . Italy, in the Engadine and in . . . [southern]

. . . . France. During his mature years he published **Morgenröte** [(]1880[ ]-[18]81[)], **Die fröhliche Wissenschaft** [(]1881[ ]-[18]82[)], **Also sprach Zarathustra** [(]1883[ ]-[18]85[)], **Jenseits von Gut und Böse** [(]1885[ ]-[18]86[)], **Genealogie der Moral** [(]1887[)], and **Ecce Homo** [(]1888[)]. He suffered a permanent breakdown in 1889 from overwork and loneliness. . . . The philosophy of Nietzsche is the rejection of the accepted absolute moral values and [of] the 'slave morality' of Christianity, for he argued that 'God is dead' . . . and that people are therefore free to create their own values. His ideal was [the] *Übermensch* or 'Superman[,]' who would impose his will on the weak and worthless. Until this century . . . his beliefs remained ignored or opposed . . . by conservatives and socialists alike, but support for modern . . . totalitarianism has often been claimed in Nietzsche's writings, by the . . . Nazi movement, among others. Nietzsche claimed that knowledge is never objective . . . but always serves some interest or unconscious purpose. His insights into the relation between thought and language have had an important influence on contemporary philosophy. . . . Nietzsche has exercised considerable influence on literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis . . . and religion, while his Superman has been considered a prototype for Hitler's ideal Aryan. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 855, columns one and two)

Noblesse D'**Épée** . . . see Noblesse De Robe.

Noblesse De Robe . . . (French: Nobility of the Robe), in . . . . [seventeenth century] . . . and . . . [eighteenth] century France, a class of hereditary nobles who acquired their rank through holding a high state office. Their name was derived from the robes worn by officials. The class was already in existence by the end of the . . . [sixteenth] . . . century, but it was only in the . . . [seventeenth] . . . century that its members qcquired the right to transmit noble status to their heirs. The period of the 1640s and

1650s was pivotal in the development of the *noblesse de robe.* In an attempt to bargain for political support during the troubled minority of Louis XIV, the crown granted detailed charters of nobility to judicial officials. At the summit of this newly created privileged class were the officers of such sovereign courts as the Parlement of Paris. . . . Because of their bourgeois [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms] background, the families of the *noblesse de robe* were at first disdained by nobles who derived their rank from military service (*noblesse d'épée)* and from long-standing possession *(noblesse de race).* The distinction between the old and the new aristocracies, between the sword and [the] robe, gradually blurred during the . . . [eighteenth] . . . century as both groups worked to defend privilege against attempts at reform by the king. In fact, it was the *noblesse de robe* that, because of its wealth, its rising social status, and its control of official positions, took the lead in opposition to reform. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Eight, page 748, columns one and two)

Novalis . . . pseudonym of Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772 . . . [to] . . . 1801), [a] German poet and philosopher, [who was] born at Oberwiederstedt, Thuringia. He studied at Jena, Leipzig, and Wittenberg[,] and [he] then went to Armstadt[,] where he fell in love with Sophie von Kühn[,] who was then . . . [fifteen years old]. In 1795 he was made auditor of the Saxon Salt Works, of which his father was director. The death[s] of Sophie . . . and of his brother Erasmus, both in 1797, . . . [were] . . . a severe shock. The tragedy aroused in Novalis a poetic and mystic strength. Feeling himself ecstatically united with his dead beloved, he tried to free the spirit from material things, and many of his poems contain a note of mysticism. *Hymnen an die Nacht* . . . were written [at] about this time. He began the romance *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* in 1800, but [he] never completed it; in 1802 his *Geistliche Lieder* were published.

. . . . Novalis is now considered [to be] one of the most important of the early romantics . . . . His works were collected and edited by his friends L. Tieck and F. Schlegel in 1802. A later edition is by P. Kluckhohn (with diaries) . . . [; this appeared in] 1928. . . . *Bibliography:* Studies by E. Heilborn, 1901; R. Samuel, 1925; J. von Minnegerode, 1941. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume nine, page fifty, column two, and page fifty one, column one)

Odysseus . . . (son of wrath), Latin Ulysses [*q. v.]* (from a western Greek form *Olysseus,* wolf), in Greek legend, son of Laertes, ruler of Ithaca (modern Thiaki or Levkas); his wife was PENELOPE [*q. v.],* by whom he had a son, TELEMACHUS [*q. v.].* Odysseus sailed with the Greeks to Troy, after some unwillingness . . . , and his courage, cunning, or eloquence proved a match for every situation during the siege. The most famous part of his story is that of his ten years' wandering by sea after the fall of Troy, as told in Homer's [*q. v.] Odyssey [q. v.].* (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume nine, page 126, column two, and page 127, column one)

Odyssey . . . The ancient Greek epic the *Odyssey,* by HOMER [*q. v.],* is thought to have been composed during the later part of the . . . [eight] . . . century BC. As with the ILIAD [*q. v.],* the poem's tight thematic control and organisation belie its oral-formulaic origins. The poem describes the long and difficult return journey of the Greek hero Odysseus [*q. v.]* to Ithaca at the conclusion of the Trojan War. After . . . [ten] . . . years of war, followed by . . . . [ten] . . . years of wandering, affliction and distraction in perilous and semimagical surroundings, Odysseus [*q. v.]* arrives home only to find his wife, Penelope [*q. v.],* besieged by suitors. By juxtaposing the fantastic worlds of the wanderings with the real world of Itaca, and by contrasting the despair and dissatisfaction of Odysseus [*q. v.]* while away from home with the joy and

satisfaction he feels on returning, Homer [*q. v.*] focuses on what it is to be human and on the values and ideals that inform human existence. The *Odyssey* has served as the archetype for later applications of the theme of wandering, of which both the first half of Vergil's *Aeneid* and James Joyce's *Ulysses* [*q. v.*] are probably the most distinguished examples. . . . **Bibliography:** Beye, Charles R., *The Iliad [q. v.], the Odyssey and the Epic Tradition* (1966; repr[inted] . . . 1976); Birk, Newman P. and Genevieve B., *The Odyssey Reader: Ideas and Style* (1968); Clarke, Howard W., *The Art of the Odyssey* (1967); Finley, M. I., *The World of Odysseus [q. v.],* rev[ised] . . . ed[ition] . . . (1978); Page, Denys L., *The Homeric Odyssey* (1955; repr[inted] . . . 1977); Steward, Douglas J., *The Disguised Guest: Rank, Role, and Identity in the Odyssey* (1976). . . . . Gerald Fitzgerald . . . (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume fourteen, page 351, column one)

Oedipus . . . in Greek legend, king of Thebes [*q. v.*]. He was exposed and left to die at birth because his father Laius had been warned by an oracle that his son would kill him. Saved and brought up by the King of Corinth, Oedipus killed Laius in a quarrel (without recognising him) and, because he saved Thebes [*q. v.*] from the Sphinx, [he] was granted the Theban [*q. v.*] kingdom and Jocasta [*q. v.*] ([who was the] wife of Laius and [the] mother of Oedipus) as his wife. After four children had been born, the truth was discovered; Jocasta [*q. v.*] hanged herself, Oedipus blinded himself, and as an exiled wanderer [he] was guided by his daughter, Antigone [*q. v.*]. Sophocles [*q. v.*] used the story in two tragedies. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 874, column three, and page 875, column one)

Old Testament . . . also called HEBREW BIBLE, the set of sacred writings shared by Judaism and Christianity. The term Old Testament implies the Christian addition of a subsequent New Testament. . . . . . .

. . . . Both Christians and Jews are known as 'people of the Book,' and the Old Testament's profoundly theological interpretation of human life and the universe as creations of the one God is the structure of ideas in which both faiths exist. The term Old Testament was devised by a Christian, Melito of Sardis, *c.* AD 170 to distinguish this part of the Bible from the New Testament. Except for a few passages in Aramaic, the Old Testament was written originally in Hebrew during the period from 1,200 [BC] to 100 BC. . . . The Hebrew canon recognises the following subdivisions of its three main divisions: (1) the Torah . . . , or Pentateuch, contains narratives combined with rules and instructions, in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deutereonomy; (2) the Nevi'im . . . or Prophets, is subdivided into the Former Prophets, with anecdotes about major Hebrew persons in the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, and stories of the Latter Prophets exhorting Israel to return to God in Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Twelve Minor Prophets; and (3) the Ketuvim . . . , or Writings, with poetry – devotional and erotic; and theology and drama to be found in Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles. . . . The total number of books in the Hebrew canon is . . . [twenty four] . . . , [which is] the number of scrolls on which these works were written in ancient times. The Old Testament as adopted by Christianity numbers more works for the following reasons. The Roman Catholic canon, derived initially from the Greek-language Septuagint . . . translation of the Hebrew Bible, absorbed a number of books that Jews and Protestants later determined were not canonical . . . ; and Christians divided some of the original Hebrew works into two or more parts, specifically, Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles (two parts each), Ezra-Nehemiah (two separate books), and the Minor Prophets (. . . [twelve] . . . separate books). (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992,

Micropædia, Volume Eight, page 909, columns two and three)

Olympian Gods

Osiris . . . ancient Egyptian god (who wears a tall curved hat with a plume each side), [who is] the embodiment of goodness, [and] who went to rule the underworld, after . . . [having been] . . . killed by **Set,** the god of night, [of] the desert, and [of] evil ([who was] portrayed as a grotesque animal). The sister-wife of Osiris was the sky and fertility goddess . . . **Isis**[ ]/[ ]**Hathor** (who wears a cow's horns, with a sun-disc between them). Her rites were mysterious, . . . [just like] . . . those of . . . Demeter, with whom she was identified by the Greeks. The son of Osiris and Isis was **Horus** (falcon-headed, or shown as a boy, representing the youthful sun), the pharaohs were thought to be his incarnation. Horus captured his father's murderer Set. Under . . . Ptolemy I's Graeco-Egyptian empire Osiris was developed (as a means of uniting his Greek and Egyptian subjects) into **Serapis** (Osiris[ ]+[ ]Apis, the latter being the bull-god of Memphis who carried the dead to the tomb), elements of the cults of Zeus and Hades being included, which did not please the Egyptians; the greatest temple of Serapis was the Serapeum at Alexandria. The cult of Osiris, and that of Isis, later spread to Rome. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 888, column one)

Ovid . . . 43 BC . . . [to] . . . 17 AD. [A] Roman poet[,] whose full name was Publius Ovidius Naso. [He was b]orn at Sulmo, [and] he studied rhetoric in rome in preparation for a legal career, but [he] soon turned to literature. In 8 AD he was banished by Augustus to Tomi, on the Black Sea, where he died: this punishment was supposedly for his immoral *Ars amatoria,* but [it] was probably because of some connection with Julia, the profligate daughter of Augustus. Among his works are the youthful *Amores;* the *Metamorphoses,* [which are] mythical stories of miraculous transformations; the *Fasti,* [which]

form . . . an incomplete poetic calendar, and the fruits of his exile, the elegiac *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto.* (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 874, column three, and page 891, column one)

Pantheon . . . temple in the Campus Martius at Rome, now the church of S. Maria della Rotunda. It was built, and most probably designed, by the emperor Hadrian (AD 117 . . . [to] . . . [AD] 138) on the site of an earlier temple [which was] dedicated to Mars [*q. v.]* and Venus [*q. v.]* by M. Vipsanius Agrippa in 27 BC. The name derives from a much later tradition that it was a temple 'of all the gods' (Greek *panton ton theon).* The Pantheon is a circular building, the largest of its kind in antiquity; it is surmounted by a dome (. . . [with an] . . . interior diameter . . . [of forty three metres and a height] . . . from floor to summit . . . [of forty five metres] . . .)[,] and [it] is entered by a portico of . . . [sixteen] . . . Corinthian columns which may have formed part of Agrippa's edifice. The gilt bronze tiles that originally covered the dome were removed to Constantinople at an early date; the bronze trusses and girders that carried the roof of the portico were melted down in the . . . [seventeenth] . . . century for use in GBernini's badachino in St Peter's. The bronze rosettes and mouldings that once adorned the coffers have also disappeared, and some of the present interior decorations are of later Renaissance date. . . . [(]The name is also applied to a famous church in Paris[, which was] designed by Soufflot in 1755.[)] (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume nine, page 326, column two)

Pauson

Penates . . . (Latin: 'those who live in the cupboard') were the ancient Roman gods who watched over the household. Responsible for guarding the domestic stores, they were linked with the general welfare of the family members[,] and [they] were worship[p]ed at the

hearth, where food was sacrificed to them. In Roman mythology the penates were originally the house gods of AENEAS, which he brought with him from the destroyed city of Troy. They were later given special importance by the state. The public penates dwelled in the Temple of VESTA[,] and [they] were considered to be protectors of the Roman nation. (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume fourteen, page 351, column one)

Penelope . . .

Periclean Athens . . . see Pericles.

Pericles . . . c[irca] . . . 490 [BC] . . . [to] . . . 429 BC. [An] Athenian politician, who dominated the city's affairs from 461 BC (as leader of the democratic party) . . . and under whom Greek culture reached its climax. He created a confederation of cities under the leadership of Athens [*q. v.],* but the disasters of the . . . Peloponnesian War led to his overthrow [in] 430 BC. Although [he was] quickly reinstated, he died soon [there]after. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 915, column one)

Pharisee . . . member of a Jewish sect which arose in the . . . [second] . . . century BC . . . in protest against all compromise with Hellenistic culture. The main emphasis was on strict observance of the law, rather than on ritual; hence the Pharisees came into conflict with the priestly caste . . . [the] . . . Sadducees. Although they believed in a coming Messiah, they rejected political action, and in the . . . [first] . . . century AD the left wing of their followers, the Zealots, broke away to pursue a revolutionary nationalist policy. After the fall of Jerusalem, Pharisee ideas became the basis of orthodox Judaism. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 921, column

three)

Phiale

Philoctetes

Philosophe . . . any of the literary men, scientists, and thinkers of . . . [eighteenth] . . . century France who were united, in spite of divergent personal views, in their conviction of the supremacy and efficacy of human reason. . . . Inspired by the philosophic thought of René Descartes, the skepticism of the Libertins, or freethinkers, and the popularisation of science by Bernard de Fontenelle, the philosophes expressed support for [the] social, economic, and political reforms, [which had been] occasioned by sectarian dissensions within the church, [by] the weakening of the absoute monarchy, and [by] the ruinous wars that had occurred toward the end of Louis XIV's reign. In the early part of the . . . [eighteenth] . . . century, the movement was dominated by Voltaire *[q. v.]* and Montesquieu, but that restrained phase became more volatile in the second half of the century. Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Rousseau *[q. v.],* Geoges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, and the Marquis de Condorcet were among the philosophes who devoted their energies to compiling the *Encyclopédie* . . . , one of the great intellectual achievements of the century. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Nine, page 388, column one)

Philosophes . . . see philosophe.

Phoebus

Plato . . . c[irca] . . . 428 [BC] . . . [to] . . . c[irca] . . . 348 BC. Athenian philosopher whose profound thinking survived in

written form and has exerted wide influence on Christianity and [on] European culture, directly and through . . . Augustine, [through] the Florentine Platonists during the . . . Renaissance . . . and [through] countless others. Born of [a] noble family, he entered politics on the aristocratic side, and in philosophy [he] became a follower of . . . Socrates [*q. v.]*. He travelled widely after Socrates'[s *q. v.]* death in about 387 [BC], and [he] founded his Academy in order to train a new ruling class. . . . Of his work, some . . . [thirty] . . . dialogues survive. The principal figure in these ethical and philosophical debates is Socrates [*q. v.,]* and the early ones employ the Socratic method, in which he asks questions and traps the students into contradicting themselves, [as] for example . . . [in] **Iron,** on poetry. Other famous dialogues include the **Symposium,** on love, **Phaedo,** on immortality, and **Apology and Crito,** on Socrates'[s *q. v.]* trial and death. It is impossible to say whether Plato's [*q. v.]* Socrates [*q. v.]* is a faithful representative of the real man. Plato's philosophy rejects scientific rationalism (that is, [it rejects the method of] establishing facts through experiment) in favour of arguments, because mind, not matter, is fundamental, and material objects are merely imperfect copies of abstract and eternal 'ideas . . . .['] . . . His political philosophy is expounded in two treatises, **The Republic** and **The Laws,** both of which describe ideal states . . . . Platonic love is inspired by a person's best qualities[,] and [it] seeks their development; Plato conceived such love as homosexual, but during the Renaissance the term was applied to heterosexual relationships which excluded physical desires. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia,** Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 938, columns two and three)

Plutarch . . . c[irca] . . . 46 . . . [to] . . . 120 . . . . Greek biographer. [He was b]orn at Chaeronea, [and] he lectured on philosophy at Rome . . . [;] . . . [he] was appointed procurator of Greece by Hadrian. His **Parallel Lives** consist of pairs of

biographies of Greek and Roman soldiers and politicians followed by comparisons between the two. North's 1579 translation inspired Shakespeare's [*q. v.]* Roman plays. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 940, column one)

Polynices . . . son of Oedipus [*q. v.]* and Jocasta [*q. v.],* and brother of Eteocles [*q. v.]* and Antigone [*q. v.].* . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 421)

Pre-revolutionary France . . . see French Revolution.

Prometheus . . . in Greek mythology, a . . . Titan [*q. v.]* who stole fire from heaven for the human race. In revenge, . . . Zeus [*q. v.]* had him chained to a rock with an eagle preying on his liver, until he was rescued by . . . Hercules. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 960, column two)

Psecas

Pyreicus

Pythagoras . . . c[irca] 580 [BC] . . . [to] . . . 500 BC. Greek mathematician and philosopher. . . . He was the founder of a politically influential religious brotherhood in Croton, . . . [southern] . . . Italy [which was] suppressed in the . . . [fifth] . . . century. Its tenets included immortality of the soul and . . . . transmigration. . . . Much of Pythagoras'[s] work concerned numbers, to which he assigned mystical properties. For example, he classified numbers into triangular ones (1, 3, 6, 10, . . .)which can be represented as a triangular array, and square ones (1, 4, 9, 16, . . .) which form squares. He also observed that any two adjacent

triangular numbers add to a square number (for example, 1 + 3 = 4, 3 + 6 = 9, 6 + 10 = 16, . . .) . . . . In geometry, *Pythagoras'[s] theorem* states that in a right-angled triangle, the square of the hypotenuse (the longest side) is equal to the sum of the squares of the lenghts of the other two sides. If the hypotenuse is *h* units long and the lenghts of the other sides are *a* and *b,* then $h^2 = a^2 + b^2$. This provides a way for calculating the length of any side of such a triangle if the lengths of the other two sides are known. The theorem is also true for any regular polygons constructed on the side of a right-angled triangle (not merely for squares). (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 969, column one, and page 970, columns one and two)

Pythagorean . . . . . . adaptation to adjective form of Pythagoras *q. v.*

Revolution . . . see **French Revolution.**

Rhanis

Rococo

Romanov . . . The Romanov dynasty ruled Russia from 1613 until the February Revolution of 1917 . . . . The family was descended from Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla, a Muscovite boyaar who lived in the first half of the . . . [fourteenth] . . . century. The name *Romanov* was taken from Roman Yuriev ([who] d[ied] . . . [in] . . . 1543), the father of Anastasia Romanova ([who] d[ied] . . . [in] . . . 1560), who was the first wife of Tsar IVAN IV. . . . MICHAEL Romanov, grandnephew of Anastasia, was elected tsar by a National Assembly in 1613; he was the first of the dunasty to rule Russia. Important Romanov rulers included PETER I, whose reign marks the beginning of imperial Russia; CATHERINE II, [who was] actually a German who married into the family; ALEXANDER I, who defeated Napoleon in 1812; and

ALEXANDER II, who emancipated the serfs in 1861. The last Romanov tsar, NICHOLAS II [*q. v.],* abdicated in March 1917. He and his immediate famnily were executed [in] . . . July 1918 . . . at Ekaterinburg ([which is the] modern Sverdlovsk). . . . DONALD L. LAYTON . . . **Bibliography**: Bergamini, John, *The Tragic Dynasty: the History of the Romanovs* (1969); Cowles, Virginia, *The Romanovs* (1971); Mazour, Anatole G., *Rise and Fall of the Romanovs* (1960). (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume sixteen, page 290, column two, and page 291, column one)

Roosevelt . . . Theodore [()]1858[ ]-[ ]1919. . . . Twenty sixth president of the U[nited] S[tates of] A[merica]. Born in New York, he was elected to the state legislature as a Republican in 1881. He was assistant secretary of the Navy [from] 1897 . . . [to] . . . [18]98, and during the . . . Spanish War of 1898 [he] commanded a volunteer force of 'rough riders . . . .['] After serving as governor of New York [from] 1898 . . . [to] . . . 1900[,] he was elected[, in 1900] Republican vice-president . . . to McKinley, whom he succeeded as president on his assassination in 1901, and [he] was elected in 1904. In office he campaigned against the great . . . trusts ([which were] combines that reduce competition), and [he] initiated measures for the conservation of national resources, while carrying on a jingoist foreign policy [which was] designed to enforce . . . [the] . . . supremacy [of the United States of America] over Latin America. . . . [Having been a]lienated after his retirement in 1909 by the conservatism of his successor . . . Taft, Roosevelt formed the Progressive or 'Bull Moose' Party, as whose candidate he unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in 1912 against Taft and Wilson. During World War I he strongly advocated American intervention. . . . He wrote historical and other works, including [from 1889 to 1896] **The Winning of the West** . . . . [He was a] big-game hunter, [but] he refused in 1902 to shoot a bear cub, and teddy bears are named after him. . . . [He] . . . won the Nobel Peace Prize for

his part in ending the Russo-Japanese war. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1009, columns one to three)

Rousseau . . . Jean Jacques [(]1712[ ]-[ ]1778[)]. French philosopher, born in Geneva. He published an examination of the **Origin and Foundations of Inequality Amongst Men** [in] 1754 and **Émile** [in] 1762, outlining a new theory of education to elicit the inspoiled nature and abilities of children. His revolutionary **Social Contract** [of] 1762, which saw governments as [having been] given authority by the people, who could also withdraw it, was immensely successful. [H]is 'noble savage' concept and [his] attacks on private property . . . caused much offence; his **Confessions,** a frank exposure of his personal faults and weaknesses, has had lasting influence on the nature of autobiography. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1012, columns two and three)

Saint-Simon . . . Claude Henri . . . Comte de[,] 1760 . . . [to] . . . 1825. French socialist. Born in Paris, he fought in the American War of Independence[,] and [he] was imprisoned during the French Revolution [*q. v.].* He advocated an atheist society ruled by technicians in **Du Système industrielle** [(]**The Industrial System[)**] which was published in] 1821. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1027, column one)

Saturn . . . in Roman mythology, the god of agriculture (Greek *Kronos),* whose period of rule was the ancient Golden Age. He was dethroned by his sons Jupiter [*q. v.],* Neptune, and Pluto. At his festival, the saturnalia in Dec[ember], gifts were exchanged, and slaves were briefly treated as their masters' equals. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1036, column three)

<u>Serapis</u>

Shakespeare . . . William [(]1564[ ]-[ ]1616[)]. English dramatist and poet, [who is] considered [to be] the greatest English playwright. [He was b]orn . . . [in] . . . Stratford-on-Avon . . . [as] . . . the son of a wool-dealer, [and] he was educated at the grammar school . . . [;] . . . in 11582 [he] married Anne . . . Hathaway. They had a daughter, Susanna, in 1583, and twins[,] Hamnet ([who] died [in] 1596) and Judith in 1595. Having joined a company of players, he was by 1589 established in London as an actor and a playwright. Early plays, written around 1589 . . . [to] . . . [15]93, were the tragedy **Titus Andronicus;** the comedies **The Comedy of Errors, The Taming of the Shrew,** and [**The] Two Gentlemen of Verona;** the three parts of **Henry VI;** and **Richard III.** [In] about 1593 he came under the patronage of the Earl of . . . Southampton, to whom he dedicated his long poems **Venus [*q. v.*] and Adonis** [of] 1593 and **The Rape of Lucrece** [of] 1594; he also wrote for him the comedy **Love**'**s Labour**'**s Lost,** satirising . . . Raleigh's circle, and [he] seems to have dedicated to him his sonnets . . . [of] . . . around 1593 . . . [to] . . . [15]96, in which the mysterious 'Dark Lady' appears. From 1594 Shakespeare was a member of the Chamberlain's (later the King's) company of players, and [he] had no rival as a dramatist . . . [;] . . . [in that period his] lyric plays **Romeo and Juliet,** [**A] Midsummer Night**'**s Dream,** and **Richard II** [which he wrote from] 1594 . . . [to] . . . [15]95 . . . [were] followed by **King John** and [by] **The Merchant of Venice** in 1596. The Falstaff plays of [the period] 1597 . . . [to] . . . [15]99 . . . [-] . . . **Henry IV** (parts I and II), **Henry V . . .** and **The Merry Wives of Windsor** ([which was] said to have been written at the request of Elizabeth I) . . . [-] . . . . brought his fame to its height. [At a]bout the same time [in 1599] he wrote **Julius Caesar . . . .** The period ended with the lyrically witty **Much Ado about Nothing, As You Like It . . .** and **Twelfth Night**[, which were written from] about 1598 . . . [to] . . . 1601. With **Hamlet**

begins the period of the great tragedies . . . [:] . . . 1601 . . . . [to] . . . 1608 . . . [when Shakespeare produced] **Othello, Macbeth, King Lear, Timon of Athens *[q. v.],* Antony and Cleopatra** . . . and [**The Tragedy of] Coriolanus** [*q. v.].* This 'darker' period is also reflected in the comedies **Troilus and Cressida, All'**s Well that Ends **Well** . . . and **Measure for Measure** [from] around 1601 . . . [to] . . . [16]04. It is thought that Shakespeare was only [a] part[icipating] author of **Pericles** [*q. v.],* which [-] with the other plays of around 1608 . . . [to] . . . [16]11 [(]**Cymbeline, The Winter'**s Tale . . . and **The Tempest[)]** . . . [contributes to the set of] the mature romance or 'reconciliation' plays of the end of his career. [It is thought that d]uring 1613 . . . Shakespeare collaborated with Fletcher in **Henry VIII** and [in] **Two Noble Kinsmen.** He had already retired to Stratford[-on-Avon] in about 1610, . . . [and] he died [there] on 23 Apr[il] 1616. For the first . . . [two hundred] . . . years after his death, Shakespeare's plays were frequently performed in cut or revised form (Nahum Tate's **King Lear[,** for example,] was given a happy ending), and it was not until the . . . [nineteenth] . . . century, with the critical assessment of . . . Coleridge and . . . Hazlitt, that the original texts were restored. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia,** Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1055, columns one to three)

Sicinius . . . 1. L. Sɪᴄɪɴɪᴜs Bᴇʟʟᴜᴛᴜs, the leader of the plebeians in their secession to the Sacred Mount in B. C. 494. He was chosen [to be] one of the first tribunes.[ ]-[ ]2. L. Sɪᴄɪɴɪᴜs Dᴇɴᴛᴀᴛᴜs, called by some writers the Roman Achilles [*q. v.],* from his personal prowess. He was tribune of the plebs in 454 [BC]. He was put to death by the decemvirs in 450 [BC], because he endeavoured to persuade the plebeians to secede to the Sacred Mound. The Persons sent to assassinate him fell upon him in a lonely spot, but he killed most of them before they succeeded in despatching him. . . . (Blakeney, E. H., editor, **A Smaller Classical Dictionary by William Smith,** J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910, page 486)

Socrates . . . c[irca] . . . 469 [BC] . . . [to] . . . 399 BC. Athenian philosopoher, [who was] said to have [also] been a sculptor and [a] soldier. He wrote nothing[,] but [he] was immortalised in the dialogues of his pupil . . . Plato [*q. v.]*. In his desire to combat the scepticism of the . . . sophists, Socrates asserted the possibility of true knowledge. In the sphere of morality he put forward the view that the good person never knowingly goes wrong. True knowledge emerges through dialogue and [through] an abandoning of uncritical claims to knowledge. The effect of Socrates'[s] teaching was disruptive since he opposed tyranny. Accused in 399 [BC] on charges of impiety and corruption of youth, he was condemned by the Athenian authorities to die by drinking hemlock. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1079, column three)

Sophocles . . . 495 [BC] . . . [to] . . . 406 BC. Athenian dramatist and tragic poet. He produced his first plays in 468 BC, when he won the prize in competition with Aeschylus [*q. v.],* and [he] wrote over 120 plays in total, of which only seven survive. These are **Ajax**, **Electra**, **The Trachinian Maidens**, **Philoctetes** [*q. v.],* and the Theban [*q. v.]* tragedies **Antigone** [*q. v.], * **Oedipus [*q. v.]* Tyrannus**, and **Oedipus [*q. v.]* at Colonus.** He modified the form of tragedy by the introduction of a third actor[,] and [he] speeded the action by lessining the role of the chorus. Whereas he said of Euripides [*q. v.]* 'He paints men as they are . . . ,['] he said of himself 'I paint men as they ought to be[,]' and [he] is noted for his noble grandeur and [for his] preservation of traditional values. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1084, column three)

Spencer . . . Herbert [(]1820[ ]-[ ]1903[)]. British philosopher. Born at Derby, largely self-taught, he was a railway engineer before entering journalism [and] philosophy. While [he was] sub-editor on

The Economist, he wrote **Social Statics** [in] 1851, expounding his *laissez-faire* views on social and political problems, and in 1855 **Principles of Psychology** appeared, followed by **Education** in 1861. In 1862 he began jod ten . . . volume **System of Synthetic Philosophy**, in which he extended . . . Darwin's [*q. v.*] theory of evolution to the entire field of human knowledge. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1096, column two)

Sylvester

Tantalus . . . Greek Tantalos, in Greek legend, son of Zeus [*q. v.*] or Tmolus (a ruler of Lydia) and Pluto ([the] daughter of Cronus and Rhea) and the father of Niobe and Pelops . . . . He was the king of Sipylus in Lydia (or of Phryigia)[,] and he was the intimate friend of the gods, to whose table he was admitted. The punishment of Tantalus in the underworld was occasioned by one of several crimes, according to the various ancient authors: (1) He abused divine favour by revealing to mankind the secrets he had learned in heaven. (2) He offended the gods by killing his son Pelops and [by] serving him to them, in order to test their power of observation. (3) He stole nectar and ambrosia, the food of the gods, from heaven and gave them to men. . . . In Hades [*q. v.*] Tantalus stood up to his neck in water, which flowed from him when he tried to drink it; over his head hung fruits that the wind wafted away whenever he tried to grasp them (hence the word [']tantalise[']). According to another story, a rock hung over his head reay to fall and crush him. (McHenry, Robert, editor, **The New Encyclopædia Britannica**, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Illinois, 1992, Micropædia, Volume Eleven, page 547, column one)

Telemachus . . . in Greek legend, son of Odysseus [*q. v.*] and Penelope [*q. v.*] . . . [; he was] a child when his father set out for Troy. After about . . . [twenty] . . . years he set sail in search of news

of him, visiting Pylos and Sparta, and returning to Ithaca in time to help his father in the famous fight with the suitors. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume eleven, page 585, column one)

The Tragedy of Coriolanus . . . see Tragedy of Coriolanus.

Theban . . . adaptation to adjective form of Thebes, *q. v.*

Theban Legend . . . Polydorus, [the] son of CADMUS *[q. v.],* succeeded his brother-in-law PENTHEUS as [the] third king of Thebes *[q. v.].* His son Laius, who succeeded him, married Jocasta *[q. v.],* [the] great-granddaughter of Pentheus and sister of Creon *[q. v.].* They had only one son. . . . Immediately after his birth, the child was exposed on Mount Cithaeron with his feet pierced and tied together, because Laius had learned from an oracle that he would die by the hand of his own son. The baby was found by a shepherd [who was] in the employ of King Polybus of Corinth, and called Oedipus *[q. v.]* because of his swollen feet. Polybus brough him up as his own son; but when Oedipus *[q. v.]* grew up, he was told by the oracle at Delphi that he would kill his father and marry his mother. Thinking that Polybus was his father, he would not return to Corinth; but on the road between Delphi and Daulis, he met Laius, whom he killed in a scuffle. . . . Meanwhile the Sphinx had appeared in the neighbourhood of Thebes *[q. v.].* Seated on a cliff, she put a riddle to every passer-by: 'What goes on four feet in the morning, on two at noon, and on three in the evening?' None could answer, and all were consequently put to death by the monster. The Thebans swore that anyone who could deliver the country from the Sphinx would obtain the kingdom, with Jocasta *[q. v.]* as his wife. . . . Oedipus *[q. v.]* solved the riddle, the answer being man, who crawls on all fours in infancy, walks on two feet in his prime, and in old age is supported by a staff. The Sphinx at once threw herself from the cliff; Oedipus was hailed as king of Thebes *[q. v.],* and [he] married Jocasta *[q.*

v.], his own mother, who bore him two sons, Eteocles *[q. v.]* and Polynices *[q. v.],* and two daughters, Antigone *[q. v.]* and Ismene *[q. v.].* Thebes *[q. v.]* was then visited by a plague. The oracle directed that the murderer of Laius should be expelled, and the seer Tiresias *[q. v.]* pronounced Oedipus *[q. v.]* the guilty man. Jocasta *[q. v.]* hanged herself; Oedipus *[q. v.]* tore out his own eyes, and [he] wandered from Thebes *[q. v.],* accompanied by his daughter Antigone *[q. v.].* At last he found refuge at Colonus in Attica, where the EUMENIDES *[q. v.]* removed him from the earth (Sophocles *[q. v.], Oedipus [q. v.] the king* and *Oedipus [q. v.] at Colonus).* Antigone *[q. v.]* returned to Thebes *[q. v.].* . . . After the departure of Oedipus *[q. v.],* his sons Eteocles *[q. v.]* and Polynices *[q. v.]* succeeded as joint sovereigns; but disputes arose between them, and it was agreed that they should rule for alternate years, the one who was not in office withdrawing from Thebes *[q. v.].* Polynices *[q. v.]* accordingly withdrew, but when Eteocles's *[q. v.]* first year of kingship ended, he would not allow his brother to return. Polynices *[q. v.]* appealed to Adrastus *[q. v.],* King of Argos *[q. v.].* Adrastus *[q. v.]* organised the exhibition known as the 'Seven Against Thebes *[q. v.]* . . . ,['] although his brother AMPHIARAÜS had foretold [that] it would end disastrously. Eteocles *[q. v.]* and Polynices *[q. v.]* killed one another in single combat, and five of the other chiefs were killed. Adrastus *[q. v.]* alone escaped (Aeschylus *[q. v.], Seven against Thebes [q. v.]).* . . . Creon *[q. v.]* now succeeded to the throne of Thebes *[q. v.].* His first act was to forbid the burial of Polynices, and he sentenced Antigone *[q. v.]* to death for disobeying this order. She was walled up in a cave, where she took her own life, together with her lover Haemon *[q. v.],* Creon's *[q. v.]* son (Sophocles *[q. v.], Antigone [q. v.).* . . . Then years after these events, Adrastus *[q. v.]* persuaded the descendants of the Seven to undertake another expedition against Thebes *[q. v.].* In this war, Thebes *[q. v.]* was captured and destroyed. The only one of the expedition to be killed was Aegialus, son of Adrastus *[q. v.].* His father died of grief and was buried at Megara on his way home

to Argos *[q. v.].* (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume eleven, page 585, column one)

Thebes . . . chief city of Boetia in ancient Greece and the birthplace of PINDAR. Its position was well defended, since it was situated in aplain surrounded by mountains. No place is more celebrated in Greek legend. Here the alphabet was introduced from Phoenicia; here was the birthplace of DIONYSUS *[q. v.]* and HERACLES; here too lived Tiresias *[q. v.]* the soothsayer and Amphion the musician. It was also the scene of the THEBAN LEGEND *[q. v.].* The first historical trace of the city dates from Boeotian (dorian) conquest, c[irca] . . . 1100 BC. Thebes then became the chief city of a confederation. She became the closest ally of the Spartans, and during the Peloponnesian War [she] was Athens's *[q. v.]* bitterest foe. In 394 BC, however, she allied with Athens *[q. v.]* against Sparta. In 382 [BC] the citadel was occupied by Spartan troops, and its recovery by Theban exiles in 378 [BC] led to war with Sparta. After the battle of Leuctra [in] . . . . 371 BC . . . for a short time she became, under EPAMINONDAS, the most powerful state in Greece; but with the death of Epaminondas at the battle of Maninea . . . [in] . . . 362 [BC], Thebes lost her hegemony. In 338 BC she shared the Greek defeat at Chaeronea. Three years later she defied Alexander[,] and [she] was largely destroyed. The city was rebuilt by Cassander and the Athenians in 316 BC. In 290 it was taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes, and [it] thereafter declined rapidly. The final blow was administerd by SULLA, who gave half [of] its territory to Delphi. (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume eleven, page 585, column one)

Three Estates . . . The population of eighteenth . . . century France was greater than that of any other contemporary European state. At the beginning of the century there appear to have been twenty million or more people in France, and the number had risen to some twenty

. . . . five million at the end [of the century]. The population was divided into three 'estates' or 'orders'[ ]-[ ]the clergy [= the 'first' estate], the nobility [= the 'second' estate,] and the 'third' [estate]. . . . . There were, perhaps, 130,000 clergy in eighteenth . . . century France. They were a privileged order . . . [which was] . . . mostly exempt from direct taxation. They granted an annual subsidy, the *don gratuit,* to the monarch for this privilege. The church as an institution was immensely wealthy with considerable lands and property. This wealth was controlled by the higher clergy . . . [-] . . . bishops, abbots and priors . . . [-] . . . who generally speaking were drawn from the ranks of the secular clergy, such as the *abbés,* who belonged to the church, [theough they] did not take holy orders, but [they] were entitled to ecclesiastical benefits. The parish priests (*curés)[,* though they were] probably better off than the bulk of the peasantry, were not wealthy: [T]hey often shared the outlook and [the] rustic speech of their rural parishioners. . . . . There are widely differing estimates about the size of the nobility during the eighteenth century; taking an average between the estimates[,] there appear to have been about 250,000 nobles. There were considerable differences of origin, wealth and ideology among them [see noblesse de robe]. . . . . In pre-revolutionary France[,] the Third Estate encompassed everyone who was not a member of the clergy or nobility: from the wealthiest bourgeois (who might own land and enjoy the seigneurial rights that went with that land) to the poorest peasant . . . [(]and many peasants were very poor[)]. It has been estimated that about a third of the population of France in 1789 could be classified as poor or indigent. (Open University, The, editor, **The Enlightenment** [*q. v.],* The Open University, Milton Keynes, 1986,

Units 13 . . . [and] . . . 14: The French Enlightenment [*q. v.*], pages seven to eleven)

Thucydides . . . [()460[ ]-[ ]400 BC()]. Athenian historian, who exercised command in the . . . Peloponnesian War in 424 with so little success that he was banished till 404. In his **History of the Peloponnesian War** he attempted a scientific impartiality. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1152, column three)

Tiresias . . . In Greek mythology Tiresias was a blind Theban soothsayer. According to one legend Athena [*q. v.*] blinded him when he accidentally came upon her bathing. His mother, the nymph Chariclo, begged for mercy; so Athena [*q. v.*] gave him the power of prophecy, as well as a golden staff to guide him in walking. Another tale relates how Tiresias, who had been changed into a woman and then back into a man, was asked to settle a quarrel between Zeus [*q. v.*] and Hera about which sex enjoyed love more. He said woman, angering Hera, who then blinded him. Zeus [*q. v.*] compensated him by giving him long life and the gift of prophecy, but Hera decreed that no one would believe his predictions. (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume nineteen, page 208, column two)

Titan . . . in Greek mythology, any of the giant children of Uranus and . . . Gaia, who included Kronos, Rhea, Themis (mother of Prometheus and personification of law and order) and Oceanus. Kronos and Rhea were in turn the parents of . . . Zeus, who ousted Kronos as the ruler of the world. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1155, column three)

Titanic . . . adaptation to adjective form of Titan [*q. v.*].**Tocqueville** . . . Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clérel de (1805[ ]-[18]59), French historian, born at Verneuil, Seine-etoise. He

went to America to study prisons in 1831, and [he] took the opportunity to collect materials for his *De la Démocratie en Amérique,* [which he wrote from] 1835 . . . [to] . . . [18]40, a work of peculiar interest as the first seasoned reasoned and more or less unbiased exposition of popular government in that country. A moderate Liberal in politics, he was elected vice-president of the Assembly in 1849, [he] was dismissed when Louis Napoleon became emperor, and [he] met with an enthusiastic reception from John Stuart Mill and other prominent Whigs when he visited England. He published [his work] *Ancien Régime [q. v.]* . . . [in] . . . 1856. His *Souvenirs,* [which were] first published in 1893, and edited . . . translated [and complemented] with an introduction by J. P. Mayer in 1948, relate to the years 1848 . . . [and] . . . [18]49[,] and [they] are interesting for their account of the political upheavals of that time. . . . ***Bibliography:*** A. de Tocqueville (ed[itor] . . . . H. S. Commager, trans[lator] . . . Reeve), *Democracy in America,* 1961; A. de Tocqueville (trans[lator] . . . S. Gilbert), [*The] Ancien Regime [q. v.] and the French Revolution [q. v.],* 1966; H. Brogan, Tocqueville, *1973.* . . . (Girling, D. A., editor, **Everyman's Encyclopaedia**, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1978, volume eleven, page 585, column one)

Tragedy . . . [see **Greek Tragedy?]**

Tragedy of Coriolanus

Tyrtaeus . . . A Greek elegiac poet of the . . . [seventh] . . . century BC, Tyrtaeus was probably from Sparta. Only fragments of his poems survive, but he was celebrated for his martial songs stressing courage and love of country. Most of his elegies are associated with the Spartan campaign during the second Messenian War, in which he served as a general. (Foderaro, Sal J., editor, **The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia**, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London, 1980, volume nineteen, page 368, column two)

Tyrtaios . . . see Tyrtaeus.

Ulysses . . . see Odysseus.

Venus

Virgil . . . (Publius Vergilius Maro)[,] 70 . . . [to] . . . 19 BC. Roman poet, born near Mantua. He was of the small farmer class whose life he celebrated in his pastoral *Eclogues [q. v.]* [of] 37 BC, and [his] *Georgics* or 'Art of Husbandry' [of] 30 BC. His epic poem, the *Aeneid [q. v.],* glorified the dynasty of this patron . . . Augustus. He was one of the most influential Roman writers, partly because his apparent forecast of the birth of Christ in the fourth eclogue gave him the status of an 'honorary Christian' in the medieval church. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1215, column one)

Voltaire . . . pen name of François-Marie Arouet[, who lived from] 1694 . . . [to] . . . 1778. French writer. [He was b]orn in Paris . . . [as the] son of a notary. He adopted his pseudonym, [which is] probably an anagram of Arouet l(e) j(eune), in 1718. He was twice imprisoned in the Bastille and three times exiled from Paris between 1716 and 1726 for libellous political verse. *Oedipe[ ]/[ ]Oedipus,* his first essay in tragedy, was staged in 1718. While [he was] in England [from] 1726 . . . [to] . . . [17]29[,] he dedicated an epic poem on Henry IV, *La Henriade[ ]/[ ]The Henriade,* to Queen Caroline, and on returning to France [he] published the successful *Histoire de Charles XII[ ]/[ ]History of Charles XII* [in] 1731, and [he] produced the play *Zaïre* [in] 1732. The reception of his *Lettres philosophiques sur les anglais[ ]/[ ]Philosophical Letters on the English* [of] 1733, a panegyric of English ways, thought and political practice, led to his takind refuge with his mistress, the Marquise de . . . Châtelet at Cirey in Chapagne[ ]-[ ]where he wrote

his celebrated play *Mérope* [in] 1743 . . . and much of *Le Siècle de Louis XIV[ ]/[ ]The Age of Louis XIV.* . . . [From] 1751 . . . [to] . . . [17]53 he stayed at the court of . . . Frederick the Great, who had long been an admirer, but the association ended in deep enmity. From 1754 he established himself near Geneva – after 1758 at Ferney, just across the French border. Among his other works are the satirical tale *Zadig; Candide* [of] 1759, a parody on . . . . Leibniz's 'best of all possible worlds[;]' . . . and the tragedy *Irène* [of] 1778. In religion a . . . Deist, Voltaire devoted himself to crushing the spirit of intolerance. . . . (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1217, column three, and page 1218, column one)

Watson . . . . John B(roadus)[,] 1878 . . . [to] . . . 1958. . . . [American] psychologist . . . [. F]ounder of behaviourism [*q. v.,* Glossary of Scholarly Terms]. He rejected introspection (observation by an individual of his or her own mental processes) and regarded psychology as the study of observable behaviour, within the scientific tradition. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1217, column three, and page 1227, column three)

Zeus . . . in Greek mythology, chief of the gods . . . . He was the son of Kronos, whom he overthrew . . . [;] . . . his brothers and sisters included Demeter, Hades [*q. v.]*, Hera . . . and Poseidon. He ate his pregnant first wife Metis ([who was] the goddes of wisdom), fearing [that] their child (Athena [*q. v.])* would be greater than himself. His second wife was Hera, but he also fathered children by other women and goddesses. The offspring, either gods and goddesses, or godlike humans, included Apollo, Artemis, Castor and Polydeuces[ ]/[ ]Pollux, Dionysus [*q. v.]*, Hebe, Heracles, Hermes, Minios, Perseus . . . [and] . . . Persephone. As the supreme god he dispensed good and evil[,] and [he] was the father and ruler of all mankind. His emblems are the thunderbolt and [the] aegis ([a]

shield), representing the thunder cloud. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1269, columns one and two)

Glossary of Scholarly Terms

absolutism . . . [A] system of government in which the ruler or rulers have unlimited power. The principle of an absolute monarch, given a divine right to rule by God, was exgensivedly used in Europe during the . . . [seventeenth] . . . and . . . [the eighteenth] . . . centuries. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page four, column three)

androgynous . . . *adj* . . . . having the characteristics of both male and female in one individual: hermaphrodite: having an inflorescence of both male and female flowers (*bot.*) . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page forty five, column two

anodyne . . . *adj. & n.* – *adj.* **1** able to relieve pain. **2** mentally soothing. – *n.* an anodyne drug or medicine. [L *anodynus* f. Gk *anodunos* painless (as AN-[1], *odune* pain)] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page forty three, column two)

anthropomorphic . . . . see anthropomorphism.

anthropomorphism . . . [The] attribution of human characteristics to gods (as in Greek [mythology] and [in] Scandinavian mythology), plants, animals, or inanimate objects (the wind, stones, and so on).

(Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page fifty three, column three)

antithesis . . . *n.* a figure in which thoughts or words are balanced in contrast: a thesis or [a] proposition opposing another [thesis or another proposition]: opposition: the direct opposite . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page fifty five, column two

antithetical . . . see antithesis.

aôroi . . . The word used of a person who dies in his prime is *aôros[,]* which means literally 'untimely' (Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death**, Duckworth, London, 1985, page seventy seven)

apocalyptic. . . *adj . . . .*pertaining to the Apocalypse: prophetic of disaster or of the end of the world . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page fifty seven, column two)

apocryphal

apotheosis . . . *n.* . . . . **1** elevation to divine status; deification. **2** a glorification of a thing; a sublime example . . . **3** a deified ideal [eccl.L f. Gk *apotheo* make a god of (as APO-, *theos* god)] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page fifty, column two)

aristocracy . . . *n.* government by, or political power of, a privileged order: a state so governed: a nobility or privileged class: an anlogous class in respect of any quality. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page sixty eight, column one)

atavism . . . *n.* appearance of ancestral, but not parental, characteristics; reversion to an ancestral type. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page seventy nine, column two)

atavistic . . . see atavism.

axiom . . . *n.* a self-evident truth: a universally received principle: a postulate, [an] assumption. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page ninety one, column one)

behaviourism . . . [a] school of psychology [which] originat[ed] . . . in the U[nited] S[tates of] A[merica], of which the leading exponent was John Broadus . . . Watson [*q. v.].* Behaviourists maintain that all human activity can ultimately be explained in terms of conditioned reactions or reflexes and [in terms of] habits [which have been] formed in consequence [of such conditioned reactions or reflexes]. . . . (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 131, column three)

beautiful soul

belletristic

Bezirk . . . see staatsfreier Bezirk.

bourgeoisie . . . the middle classes. The French word originally meant the freemen of a borough. Hence it came to mean the whole class above the workers and [the] peasants, and below the nobility. [']Bourgeoisie['] has also acquired a contemptuous sense, . . . implying commonplace, philistine respectability. by socialists it is applied to the whole propertied class, as distinct from the

proletariat. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 173, column two)

casuist . . . *n.* **1** a person, esp[ecially] . . . a theologian, who resolves problems of conscience, duty, et[ ]c[etera] . . . , often with clever but false reasoning. **2** a sophist or [a] quibbler. . . . (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 175, column one)

casuistic . . . see casuist.

catharsis . . . *n.* purification: evacuation of the bowels; purification of the emotions; as by the drama according to Aristotle [*q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names]: the purging of the effects of a pent-up emotion and [of] repressed thoughts, by bringing them to the surface of consciousness (*psych.).* [Gr. *kathartikos,* fit for cleansing, *katharos,* clean.] (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,** Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 206, column two)

cathartically . . . adaptation to adverb form of catharsis [*q. v.].*

cenotaph . . . *n.* a tomblike monument, esp[ecially] . . . a war memorial, to a person whose body is elsewhere. [F *cénotaphe* f. LL *cenotaphium* f. Gk *kenos* empty + *taphos* tomb] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 181, column one)

confidant . . . *n.* (*fem.* **confidante** *pronunc[iation]* . . . [: the] same) a person trusted with knowledge of one's private affairs. [. . . (eighteenth) . . . c(entury) . . . for earlier CONFIDENT *n.* prob(ably) . . . to represent the pronunc(iation) . . . of F *confidente* (as CONFIDE)] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page

239, column two)

confidantes . . . see confidant.

cornucopia

de facto . . . (L.) actual, if not rightful . . . : in fact, actually. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 337, column two)

de jure . . . (L.) *adj.* and *adv.* by right: rightful. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 340, column two)

demographical . . . see demography.

demography . . . the study of the size, structure, and development of human populations to establish reliable statistics on such factors as birth and death rates, marriages and divorces, life expectancy, and migration. Demography is important in the social sciences as the basis for government planning in such areas as education, housing, welfare, transport, and taxation. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 359, column two)

dialectic . . . a Greek term, originally associated with Socrates's [*q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names] method of argument through dialogue and conversation. The word was taken over by . . . [nineteenth] . . . century German thinkers, notably [by] . . . Hegel [*q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names] and [by] . . . Marx. For Hegel [*q. v.],* dialectic refers to thought which develops through contradiction. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 367, column one)

dialectical . . . see dialectic.

dichotomy . . . *n.* . . . **1 a** a division into two, esp[ecially] . . . . a sharply defined one. **b** the result of such a division. **2** binary classification. **3** *Bot.* & *Zool.* repeated bifurcation. (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 323, columns one and two)

Diremption . . . [Miller, A. V., translator, **Phenomenology of Spirit by G. W. F. Hegel,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 556, may be helpful

disjecta membra

empirical

empiricism . . . (from Greek *empeiria* . . . [=] experience or experiment) a long-established tradition in British philosophy, frequently contrasted with . . . rationalist. The principal tenet of empiricism is the belief that all knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience. It suspects metaphysical schemes based on *a priori* propositions, which are claimed to be true irrespective of experience. Empiricism developed in the . . . [seventeen]th and [the] early . . . [eighteen]th centur[y] . . . through the work of . . . Locke, . . . Berkeley, and . . . Hume, [who are] traditionally known as the British empiricist school. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia,** Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 418, column one)

empiricist . . . see empiricism

enfranchise . . . *v. t.* to set free: to give a franchise or political privileges to. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,** Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 430, column

two)

epic poetry

eschatology . . . (*theol.*) *n.* the doctrine of the last or final things, as death, judg[e]ment, the state after death. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 445, column two)

excoriate

exegesis

feudalism . . . a form of social stratification which arose in Europe during the [period from] the . . . [fourth century] . . . [to the] . . . [tenth] centur[y] . . . under which the monarch owned all land. In return for military service the monarch allowed powerful vassals to hold land . . . and often also to administer justice and [to] levy taxes. They in turn 'sub-let' such rights. At the bottom of the system were the serfs, who worked on their lord's manor in return for being allowed to cultivate some land for themselves, and [they] so underpinned the system. They could not be sold as if they were slaves, but [they] also could not leave the estate. The system declined from the . . . [thirteenth] . . . century, partly because of the growth of a money economy, with commerce, trade, and industry, and partly because of the many peasants' revolts of [the period from] 1350 . . . [to] . . . 1550. Serfdom ended in England in the . . . [sixteenth] . . . century, but [it] lasted in France until 1789 . . . . and in the rest of Western Europe until the early . . . [nineteenth] . . . century. In Russia it continued until 1861. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 452, column three, and page 453, column one)

fiat . . . *n.* a formal or solemn command: a short order or warrant

of a judge for making out or allowing processes, letters-patent, et[ ]c[etera] . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 484, column two)

fiscal . . . *adj.* & *n.* of public revenue. . . . (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 442, column one)

Foucaultian . . . adaptation to adjective form of **Foucault** [*q. v.*, Glossary of Proper Names].

general will

heroes

heuristic

humanism

hypocrisy . . . *n.* . . . **1** the assumption or [the] postulation of moral standards to which one's own behaviour does not conform; dissimulation, pretence. **2** an instance of this. [ME f. OF *ypocrisie* f. eccl.[ ]L *hypocrisis* f. Gk *hupokrisis* acting or a part, pretence (as HYPO-, *krino* decide, judge)] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 581, column two)

hypocrite . . . see hypocrisy.

in passim

isomorphic . . . see isomorphism.

isomorphism . . . similarity in unrelated forms (*biol.*): close similarity in crystalline form combined with similar chemical constitution (*crystal.*). (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,** Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 484, column two)

kudos

liberalism . . . the political and social theory . . . [which] . . . developed during [the period from the] . . . [seventeenth century] . . . [to the] . . . [nineteenth] . . . centur[y] . . . as the distinctive theory of the industrial and [the] commercial classes in their struggle against the power of the monarchy, the church, and the feudal landowners. In Politics it stood for parliamentary government, freedom of the press, [of] speech and [of] worship, and [for] the abolition of class privileges; economically it was associated with . . . laissez-faire, [that is with] a minimum of state interference in economic life, and [with] international free trade. In the late . . . [nineteenth century] and [the] early . . . [twentieth] centur[y] . . . these ideas were modified by the acceptance on the one hand of universal suffrage, [which had] hitherto [been] opposed by most liberals, and on the other [hand] of a certain amount of state intervention, in order to ensure a minimum standard of living and to remove extremes of poverty and [of] wealth. The classical statement of liberal principles is found in *On Liberty* and [in] other works of J[.] S[.] . . . Mill. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 711, column three)

liminality . . . '[T]he stage where the soul [of the deceased] is very much betwixt and between,' namely during the time that elapses in the funerary period between the moment of the death of the deceased person and the burial of his corpse. By way of a kind of superstition the immediate family of a deceased person was also

considered to be in a state of liminality in so far as the notion of a passage of the deceased person from the world of the living to the world of the dead, on which he was partly accompanied by his close relatives in the ceremony of burial, logically placed the living who partook in this passage, albeit only *in ritual,* in this intermediate category as well. (Own definition with a quotation from Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek City State**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, page thirty two)

loci see locus.

locus . . . *n.* a place, locality, location: a passage in a writing: the position of a gene in a chromosome: the line or [the] surface constituted by all positions of a point or [a] line satisfying a given condition (*math.)* . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 772, column one)

materialism . . . the philosophical theory that there is nothing in existence over and above matter. Such a theory excludes the possibility of deities. It sees mind as an attribute of the physical, [and] not [therefore as] independent of the body. Like most other philosophical ideas, materialism probably arose among the early Greek thinkers. The . . . Stoics and the . . . Epicureans were materialists, and so were the ancient Buddhists. Among modern materialists have been . . . Hobbes [*q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names], Büchner, and . . . Haeckel. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 770, column two)

metaphysics . . . *n.* treated as *sing[ular]* . . .) the science which investigates the first principles of nature and [of] thought: ontology or the science of being: loosely and vaguely applied to anything abstruse, abstract, philosophical, subtle,

transcendental, occult, supernatural, magical. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 824, column one)

métier . . . *n.* one's calling or business: that in which one is specially skilled. [Fr.,[ ]L. *ministerium.]* (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 825, column one)

modus vivendi . . . way of life or living: an arrangement or compromise by means of which those who differ may get on together for a time: such an arrangement between states or between a state and the Pope. [L. *modus,* manner.] (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 845, column two)

monotheism . . . the belief or doctrine that there is only one God, the opposite of polytheism [*q. v.].* (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 810, column one)

monotheistic . . . adaptation to adjective form of monotheism [*q. v.].*

nemesis

Nietzschean . . . adaptation to adjective form of **Nietzsche** *q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names.

nucleus . . . *n.* . . . **1 a** the central part or thing [a]round which others are collected. **b** the hernel of an aggregate or [of a] mass. **2** an initial part [which is] meant to receive additions. **3** *Astron.* the sold part of a comet's head. **4** *Physics* the positively charged central core of an atom that contains most of its mass. **5** *Biol.* a

large dense organelle of eukaryotic cells, containing the genetic material. **6** a discrete mass of grey matter in the central nervous system. [L, = kernel, inner part, dimin. of *nux nucis* nut] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 813, column one)

nunc dimittis

orthodox . . . (Gr. *doxa,* opinion), sound in doctrine: believing, or according to, the received or [the] established doctrines or opinions, esp[ecially] . . . in religion . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 931, column one)

orthodoxy . . . see orthodox.

oxymoron . . . *n.* a figure of speech by means of which contradictory terms are combined, so as to form an expressive phrase or epithet, as *cruel kindness, falsely true,* et[ ]c[etera] . . . [Gr. neut. of *oxymoros,* lit. pointedly foolish[ ]-[ ]*oxys,* sharp, *moros,* foolish.] (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 945, columns one and two)

oxymoronic . . . see oxymoron.

pagan . . . *n.* a heathen: one who is not a Christian, Hew, or Mohammedan: more recently, one who has no religion: one who sets a high value on sensual pleasures. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 948, column two)

paganism . . . see pagan.
par excellence . . .

paradigm . . . a term used by the American historian of science T[.] S[.] . . . Kuhn to describe all those factors, both scientific and otherwise, which influence the research of the scientist. The term has subsequently spread to the areas of social studies and politics. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 902, column one)

patriarch . . . (Greek[:] 'ruler of a family') in the Old Testament [*q. v.,* Glossary of Proper Names], one of the ancestors of the human race, and especially those of the Jews from Adam to the sons of Jacob. In the . . . Orthodox Church, the term refers to the leader of a national church. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 908, column three)

patriarchal . . . see patriarch.

per se . . . *adv.* by or in itself; intrinsically. [L] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 888, column one)

persona . . . (. . . L.) Jung's term for a person's system of adaptation to, or manner assumed when dealing with, the world[ ]-[ ]the outermost part of the consciousness, the expression of the personality: Roman actor's mask: character in fiction, esp[ecially] . . . in drama: speaker in a poem: social façade or public image . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1972, page 995, column one)

platteland . . . *S. Afr.* remote country districts. (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 913, column one)

polis . . .

polytheism . . . the worship of many gods, as opposed to monotheism [*q. v.]* (belief in one god). Examples are the religions of ancient Egypt, Babylon, Greece and Rome, Mexico, and modern Hinduism. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 947, column two)

prima facie . . . (L.) on the first view: at first sight. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1065, column one)

profanation

proleptic

prophylactically

prosopopoeia . . . *n.* the rhetorical introduction of a pretended speaker or the personification of an abstract thing. [L f. Gk *prosopopoiia* f. *prosopon* person + *poieo* make] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 959, column two)

quid pro quo . . . (L.) something for something: something given or taken as equivalent to another, often as retaliation: action or fact of giving or receiving thus. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1107, column one)

raison d'etre . . . *n.* . . . . a purpose or [a] reason that accounts for or justifies or originally caused a thing's existence. [F, = reason for being] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 990, column two)

romantic . . . *adj.* **1** of, characterised by, or suggestive of an idealised, sentimental, or fantastic view of reality; remote from experienc . . . . **2** inclined towards or suggestive of reomance in love . . . . **3** (of a person) imaginative, visionary, idealistic. **4 a** (of style in art, music, et[ ]c[etera] . . .) concerned more with feeling and [with] emotion than with form and [with] aesthetic qualities; preferring grandeur or picturesqueness to finish and proportion. **b** (also **Romantic)** or[,] or relating to[,] the . . . [eighteenth century and nineteenth] . . . c[entury] . . . romantic movement or style in the European arts. **5** (of a project et[ ]c[etera] . . . .) unpractical, fantastic. . . . (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 1045, column two)

roturier

salonfähig

serendipitous

staatsfreier Bezirk

status quo . . . (L.) the state in which: the existing condition. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1320, column two)

stereotype . . . (Greek[:] 'fixed impression') a one-sided, exaggerated, and preconceived idea about a particular group or [about] society [as a whole]. It is based on prejudice rather than [on] fact, but by repetition stereotypes become fixed in people's minds, resistnat to change or to factual evidence to the contrary. The term, originally used for a method of duplicate printing, was adopted in a social sense by the American journalist Walter Lippmann in 1922. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**,

Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1105, column three)

sublate . . . *v. t.* to remove *(obs.):* to deny *log.):* to resolve in a higher unity *(phil.).*[ ]-[ ]*n.* **sublation.** [L. *sublatum,* used as supine of *tollere,* to take away[ ]-[ ]*sub* in sense of away, *latum.]* (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,** Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1345, column two)

sublimation

sui generis . . . *adj.* of its own kind; unique. [L] (Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 1220, column one)

symbiosis . . . *n.* a mutually beneficial partnership between organisms of different kinds: esp[ecially] . . . such an association where one lives within the other. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1367, column one)

syncretic

taboo . . . from Polynesian ***tabu,*** 'forbidden . . .,['] applied to magical and religious objects. In psychology and the social sciences the term is used for practices which are generally prohibited because of religious or social pressures. (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1128, column one)

teleological . . . see teleology.

teleology . . . *n. . . . Philos.* **1** the explanation of phenomena by the purpose [which] they serve rather than by postulated causes. **2** *Theol.* the doctrine of design and purpose in the material world.

(Allen, R. E., editor, **The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, page 1254, column one)

trauma . . . *n.* a wound: an injury: an emotional shock that may be the origin of a neurosis (*psych.*)*:* the state or [the] condition [which is] caused by a physical or [an] emotional shock. (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1433, column one)

triad . . . *n.* a group or [a] union of three: in Welsh literature, a group of three sayings, stories, et[ ]c[etera] . . . , about related subjects: a group of three lines or stanzas in different metres: a chord of three notes, esp[ecially] . . . the common chord (*mus.*)*:* an atom, element, or radical with a combining power of three (*chem.*). . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1436, columns one and two)

triadic . . . see triad.

usurp . . . *v. t.* to take possession of by force, without right, or unjustly: to assume (the authority, place, et[ ]c[etera] . . . , of someone, or [of] something, else): to take possession of (the mind): to take or [to] borrow (a name or a word): to supplant (*arch.*)*.[ ]-v. i.* to practice usurpation: to encrach ([up]on). . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1495, column one)

usurpation . . . see usurp.

utilitarian . . . see utilitarianism.

utilitarianism . . . a philosophical theory of . . . ethics [which was] outlined by the philosopher Jeremy . . . Bentham . . . and

developed by J[.] S[.] . . . Mill. According to utilitarianism, an action is morally right if it has conseqneuces which lead to happiness, and [it is] wrong if it brings about the reverse of happiness. Thus, society should aim for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. . . . (Upshall, Martin, editor, **The Hutchinson Encyclopedia**, Hutchinson, London, 1988, page 1200, column one)

vis-a-vis . . . *adv.* face-to-face.[ ]-[ ]*prep.* face-to-face with.[ ]-[ ]*n.* one who faces, or is opposite to, another: a light carriage with seats facing each other: an S-shaped couch: opposite number. [Fr. *vis,* face (-[ ]L. *visus,* look), *à,* to.] (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1515, column one)

Zeitgeist

zoomorphism . . . the representation, or the conception, of a god or a man in animal form. . . . (Macdonald, A. M., editor, **Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary**, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1977, page 1592, column one)

Appendices

Appendix One

CREON:[◊] . . . My son, is it possible that you have heard the decree appointed for your bride and have come in a frenzy of rage against your father? Or do I keep your loyalty however I may act?

HAEMON:[◊] Father, I am yours. To me your judgements are good and upright, and I shall follow them. . . .

CREON: Yes, my son, this should be the resolution in your heart, to set yourself in all things behind your father's judgement. . . . anyone whom the city may set in office must be obeyed in matters great and small, just and less just. For there is no greater evil than disobedience: it is this that destroys cities, this that makes houses desolate, this that breaks up allied ranks in rout. But when men succeed, it is obedience that most often saves their lives. . . . Thus the appointed rules must be upheld . . . .

CHORUS: To us, unless we have been tricked by age, you seem to be speaking wisely in what you say.

HAEMON: Father, the good sense which the gods implant in men is the greatest of all the world's possessions. . . . What greater treasure can there be for sons than a father's glowing reputation, or for a father than that of his sons? . . . even if a man is wise, it is no shame for him to learn much . . if I, as a younger man, may also offer an opinion, I say that much the best thing is for a man to be born completely full of understanding; but otherwise - and it does not usually turn out that way - it is also good to learn from those who speak rightly.

CHORUS: It is fair that you, lord, should learn from him, if he says anything useful; and you too should learn from

the King. There have been good words spoken on both sides.

CREON: Shall men of my age be taught wisdom by one of his?

HAEMON: Nothing that is not right; and, if I am young, you should consider my actions, not my age.

CREON: Is it an 'action' to honour those who mis-behave?

HAEMON: I would not urge that one should show honour to the wicked.

CREON: Is *she* not afflicted with that malady?

HAEMON: The community of this city of Thebes[◊] says no.

CREON: Shall the city tell me what orders to give?

HAEMON: You see? You sounded all too young in saying that.

. . . .

. . . .

CREON: By Olympus above us, I'll have you know that you will live to regret insulting me with your reproaches. . . .

HAEMON: . . . Rave on . . . in the company of any friends who are willing to endure it. . . . [*Exit Haemon by a parodos.* (original emphasis)]

CHORUS: The man has gone, lord, in angry haste. At his age the heart grows bitter when hurt. . . . .

. . . .

TIRESIAS:[^{◊]} Lords of Thebes, we have come on a shared path, two seeing with the eyes of one; for it is thus, with the help of a guide, that the blind must walk.

CREON: What is your news, aged Tiresias?

TIRESIAS: I shall tell you, and you must obey the prophet.

CREON: Well, I have not neglected your advice in the past.

TIRESIAS: That is why you have steered the city on a straight course.

CREON: I can testify from experience to the help you give.

TIRESIAS: Take note that you are treading once more on a knife-edge of fortune.

CREON: What do you mean? How I shudder at your words!

TIRESIAS: You will learn when you hear the tokens that belong

to my craft. As I took my place in the ancient seat of augury, where I had a gathering-place for every kind of bird, I heard the unfamiliar noise of birds shrieking in evil and unintelligible frenzy. And I realised that they were tearing each other with murderous talons; for the whirring of their wings was all too expressive. At once in fear I made trial of burnt offerings at a blazing altar. But Hephaestus did not shine forth from the sacrifice; instead wet slime oozed from the thigh-bones onto the embers, and smoked and sputtered, and the gall was sprayed high in the air, and the dripping thighs lay bare of their covering of fat. I learned from this boy of these abortive prophecies from unrevealing rites; for he is my guide, as I am other men's. And it is your counsel that has brought this sickness onto the city. . . . Consider these things then, my son. Error is common to all mankind; but when one errs, that man is no longer thoughtless or luckless who remedies the evil he has incurred and does not remain immovable. Stubbornness merits charges of stupidity. But give way to the dead, and do not stab a fallen man. . . .

CREON: Old man, you are like archers shooting at me as your target, and I am not left untried even by the seers among you; no by their tribe I have long been traded and treated as merchandise. . . . I know well that no man has the power to pollute the gods. Even the very wise among mortals suffer shameful falls, aged Tiresias, when they speak shameful words fairly for the sake of profit. . . . . Do you know that the man you speak of is your ruler?

TIRESIAS: I know it; for it is through me that you saved this city and possess it.

CREON; You are a skilful seer, but fond of doing wrong.

TIRESIAS: You will drive me to reveal the secrets locked in my breast.

CREON: Unlock them, only without speaking for gain.

TIRESIAS: Indeed, I think it will be so - as far as you are concerned.

CREON: Be sure that you will not trade on my resolve.

TIRESIAS: Then be you fully sure that you will not accomplish many rapid cycles of the sun before you have rendered up an offspring from your own loins, a corpse in exchange for corpses, because you have thrust below one of those above, arrogantly lodging a living creature in a tomb, and have kept here one of those below, a corpse dispossessed, dishonoured, impure. These are not your concern nor that of the gods above; you do them violence in treating them thus. For this there are savage spirits of punishment lying in wait for you, the Furies of Hades and of the gods, to see you caught up in these same evils. And look whether I speak these words for money; for the time is not far off when this will be made clear by the shrieking of men and women in your house. [Hatred convulses all the cities whose mangled bodies have received their funeral rites from dogs or wild beasts, or from some winged bird which has brought an impure smell to the city with its hearths.] Such, since you provoke me, are the arrows for your heart which I have shot at you, like an archer, in my anger - arrows surely aimed, whose sting you will not evade. . . . Boy, take me home, so that he may direct his anger at younger men, and learn to keep a quieter tongue and a better mind than the mind which now he bears. . . . [*The boy leads Tiresias away.* (original emphasis)]

CHORUS: The man has gone, lord, after making dreadful prophecies. And I know that, ever since I first bore this white hair in place of black, he has never yet uttered

a false prophecy to the city. (Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone,</u>** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, pages seventy three, seventy five, seventy seven, eighty one, eighty three, eighty five, 103, 105, 107, 109 and 111)

<u>Appendix Two</u>

[T]he same men who praised love of the beautiful and the culture of the mind shared the deep ancient distrust of those arists and artisans who acutally fabricated the things which then were displayed and admired. The Greeks, though not the Romans, had a word for philistinism, and this word, curiously enough, derives from a word for artists and artisans . . . ; to be a philistine, a man of banausic spirit, indicated, then as today, an exclusively utilitarian mentality, an inability to think and to judge a thing apart from its function or utility. But the artist himself . . . was by no means excluded from the reproach of philistinism; on the contrary, philistinism was considered to be a vice most likely to occur in . . . fabricators and artists. To Greek understanding, there was no contradiction between . . . the love of the beautiful, and contempt for those who actually produced the beautiful. The mistrust and actual contempt of the artists arose from political considerations: fabrication of things, including the production of art, is not within the range of political activities; it even stands in oposition to them. The chief reason of the distrust of fabrication in all forms is that it is utilitarian by its

very nature. Fabrication, but not action or speech, always involves means and ends; in fact, the category of means and ends derives its legitimacy from the sphere of making and fabricating where a clearly recognizable end, the final product, determines and organises everything that plays a part in the process - the material, the tools, the activity itself, and even the persons participating in it; they all become mere means toward the end and they are justfied as such. Fabricators cannot help regarding all things as means to their ends or, as the case may be, judging all things by their specific utility. The moment this point of view is generalised and extended to other realms than that of fabrication it will produce the banausic mentality. And the Greeks rightly suspected that this philistinism threatens not only the political realm, as it obviously does because it will judge action by the same standards of utility which are valid for fabrication, demand that action obtain a pre-determined end and and that it be permitted to seize on all means likely to further this end; it also threatens the cultural realm itself because it leads to a devaluation of things as things which, if the mentality that brought them into being is permitted to prevail, will again be judged according to the standard of utility and thereby lose their intrinsic, independent worth, and finally degenerate into mere means. In other words, the greatest threat to the existence of the finished work arises precisely from the mentality which brought it into being. From which it follows that the standards and rules which must necessarily prevail in erecting and building and decorating the world of things in which we move, lose their validity and become positively dangerous when they are applied to the finished world itself.

Appendix Three

The civil-law relationship between the debtor and his creditor
. . . has been interpreted in an . . . exceedingly
remarkable and dubious manner into a relationship in
which to us modern men it seems perhaps least to belong:
namely into the relationship between the present
generation and its ancestors. . . . Within the original
tribal community . . . the living generation always
recognised a juridical duty toward earlier generations,
and especially toward the earliest, which founded the
tribe . . . . The conviction reigns that it is only through
the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that
the tribe *exists* - and that one has to *pay them back* with
sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognises a
debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears
never cease, in their continued existence as powerful
spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new
strength. . . . What can one give them in return?
Sacrifices . . . , feasts, music, honours; above all,
obedience - for all customs, as works of the ancestors,
are also their statutes and commands: can one ever give
them enough? This suspicion remains and increases; from
time to time it leasds to a wholesale sacrifice, something
tremendous in the way of repayment to the "creditor" .
. . The *fear* of the ancestor and his power, the
consciousness of indebtedness to him, increases,
according to this logic, in exactly the same measure as
the power of the trive itself increases, as the tribe
itself grows ever more victorious, independent,

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honoured, and feared. . . . Every step toward the decline of a tribe, every misfortune, every sign of degeneration, of coming disintegration always *diminishes* fear of the spirit of its founder and produces a meaner impression of his cunning, foresight, and present power. If one imagines this rude kind of logic carried to its end, then the ancestors of the *most powerful* tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a *god.* Perhaps this is even the origin of gods, an origin therefore out of *fear!* . . . The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth. Presuming we have gradually entered upon the *reverse* course, there is no small probability that with the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God there is now also a considerable decline in mankind's feeling of guilt; indeed the prospect cannot be dismissed that the complete and definitive victory of atheism might fee manking of this whole feeling off guilty indebtedness toward its origin, its *causa prima.* Atheism and a kind of *second innocence* belong together.

Appendix Four

Although art, religion, and philosophy share the same universal content, their respective media differ. Speaking most broadly, the medium of art is *sensation.*

Art presents its content sensuously by means of human fabrications which, in ideal cases, exemplify a limited kind of perfection. These are artworks which, through their beauty, present perfection through sensation. The medium of religion is *mental imagery,* and its empirical content is given shape through internal pictures of "what is godlike." Last, the native realm of philosophy is *pure conception,* and its content is logically patterned in the dialectical form of "what is conceptual," or what Hegel calls "the concept." In art, religion, and philosophy, then, a constant universal human aspiration - the goal of complete self-development - is variously expressed in the form of perceivable external objects, empirically constituted mental images, and pure concepts. . . . As one moves from art to religion to philosophy within Hegel's theory of human culture, one follows a progression from "sensation" to "conception" - a progression that is part of Hegel's intellectual inheritance from Plato. Just as Plato characterised the spiritual passage from ignorance to truth as a movement from a realm of sensation to the realm of pure conception, Hegel traces the passage of cultural expression from art, to religion, to philosophy as a movement that begins with the confusion and contingency of sense-perception and concludes with the clear precision and necessity of pure thought. Inspired by Plato, Hegel devalues sensation in favour of pure conception, and inevitably allows the spirit of Plato's own notorious devaluation of art to haunt his own theory. (Wicks, Robert, 'Hegel's Aesthetics: An Overview,' in Beiser, Frederick C., editor, **The Cambridge Companion to Hegel**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pages 351 and 352)

Appendix Five

Not infrequently a new content may find expression in old
forms; but it may also destroy the old forms with an almost
explosive violence and bring new ones into existence. The
Swiss critic Konrad Farner quotes Christian art during
the period of later antiquity as an example of a new
content temporarily borrowing old forms. This art, he
writes,

made use of old pagan forms to express a new, no longer
pagan content. Christian artists had to use old
forms in order to present the new content in
the most direct way possible, since these forms
corresponded to familiar ways of seeing - and
the prime concern of the early Christians was
to make the Christian message widely known, in
order to create a new world. Generations of
artists had to come and go before a new form
corresponding to the new content was found, for
new forms are not suddenly created, nor are
they introduced by decree - which,
incidentally, is also true of new contents. But
let us be clear about it: the content, not the
form, is always the first to be renewed; it is
content that generates form, not vice versa;
content comes first, not only in order of
importance but also in time, and this applies
to nature, to society, and therefore also to
the arts. Wherever form is more important than
content, it will be found that the content is

out of date. At the end of the Middle Ages it was scurrilous Gothic,[◊] at the time of dying absolutism it was mannered Rococo,[◊] and at the time of the decaying bourgeoisie it is empty abstraction.

No one can deny that Christianity brought new ideas into the world. But we should not overlook the fact that, in the early centuries of our era, it belonged to antiquity even so far as its content was concerned. It competed with similar religions, such as the cults of Mithras,[◊] Isis,[◊] and Serapis[◊] – religions which also went far outside local boundaries and attempted to satisfy the Roman Empire's thirst for religious unity. And Christianity, especially in its Alexandrian[◊] version, was extremely anxious to establish itself as a movement *within* and to associate itself both with the arts and the philosophy of antiquity. (Bostock, Anna, translator, Ernst Fischer: <u>**The Necessity of Art: A Marxist Approach**</u> <u>[**Von der Notwendigkeit der Kunst]**,</u> Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963, pages 142 and 143, original emphasis)

In order to save an outdated social content, the ruling class adopts protective postures towards old forms – although it is always prepared, at a critical moment, to abandon these in exchange for undisguised dictatorship. At the same time it tries to cast suspicion on new forms – which may not yet have attained full maturity – and so to damn the new social content. It is becoming more and more embarrassing to glorify or justify the old social content of capitalism with all its attendant disasters. And so the champions of capitalism now defend 'only' its social and political forms of expression. This tendency to

overlook the content, this emphasis laid on form as though it were the essential thing, indeed the only thing worthy of attention, has also affected a large section of the uneasy intelligentsia in the capitalist world and has brought into being the phenomenon of 'formalism' in the sphere of the arts. This is not really a question of the means of artistic expression (for there can be objection to experimenting with new means); it is a question of the deeper, more general problem of 'formalism' as a phenomenon typical of social form no longer in keeping with the times, typical of the fact that a ruling class has outlived itself. (Bostock, Anna, translator, <u>Ernst Fischer</u>: **The Necessity of Art: A Marxist Approach** [**Von der Notwendigkeit der Kunst],** Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963, page 130)

Appendix Six

When Thebes at length stood firm one might
      have guessed
That Cadmus[◊] in his banishment was blessed:
Happy with child of Mars[◊] and Venus[◊] wed;
Happy with children of such mother bred:
In sons and daughters did his race endure,
With grandsons tall to make succession sure.
But wise the word: "Await the end: let none be counted happy
    till his days are done."
   A grandson first it was (while prospering so
His fortune seemed) that proved a cause of woe,
When horns belying nature crowned his head,

And staghounds lapped the blood their master
    shed.
Who weighs his deed will find no crime therein,
But fate made error pay the price of sin.
    There stood a hill where many a beast had
        bled,
And here through trackless wastes, the hunt was
    led.
When noon made short the shadows, and the sun
Was in midheaven, with half his course to run,
The Theban prince addressed his faithful band,
And in contented tones thus gave command:
"Full fortune, friends, has crowned the day: each
    net,
Each hunting-spear with blood of beasts is wet.
When next the dawn, in car of crocus hue,
Leads in the day, take we the trail anew;
But now the sun 'twixt coast and coast attains
His midmost height, and cracks the parching
    plains.
Then strike the nets, while Phoebus[◊] shows his
    power."
His men obeyed and gave repose its hour.
    Within a vale, Gargaphië,[◊] cypress made
With prickly pine a dense and sacred shade,
Kilted Diana's[◊] haunt; and in the wood,
Far in a secret glade, a grotto stood;
Where nature mimicked art, and tufa soft
And living pumice raised an arch aloft.
To right a whispering spring, thin trickling,
    brimmed
A limpid pool, with grassy margent rimmed.
Tired from the chase, the goddess freshened here
Her maiden limbs with water dewy-clear;

And passing with her nymphs the archway low,

To one, who squired her, gave her slackened bow,

Her dart, her quiver; and to one her cloak,

Which she with ready arm extended took.

Two free her feet; while Theban Crocale's[◊] care,

With art more expert, knots the straying hair. –

Her own hangs loose. – Five maidens more there
        be:

Hyale,[◊] Nephele,[◊] and Phiale,[◊]

Psecas,[◊] and Rhanis,[◊] who the water fling

Dipped in capacious vessels from the spring.

Appendix Seven

[N]ot all Athenian men died in battle, but every epitaph shows in one way or another that *the city would always remember the qualities of the dead man* [emphasis added]. Not all Athenian women died in their beds, but it was always left to the husband, or at least to the family, to preserve the memory of the dead woman. . . . At the level of social expectations, the city, in effect, had no comment to make on a woman's death, even if she was as perfect as she could be. A woman was allowed no accomplishments beyond leading an exemplary existence, quietly as wife and mother alongside a man who lived the life of a citizen. Quietly[ ]-[ ]this at any rate was the life that Pericles recommended, in his funeral speech, to the widows of Athenians fallen in battle. The glory (*kleos)* [original emphasis] of men lived on, carried to the ears of posterity by the thousand voices of renown. The glory of a woman had no spokesman but her husband, ever since Penelope[◊] stated that only the return of Ulysses[◊] would revive her diminished *kleos* [original emphasis]

(**Odyssey** [original emphasis] XIX.124-128). It was the husband who, after the death of his wife, would be the repository of her memory. If she survived her husband, *it was for a woman not to get herself talked about among men, in terms of either praise or blame* [emphasis added]. The glory of a woman was to have no glory.[2] [original endnote]

2. Thucydides II.45.2, a remark that has been commented on and discussed ad infinitum, starting with Plutarch, who, at the beginning of *De mulierum virtutibus,* attacks such an idea. But Plutarch, who sees in feminine virtues 'a good deal of historical exposition,' belongs to an era in which the literary genres were less centered on the city than in classical times, and so there was room for women's participation in history.

Appendix Eight

Coriolanus [◊ to the senators of Rome]: ' . . . What may be sworn
      by, both divine and human,
Seal what I end withal!° This double worship,
Where one part does disdain with cause, the other
Insult without° all reason; where gentry,° title,
  wisdom
Cannot conclude° but by the yea and no
Of general ignorance – it must omit°
Real necessities, and give way the while
To unstable slightness.° Purpose so barred,° it
  follows
Nothing is done to purpose. Therefore, beseech

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  you -
You that will be less fearful than discreet;°
That love the fundamental part of state°
More than you doubt° the change on't; that prefer
A noble life before a long, and wish
To jump° a body with a dangerous physic°
That's sure of death without it - at once pluck
  out
The multitudinous tongue;° let them not lick
The sweet which is their poison. Your dishonour
Mangles true judgement, and bereaves the state
Of that integrity° which should become't;
Not having the power to do the good it would,
For th' ill which doth control't.° . . . . . . . . . . . . .
      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
      . . . . . . . . . . . . . What should the people do with
        these bald°
  tribunes,
On whom depending, their obedience fails
To th' greater bench?° In a rebellion,
When what's not meet, but what must be, was law,
Then were they chosen; in a better hour
Let what is meet be said it must be meet,°
And throw their power i' th' dust.'
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(Brower, Reuben, editor, **The Tragedy of Coriolanus by William Shakespeare,**[◊] New American Library, New York, New York, 1966, pages 122 to 124, emphasis added [the symbol ° refers to an entry in Brower's glossary, which - together with his interpretation of the above passage - is quoted below]

. . . **withal** with . . . **without** beyond . . . **gentry** gentle birth . . . **conclude** decide . . . **omit** overlook . . . **unstable slightness** unsteady trifling . . . **Purpose so barred** when the intention (of charting a policy in

advance) is so thwarted . . . **less fearful than discreet** i. e., more prudent than fearful . . . **fundamental part of state** basic constitution of the government . . . **doubt** fear . . . **jump** risk harming . . . **physic** medicine, treatment . . . **multitudinous tongue** (the voice of the 'Hydra,' the tribuneship) . . . **integrity** wholeness . . . **control't** overpower it . . . **bald** trivial (pun) . . . **th' greater bench** i. e. the senate . . . **it must be meet** that it *must* be fitting (Brower, Reuben, editor, **The Tragedy of Coriolanus by William Shakespeare**, New American Library, New York, New York, 1966, pages 122 to 124, emphasis added); [b]y this point in the play the noble life is not only being equated with the 'deeds of Coriolanus,' but with the ironic qualifications of his pride. 'A "noble" life' on his lips can be taken by the tribunes and [the] people simply as 'the life of the nobles, the senate.' Coriolanus'[s] plea for the 'fundamental part of state,' his concern for the 'integrity' of the body-politic seemingly echoes Menenius'[s[◊]] fable; but 'to pluck out[ ]/[ ]The multitudinous tongue,' to eliminate the tribunes, is effectively to deny the people, is effectively to deny the people any part in the government. Coriolanus does not want a 'blended' voice, but only one. He alone, he half implies, is the proper voice of the state. He is making this plea, he says, in the interest of avoiding 'confusion.' The hero who pleads for order, who fears revolution, speaks revolutionary doctrines[,] and [he] nearly starts one. He of course intends a counterrevolution; but he very nearly sets a true popular revolution under way. . . . The metaphor that runs through Coriolanus'[s] speech is the familiar medical one of the play (used once, but only once, by Plutarch[[◊]]): he offers 'a dangerous physic,' and in his view he is the health

of the state. But to the tribune Sicinius[◊] '[h]e's a disease that must be cut away' (III.i.293). Menenius accepts the implication, but [he] proposes 'a cure' rather than 'surgery.' He would proceed by 'the humane way' of compromise; that is, by Chapman's[◊] (and Plutarch's) way of 'humane government.' But the fatality of Coriolanus'[s] nature[ ]-[ ]his pride and 'choler,' his lack of temperance[ ]-[ ]carries him on to destroy what he thinks he is saving . . . (Brower, Reuben, editor, **The Tragedy of Coriolanus by William Shakespeare**, New American Library, New York, New York, 1966, pages xxxviii and xxxix)

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Appendices

[on soft and hard {Enlightenment}, Eurydice, light and dark, rationality and superstition, see Goldhill, Simon, **Reading Greek Tragedy**; see also margin notes and other notes for suggestions for conclusion; introduction might cover some other Greek plays as well as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; conclusion should cover private dimension of death, what it meant at the dawn of romanticism, images of nature, beasts, domination by 'science', et cetera)

The family is an enclave of divine law within the temporal world, an enclave wherein the woman as 'the concrete embodiment of crime'[cccxiii] has safe sanctuary. But although, therefore, '[t]he family is the internal foe of the antique State'[cccxiv] (and antique is here not to be understood as an evaluative epithet but, rather, as a label denoting the fifth century before Christ[cccxv]), its preservation is assured by the state's recognition of its own dependence on the regeneration of its military-political resources by the family,[cccxvi] on account of which 'the state, even in the moment of conflict, will "concede divine honours" to the domestic, ethically private dimension of existence,'[cccxvii] will tolerate the family as a '*staatsfreier Bezirk*' within the sphere of its own jurisdiction.[cccxviii] However, while the insight that the family is indispensable to, because constitutive of, the state *also* by virtue of its role in the care of its ancestors is less immediate in the force of its conviction, it is all the same equally undeniable. The former circumstance is undeniable on account of the patent evidence in the form of the family's offspring, and the latter circumstance is a logical corollary of the former. The perpetuity of the state, which makes it prior to the family, is the reward of procreation, which in its turn is carried on by the compulsion of desire, an instinctive force that creates life as much as other instinctive

forces - 'unconscious appetites'[cccxix] - extinguish its physical remnants, and '[t]he family . . . puts its own action in their place,'[cccxx] that is, in the place *also* of desire, which it 'weds' to the sentiment of love just as it 'weds the blood-relation to the bosom of the earth.'[cccxxi] In this 'action' the family confers on its offspring what it does not have itself, that is, the halo of culture with which a state's legitimacy is built by its youth as it comes of age and is admitted into citizenship or entrusted with the responsibility of carrying forward the family's role in nurturing the nuclei of culture. The family, in other words transfigures the links between nature and culture in that it absorbs within itself the stigma which the state's ultimate dependence on 'unconscious appetites'[cccxxii] implies, but, *also,* the family *sublates* this circumstance in that it itself 'possesses in the community its substance and enduring being.'[cccxxiii] And just as the family thus mediates to the state the divine law in which it 'possesses . . . its power and authentication,'[cccxxiv] so it also parallels in the pattern of its own existence the function which war has for the state. While namely 'war . . . [is] . . . the

necessary discipline and highest function of *citizens,'* [cccxxv] wherein the state manifests its own cultural being *and* at once distinguishes it from the 'mere . . . natural being' [cccxxvi] to which individual life *potentially* degenerates, so death is the foremost and ultimate obligation of a man in his family role in that it furnishes his kin 'with its ancestral pantheon, its household Lares.' [cccxxvii] The ancestral pantheon is the final station of man, in which he, having made his contribution to the collective, political purpose, reverts to *'pure being, death'* [cccxxviii] and is thus once again conjoined, through love, with the natural being of his family, the source of his individual life that he has actualised in the state. And by virtue of its existence through the '"work" which the individual . . . has undertake[n] . . . on its behalf,' [cccxxix] that is, the assertion of the polity in war, the ancestral pantheon becomes for the family more than just a profane *source* from which it emanates in a mere causal and sequential sense - it becomes a *symbol* of the family's divine function in the edifice of culture. Correspondingly, war is not the mere causal and sequential *end* of the state but it is the *image* of its divine inspiration. Through the sentiment of familial love, war and the ancestral pantheon are brought into a dialectical relationship, hallowed by the rites of burial and hero worship just as the battle itself, that would otherwise 'be an intolerable slaughter,' [cccxxx] blasphemous like the gory mangling of corpses by 'unconscious appetites.' [cccxxxi]

'The family is the internal foe of the antique state' [cccxxxii] because it represents an order that, in the logic of its existence parallel to the state, makes the latter's character as a temporal and *particular* phenomenon manifest and hence denies it its potential claim to the absolute rightness of its laws. And each state is of course particular in relation not only to the divine realm, out of whose popular conceptualisation [cccxxxiii] it derives its own *raison*

d'être and legitimacy, but also to other states versus which it continually has to assert its sovereignty, which is the sublimation of the individual wills of its citizens. The *actual* state is no less inherently indictable than the family,[cccxxxiv] 'yet regardless of its degree of imperfection, a state is such only in so far as it realises in its actual historical being the Idea, or the principle, of the state,'[cccxxxv] and it is in this *endeavour* in which it can root its claim that it has divine sanction. It is however the family that, in the timelessness of its function, in the regularity of its reproductive activities, originally *provides* the image of an *organism* that is complete in itself and obeys its own rules[cccxxxvi] on which the *Idea* of the state is modelled, because it is in fact the family which, by putting its own action in the place of nature,[cccxxxvii] demonstrates its supremacy over unpolitical, because indiscriminate, forces and thus asserts *its* place in the *political* world of culture. And hence it is only by derivation that the state can aspire to this image of being an organic and therefore self-validating fixture in the firmament of culture: The state's lease in the world of culture is grounded in the 'work' which the family does on its behalf (as much as the

continuity of the family is assured by the 'work' that the individual does for it in dying and thereby furnishing it with its ancestral pantheon[cccxxxviii]). This 'work' consists in the ideological service that In the funerary ceremony the family renders to the state an ideological service by clothing its practical actions on the occasion of death in the guise of ritual and by hence permitting the state its pretension that its foundations are natural only in the representations of folklore and myth, not in reality.[cccxxxix] In this ideological process the self-effacement of women for the glory of men[cccxl] is thus paralleled in the family's escorting of the deceased to his final resting place and in the family's ritual *administration* of the separation of the soul from the body and the flesh from the bones *on behalf of the state,* by which the state is enabled to raise itself to the status of an abstract and universal entity whose principles permeate its constitutive elements, that is, also the family, rather than vice versa.[cccxli] The family shoulders the inherent indictability of the state and makes it its own. The *ideal* of the state is made sacrosanct by a purging from it of its historic specificity, which is at once its imperfection, in that this is associated with its individual citizens at the time of their death and in that the care of their remains is unequivocally assigned to the family, whereas any public ceremonial in honour of a fallen soldier honours him as an individual and the limited historical end to which he gave his life only secondarily, whereas it primarily reaffirms the (Hegelian) ideology which portrays self-sacrifice for the state as coterminous with the interest of the individual concerned.

The ideological benefit that accrued to the state from the ritualistic disposal of corpses by the family is of course vitally connected with the material-economic pillars of the state, that is, of the *actual* state in which the idea of the state is given its

temporal embodiment. In other words, while on the one hand funerary rituals obviously are formalised expressions of private grief at the departure of a relative, this purpose does on the other hand not suffice to justify them in Hegel's model of the state; if it did, the custom of burial and its embroiderments by expressions of piety, indeed any current notions of 'piety' themselves, would be entirely irrational, arbitrary and impulsive flashes of personal sentiment, mirages of spiritual energy inexplicably emerging out of themselves, whereas the state would stand aloof and isolated from the responses of its citizens to the death of another citizen – the state would be *particular,* in this case not on account of its historical specificity, but on account of its apparent *partisan* character, its *separateness* from its citizens. It is however also one of the functions of funerary activities to concern themselves, in a ritualistic-symbolic manner as the occasion of death demands, with the relationships of citizens with one another in civic society, and more indirectly with the structuration of civic society in the state for the end of politics. While namely burial customs are in one way formalised reflections on the experience of *separation,* the anodyne notions

of passage and continuity, and of family re-union in the nether world, with which the family consoles itself for the loss of a relative in the present, in so far as they conjure a link between the family and the nether world, logically also imply a parallel connection between the family and the state within which it functions.

While the family therefore expects for its ideological service to the state a material dividend and so (notwithstanding its eternal *principle)* makes itself a historically specific component of the political edifice, the state, conversely, sanctifies its own material-temporal embodiment by projecting *this* principle onto the divine realm, by way of the offering of sacrifices - colonnaded temples and fattenend livestock - to the gods. It is true that '[n]either finely roofed houses, nor the stones of well-built walls, nor even canals and dockyards make up the polis . . . [,] . . . but men,'[cccxlii] yet at the same time the two relationships – between men and the *polis* and between the *polis* and the gods - which together make up the *idea* of the state, are underpinned by material *symbols,* and so the burial customs which the family cultivates replicate and corroborate the aforementioned notion of reciprocity. Whereas the state, as an abstract concept, transcends the shortlived material interests of individuals, and, in reality, through its end of war, indeed 'deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns,'[cccxliii] it at once serves its citizens as a vehicle for the realisation of the 'good life' by protecting, with its laws, the stake the citizens have in the present through their property. Each citizen's private property allows him to 'enjoy a sense of personality:'[cccxliv]

> A person has as his substantive *end* the right of
> putting his will into any and every thing and thereby

> making it his, because it has no such end in itself
> and derives its destiny and soul [*only*] *from his will.*
> This is the absolute right of appropriation which man
> has over all "things,"'[cccxlv]

and 'hence it is the duty of the state to respect the right of the citizen to his property.'[cccxlvi] It is in the sentiment by which citizens are attached to their personal property wherein 'culture' germinates, and because the state is the epitome of 'culture' – and is distinguished by it from 'the bestial in the systematisation of things'[cccxlvii] – '[r]espect for property . . . is, for Hegel, inseparable from religious belief.'[cccxlviii] Hence the funeral serves not only pious functions but also, quite overtly, the end of re-regulating property relations that have been upset by the death of a citizen. This process of re-regulation addresses several distinct factors in men's relationship with their property, namely, in particular, the *chronological* factor of the timespan within which this re-regulation takes place; the *ideological* factor of the fate of the property itself – that is, whether it is re-allocated or destroyed – and what this suggests for its political significance, and the *functional* question of

who is involved in the process and who has a title to the deceased's estate. The chronological factor underscores the need in civic society for a culturally appropriate definition of death which encompasses not just the absence of (natural) life but also of the absence of a stake in the polity. This factor hence takes account of the incongruence of social death and physical death and thus sets the death of human beings apart from the death of other creatures;[cccxlix] the sentiments which *link* human life to property, to culture, and to the state are thereby emphasised. The idea that the re-regulation of property relations needs time, that it takes place within a time*span* which is somehow demarcated, corresponds to the distinction between social death and physical death. In connection with the political and religious significance of property, therefore, there arises the imperative to make sense of the divergence between the termination of a citizen's political *activity* and 'the *calm* of simple universality'[cccl] into which he 'raise[s] . . . himself out of the *unrest* of the accidents of life,'[cccli] namely political activity, in death: the two have to be *harmonised.*[ccclii] And so the basis for the concept of liminality as the chronological passage between the different manifestations of death, or for the idea that a citizen may successively experience a primary and secondary 'deaths,' is given.

Allusions to the idea that 'mere' physical life has no place in the polity because it has not legitimate links with the material symbols of culture abound in **Antigone.** Antigone herself appears to accept that she has no standing in the citizens' deliberations about her punishment for the burial of Polynices: 'Take courage . . . [she says to her sister Ismene] . . . you live, but *my spirit has perished long since, so that I might serve the dead.'*[cccliii] In saying this Antigone corroborates the understanding that human life is *cultural* life, because it embodies itself *through 'spirit'* in material symbols (but

there is also a suave irony in Antigone's agreement to exit from the polity on *this* ground as it shrewdly disregards her exclusion on the *conventional* ground of her gender). Later, Creon concurs with her when he says about her to Ismene: 'Do not speak of her as present. She no longer exists.'[cccliv] And to this 'social death' corresponds 'social *life,*' as one might call the 'power' of the dead that they were deemed to have not only in close proximity of their graves but also in the days and weeks after their death - specifically upon their surviving relatives[ccclv] The process of re-regulating property relations, therefore, was an essential corollary to the political re-adjustment that also had to follow upon the death of a citizen and which principally had as its object the preservation of the principle that the citizens *were* the *polis*[ccclvi] and that there could be no incongruence between their *individual* wills and their collective *political* will, a principle that was potentially undermined by the posthumous *individual* interests of a deceased citizen as, in death, he had returned into the orbit of the family. To conjure, therefore, a person's presence whe he has died or his absence when he 'yet lives'[ccclvii] is a characteristic emotional reaction to death, and

,as well as in the days and weeks after their death

are applied to the extend not only from the family to the nether world,

The symbolism that was inherent in the burial practices of ancient Greece corroboratively served to determine the specific meaning that 'separation' assumed in this context and to establish its eschatological function. One important aspect of the funerary ritual in ancient Greece was its concern with the notion of passage, and it was in part the need to reconcile the ideas of passage and separation by which the occurrence of death came to be associated with the spectre of pollution, a term that in its turn takes on a peculiar significance in its association with death.

Tending to the corpse of a deceased person made those whose task this was doubly exposed to the exacting scrutiny of the gods because for the duration of the funerary period – the time that elapsed between the moment of death of the deceased person and the burial of the corpse – the condition of *liminality,* 'the stage where the soul [of the deceased] is very much betwixt and between'[ccclviii] – symbolically extended to them in so far as the notion of a passage of the deceased person from the world of the living to the world of the dead on which he was partly accompanied by his close relatives in the ceremony of burial logically also placed the living who partook in this passage,

albeit only *in ritual* in this intermediate category. The solemnity of the ritual, in turn, demanded that the continuing journey of the deceased person to this destination in Hades was reflected in the mourning of his close living relatives who

Statecraft as Worship, Treason as Blasphemy

Separation and Continuity, et cetera

Statecraft as Worship, Treason as Blasphemy

Mortals as Proxies of Gods and Fallen Heroes

Posthumous Vengeance: No Glory Without Nemesis?

Modes of Departure

But in the corpse of Polynices a challenge to this ancient world view arises, a challenge which probes the consistency of the principle of reciprocity between men and gods [and for this reason new perspectives on blasphemy and honour, new heading below], and the awkward possibility that an action which pleases one god will offend another god presents itself as a destructive predicament. It is a predicament that is as destructive to the harmony between men and gods as putrefaction is to the balanced polarity between nature and culture.

One object of Creon, in decreeing that last respects, in the form of mourning and burial, are to be denied to Polynices, is to exercise the state's prerogative of retribution as a response to the crime of treason. As however the state's legitimate claim to this substitute for redress is frustrated by the traitor's death, by seeking to pursue him beyond his death Creon violates the divine dispensation. His prerogative of retribution ceases where the judgement of the deceased by the gods of the nether world begins.[ccclix]

Even if Creon were right in dismissing Antigone's defence that she buried Polynices because 'Hades desires these rites,'[ccclx] and it is the hitherto unchallenged custom of letting the corpses of traitors rot in open air that gives Creon's dismissal of Antigone's defence its semblance of legitimacy, he nonetheless is culpable in as far as he exceeds his temporal authority by attempting, in the place of

Hades, to pass judgement on Polynices posthumously. Creon's vain and impetuous obsession with this endeavour whittles away his stature not only *vis-à-vis* his subjects but also *vis-à-vis* the gods by whose favour he is entitled to respect in his present position; as a result the devotion that Creon aims to show to the gods on behalf of Thebes is tarnished, and the title of Thebes to the blessing of the gods for the conduct of its affairs is imperilled.

However, moving on from the notions of judgement and retribution to those of purity and honour, it is clear that – before the background of Polynices' death – the blight of his corpse confounds both Creon and Thebes in these regards too. Had Polynices survived his assault on Thebes, then – by the means of punishment – the citizens' sense that they have defended themselves on the basis of provident right against aggression from abroad could have been restored to them. And had, on the other hand, Eteocles survived, then he might have posthumously made good his own past perfidy *vis-à-vis* his fallen brother without offending the citizens (and, in particular, their idea of piety[ccclxi]) by magnanimously permitting the burial of the corpse; the convention would not have been profaned by this

exceptional departure from it because it is *through* the convention of leaving fallen traitors unburied that in such a unique situation this gesture of posthumous magnanimity might have become possible and *as such* justifiable. But, perhaps more than piety, it was human awe of Hades, 'who "overlooks everything with his recording mind,"'[ccclxii] and of Zeus, whose power no 'human transgression can check,'[ccclxiii] which made the belief that '[o]ne generation does not release another'[ccclxiv] a holy truth that did not merely deter from the possibility of discretion in the administration of burial rites but clearly made the idea of discretion as such so sacrilegious that it was not entertained in the first place.

the recurs in the reflections on rights and duties which permeate **Antigone** and the other works in the genre of ancient Greek tragedy. Hegel saw religion and 'pure consciousness' as one, but in the absence of an understanding of their identical character on the part of common men, the *positive* break with nature which Hegel's normative conception of the modern state represented in theory (and which in his view had been inchoately achieved in the *polis* of ancient Greece) was dependent upon an *image* of a workable and plausible *modus vivendi* between the realms of God and of man. Hegel's contemporaries *might* have realised such an imaginary *modus vivendi* if they had not estranged themselves from religion by permitting their notion of it to be subsumed in *Christianity* and by in turn regarding Christianity as the actual substance of religion, hence availing Christianity to the ruling elites as the *vehicle* for their ideology by failing to see Christianity, more appropriately, as '*only [a] sign* . . . on the path to God.'[ccclxv] However, as culture, in the form of Christianity, thus intervened between men and true religion, that is, religion as it *is* 'pure consciousness,' the

manipulation of the popular *idea* of religion and the consequent assignation of religion to a separate, artificial realm, one that was neither the realm of God nor the realm of man, was politically opportune and therefore not surprisingly exploited for temporal ends. The *Christian* religion thus was mere superstition, an adulteration of *real* religion, and as such it served its propagators in their objective of alienating people from their own consciousness and of thereby making them the subject of the 'consciousness' of the elite that was purportedly inspired by 'the longed-for "beyond,"'[ccclxvi] a totem that was as politically expedient as it was spurious. The spirit of 'rationality' which the Enlightenment brought to prominence did nothing but to *cement* this false division between religion and pure consciousness; by absurdly making the former subject to the scrutiny of the latter it put 'rationality' on a par with *and* in the place of superstition. In contrast, for although in the polytheist mythology of which the art of Sophocles and his contemporaries is a record the 'concordance'[ccclxvii] between culture and heaven which Hegel eulogised in his analysis of the era was also partly imagined,

the imagined *contract* between Gods and men in ancient Greece was not *systematically* exploited and distorted by identifiable sections of society at the expense of other sections. Among the factors which account for this difference between Hegel's and Sophocles' periods in the extent to which a faith underpinned an ideology *may* be that the Greek city states had less complex and more equitable political structures, as well as smaller territories, than the states of Enlightenment Europe and that therefore the citizens of, for example, Thebes, had a greater sense of common identity than those of, for example, Louis XVI's France (considering also that external challenges to the respective state had a more immediate effect on the former's citizens than on the latter's): Consequently it can be assumed that stimuli for the ideological distortion of faith were weaker in antiquity than in the more recent period. At the same time, however, it was also in the nature of ancient Greek religious beliefs that, unlike Christianity, they did not lend themselves to being harnessed *as a whole* for political ends, because notions of precedence among the gods and of the unreliability and indeed mischievousness of gods were a corollary of the polytheist faith, and as such they ensured that claims in the names of one god could invariably be qualified with claims in the names of other gods. Thus, while of course also in Thebes political capital was made out of the assumed will of the gods (as the dialogues in **Antigone** show), this practice did not have then, as it did in the Enlightenment, its own momentum, but it was, rather, an *ad hoc* device which allowed interpretations of ancient Greek religious mythology to be corroborative of *different* political sentiments which were not *consistently* those with which the state concurred. Because of this the ancient Greek mythology could retain its character and vitality as a folk religion which, in the way in which it was sincerely shared by all, could suggest to Hegel the unity of religion and 'pure consciousness' of which he wrote.

Notwithstanding these observations, however, it is still patently evident that there *was* in ancient Greece some kind of tacit 'arrangement' between men and gods which at least shared *appearances* with the conception of the divinely sanctioned feudal order that was brought down by the French Revolution and that was driven by suppositions about "God's universal plan on earth, so that the hierarchy of feudal relations held its authority not by any will in the present world, but by the will of God."[ccclxviii] Unlike in the model of the feudal polity, however, wherein the (temporal) political structures 'constituted [themselves as] a network of relations under God [and wherein] God sat on the throne that would later be brought down to earth in the form of the absolutist monarch,'[ccclxix] the ancient Greek idea of the relationship between the divine realm and the temporal realm, between heaven and culture, emphasised a notion of 'bargaining' between the one and the other, of a partnership rather than of a hierarchy. Creon's reference to the *votive* offerings which Polynices had set out to defile is in keeping with the ideas of a pact between gods and men in which the

legitimacy of the political order is a feature of its 'accreditation' to the divine edifice and of the good fortunes of the state being a return from the gods for sacrifices and atonement, and hence the *polis* was not regarded as a bequest from the gods of which its rulers had to show themselves worthy by a form of 'good husbandry,' that is, imitation of the gods, as might be argued for the feudal monarchies, but, rather, as a joint possession.[ccclxx]

[check on possible duplication in part two of reciprocity argument in part one]

Out of this arises the force

to which Creon's prohibition of the burial of Polynices is testimony. acquiring citizenship without the qualification of

as much as the dead may be doubly dead, so the living may be dead

vengeance and honour

in the emphasis on the idea that the bond by which society cohered was given by men's 'lineal descent from the dead.'[ccclxxi] It is this notion of lineal descent, in turn, of which Hegel availed himself to reaffirm the status of the family as the nucleus of the political realm, because in the act of burial the family 'makes . . . [the deceased] . . . a member of a community which prevails over and holds under control the forces of particular material elements and the lower forms of life,[ccclxxii] and which is a 'presiding part of the Family.'[ccclxxiii]

Citizenship and Honour

However, before . . .

Status and Exclusion

In the present context the ritual of burial serves as an element of public life in ancient Greece which demonstrates the continuity of the concept of citizenship from then to Hegel's day. Death as a biological fact, on the other hand, has a quite separate significance both in terms of how it was perceived by people in the fifth century before Christ and in the eighteenth century, and in terms of possible parallels between these popular perceptions in the two periods. Although of course death demands the public response of burial, the experience of death and its anticipation are profoundly personal, and the ritualistic interaction between, respectively, the living and the deceased, and the wider community and the bereaved, as expressed in funerary customs, can only be symbolic. Antigone's composure in the face of her prospective death shows that she was quite free from any burden of anxiety, and in this she epitomises the *individual* attitude to death which was characteristic of her time, 'a basic, almost "natural . . . [attitude] . . . which was "almost unchanged for thousands of years . . . a naive and spontaneous acceptance of destiny and nature"'[ccclxxiv] in which she was strengthened by her faith, because she says: 'I shall have to spend more time pleasing those below than those here, for there I shall lie for ever.'[ccclxxv] (And later it is also not so much the imminence of her own death but rather the notion that an opportunity for the procreation of *new life* is forfeited that fills her with horror.) The *popular* reaction to Antigone's impending death, however, which Haemon conveys to his father as he says that

he 'can hear in the darkness how the city mourns for this girl . . . [because she] . . . is dying the worst of deaths for the most glorious of deeds,'[ccclxxvi] is distinctly *romantic* in its vivid imagination of the contrasts between her beauty and the cruelty of her fate, and between her noble conscience that is concerned with *the integrity of the family* and the raw selfishness that she has to confront in Creon, who is driven by *a cheap notion of his own image.* And it is through Hegel's model of the family that a connection between the seemingly different concepts of citizenship in ancient Greece and in post-1789 France is given, because the *idea* of the modern bourgeois state and of its emphasis on the political weight of the *individual,* which was ushered in by the French Revolution, is preempted (in Hegel's analysis) by the family: '[T]he individual in the Family is primarily related to the Family as a whole, and not by ties of love and sentiment to its particular members.'[ccclxxvii] 'The *positive*[ccclxxviii] End peculiar to the Family is the individual *as such,*'[ccclxxix] and this is Antigone's message to Hegel in her quest for the burial of Polynices. Her rationale is informed by the universality – in time and in space – of the family (which, through force of circumstance, she has to represent), and she sets it against and above Creon's rationale which is concerned with the narrow interests of Thebes and, later, with his own even narrower interests.

Just as procreation is ambiguously situated *between* nature and culture, so also is death. However, while procreation belongs properly into the *private* sphere of the family because its ultimate benefit to the state in supplying it with soldiers is merely contingent, death cannot be so neatly associated with *either* the state *or* the family. The occurrence of death concentrates the minds of relatives *and* citizens, and accordingly an analysis which takes account of the significance of death in both its private and public dimensions is required. Logically, death as an event in the life of a human being falls into the domain of the family as much as procreation, because both death and procreation are at the seam of nature and culture[ccclxxx] over which the family presides. As much as the family prepares its offspring for public duties and thus serves as a passage from nature to culture for each individual, so '[i]t is [also] concerned with individuality raised out of the unrest and change of life into the universality of death;'[ccclxxxi] that is, it also accompanies (but then only symbolically, after his death) an individual on his journey back to nature, 'i. e. the Family exists to promote the cult of the dead.'[ccclxxxii]

it must be *separated* from the living, but it must also *remain* separated, at least symbolically, from nature, from scavenging dogs and birds.[ccclxxxiii] A The idea that a deceased is owed posthumous respect is common to both antiquity and the Enlightenment, but the honour which may thus be accorded to a citizen after his death admits of gradation, and so death, too, becomes an object of vain vying among men for the status that it may potentially confer or confirm.

But it is important to distinguish here between death and burial. Both have their own separate significance in regard to the issue of honour, but the subject is complicated by the frequent metonymical use of 'death' for burial and for all the sentiments and customs that accompany by tradition but not necessity the occurrence of death. That aspect of a family's and the public's response to someone's death which goes beyond the minimum response of hygienic disposal of the corpse serves to indicate a deceased's status, and the elaborateness of the burial rituals, the conscientiousness in their observance, thus may contribute to what in ancient Greece was regarded as a 'fine death.'[ccclxxxiv] These folkloristic practices, however, also constitute what may be termed an 'overlap' of the world of culture into the world of nature, a superstitious means of effacing the sharpness of the transition from one to the other, for the purposes both of honouring the deceased and of imbuing death with those desirable connotations which it needed in order not to be feared by the soldiers of the ancient Greek city states. On the other hand there is also and overlap of the world of nature into the world of culture which is so manifest in the awe of death that death is ever-present even when it does not actually occur.[ccclxxxv] Before the background of these

preliminary observations the similarities and differences between conceptions of death at Hegel's time and in the era of Thebes assume added meaning which allows the contrast between death and burial to be brought out more clearly. Antigone's anticipation of her prospective death was quite free from any burden of anxiety, and thus her attitude to death was 'a basic, almost "natural" . . . [one, an attitude] . . . which was "almost unchanged for thousands of years . . . a naive and spontaneous acceptance of destiny and nature"'[ccclxxxvi] in which she was strengthened by her faith because she said: ' . . . I shall have to spend more time pleasing those below than those here, for there I shall lie for ever.'[ccclxxxvii] (And even her later horror at her imminent entombment arises not so much from fear of her own fate but rather from her notion that through her death before the due term of . . . [her] . . . life has come'[ccclxxxviii] an opportunity for the procreation of new life is forfeited.) But it is her faith also that assigns to her the duty to respond piously to the death of her brothers, it assigns to her the burial of Polynices

circumstance of the considerable disparities between the religious

life in the Thebes of **Antigone,** in which the heritage of *paganism* was still discernible, and the *Christian* religious culture of Hegel's day. Nonetheless, it is possible to make some sense of the bearing which religious sentiments had on political values in ancient Greece and even of how this could be appreciated from a different religious perspective, since there are indeed significant affinities between the *intellectual conceptualisation* of religion (notwithstanding the profound differences in the subjective experience of it) in ancient Greece and the manner in which the eighteenth century *philosophes* engaged with this theme.

are which he does not recognise when it is propounded by Antigone

Creon, however, while

negative freedom
particularity

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duty
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 . . . In the case of Hegel, who thus characterised the play, his analysis of society in his own period has sedimented into his interpretation there is of course (as has already been indicated earlier) a backward projection of his impressions

thus, of course

Ideological Distortions Through Time of the Concepts of

Religion, Law, Morality, Honour and Gender[ccclxxxix] **Antigone** allowed Hegel to demonstrate that the state lives through its idea and falls through insufficient (or - as is perhaps the case with Creon - reluctant) comprehension of its purpose by those who represent it (and hence Hegel distinguishes between particular states in history which are transient like the whims of their fallible representatives and the model of the ideal state which can only be approximated).

Rather, God's wisdom expressed itself in the organisation of the family, in the natural duties of parents and children, of husband and wife, and of brother and sister towards one another, and in the equal and impartial love of family members for each other. On earth, therefore, the family, as the state's regenerative resource, is also the ultimate locus of its sovereignty. Consequently, since sovereignty does not reside in an individual - nor indeed in the family *as such* - but in the divinely ordained yet rational operation of the principle of balance between the family and the state, the family is not only a physical pillar of the political order but it

is also a force of idealism which bears on the reasoning of government and tempers the utilitarian imperatives to which it might otherwise submit. Only through this provident ordering of competitive and hence potentially conflicting forces in the state can it be endowed with genuine legitimacy, that is, legitimacy which is not derived from an individual and which, precisely because of this, enables the state to be a vehicle for the actualisation of the individual's destiny.

Thebes: Political Idyll or Inchoate Synthesis of Nature and Culture? Historical Background and Philosophical Justification of Hegel's Tributes to Ancient Greece

In having witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the evaporation of the ideology that has held it together, the present generation may be privy to a revelation of truths as epochal as those which have made feudalism untenable two centuries ago. It is intriguing that Hegel should have posthumously inspired the interpretation of these recent developments - the 'unabashed victory of . . . liberalism' (albeit by default of the contending ideology) - as corroboration of the thesis that history has ended

with the truths of 1789. It is the very essence of Hegel's conception of history that it is a dialectical process which yields absolute knowledge *not* by perfecting ideology[cccxc] but by *transcending* it. Hegel's 'poignant, painful longing' [cccxci] for the Greece of Sophocles' **Antigone,** as an approximation of an ideal political system where 'political liberty and religious faith [are] concordant,'[cccxcii] arises out of his perspective on history as an open-ended succession of stages of emancipation *from* ideology. And when Hegel wrote – at about the time of the Battle of Jena (the event which one modern philosopher designated as the watershed between the period of 'history' and the period which

succeeded it) – his sentiment arose out of his acute perception that the spirit of 'rationality' and 'progress' (as propagated by Henri Comte de Saint-Simon and his followers) to which Christian orthodoxy had given way was merely a new corruption of divinely inspired ideas for sectional political ends just as the latter had been.

In Hegel's perception the political order of the Thebes of **Antigone** shared with pre-revolutionary France the potential for a fruitful development along the teleological path which he projected and on whose course human knowledge would be furthered. Whereas in pre-revolutionary France the actualisation of God's purpose on earth was foiled by the aristocracy's ruthless usurpation of power and its manipulation of Christian teaching for the purpose of entrenching the feudal hierarchisation of society, Thebes inspired Hegel in that its order *suggested* the perfect balance between the state and the Kingdom of God, between culture and nature, between civil law and divine law, and – more generally – in that it suggested the constructive complementarity of seemingly disparate moments, which was the essence of his philosophy. Just as for one modern philosopher there was a continuity between Romanoff and Lenin in that both clung to an atavistic form of statism,[cccxciii] there was for Hegel a different but equally significant continuity between the *Ancien Régime* and the new order that issued from the revolution: Both harnessed a 'mere belief'[cccxciv] in ideologically distorted ideas, that is, in religion and an idealised future

respectively, in their pursuit of legitimacy. Both orders therefore were partial – they existed in and were interpreted by human consciousness alone. Because profane political opportunism was the underlying principle before *and* after 1789, the utilitarian current which thus conjoined the outgoing monarchy and the incoming new government belied the political advance that it purported to have achieved.

Thebes could serve Hegel as a model of a state where worldly sovereignty was limited in its potential claims and scope by resting on pillars of legitimacy which were outside itself, because there God did not rule the state *through* someone who was seen as his divinely sanctioned representative. Rather, God's wisdom expressed itself in the organisation of the family, in the natural duties of parents and children, husband and wife, and brother and sister towards one another, and in the equal and impartial love of family members for each other. On earth, therefore, the family, as the state's regenerative resource, is also the ultimate locus of its sovereignty. Consequently, since sovereignty does not reside in an individual – nor indeed in the family *as such* – but in the divinely ordained yet rational operation of the principle of balance between the family and the state, the family is not only a physical pillar of the political order but also a force of idealism which bears on the reasoning of government and tempers the utilitarian imperatives to which it might otherwise submit. Only through this provident ordering of competitive and hence potentially conflicting forces in the state can it be endowed with genuine legitimacy, that is, legitimacy which is not derived from an individual and which, precisely because of this, enables the state to be a vehicle for the actualisation of the individual's destiny.

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An Exploration of Hegel's Approach to Sophocles' **Antigone**

[heading]

Hegel's interpretation of Sophocles' Antigone is of interest in as far as it helps to make his perspectives on the state, on law, on religion, and on morality more accessible than they are when they are analysed without the illustrative aid of this ancient play. Yet, since Hegel mentions Antigone only twice in The Phenomenology of Spirit, his views on those important aspects of man's political existence which he considered to be corroborated by the play actually have to be inferred from his general narrative in The Phenomenology of Spirit and from the historical context in which Hegel worked. The Phenomenology of Spirit was first published in

1807, eighteen years after the French Revolution, which Hegel experienced during his student years in Germany. This epochal event was significant for Hegel and other philosophers of the period in that it vindicated new ideas about politics and the state that had already gestated for some decades and which, rather than the revolution itself, inspired a new outlook on society and on man's purpose. The principal sentiments of this new outlook were 'rationality' and 'progress,' and the circumstance that they generally came to be indentified with Henri Comte de Saint-Simon rather than with Hegel can be partly explained with the difficulties of comprehension which Hegel's writing posed even for German academics and which of course it posed more so still for thinkers in France and other European countries in which the effects of the French Revolution were felt. Another reason, however, for Hegel's lesser initial influence is that he, unlike Saint-Simon, did not turn against religion as such, but only against Christian orthodoxy and against the corruption of religion for ends of unjust government (as experienced by France prior to the revolution). Religion itself was to Hegel a vital autonomous and contructive force in the shaping of man's political destiny, and in this respect his thinking was out of step with the vogue of his age to see religion as incompatible with rationality. Hegel also was not in tune with his contemporaries in seeking wisdom in the past rather than in an idealised future.

[heading]

Ancient Greece, as represented in Antigone by the state of Thebes, approximated in Hegel's view an ideal political system, because it was a political system where 'political liberty and religious faith [were] concordant.'[cd] The circumstance that this interpretation of the play is in apparent contradiction to its plot is essential to

an understanding of Hegel's model of the attainment of absolute knowledge by a process of reasoning that navigates through seemingly opposed propositions which however are partial truths which can be reconciled in a synthesis when they are recognised as such. In Hegel's conception of the state it functions outwardly as the principal vehicle of history and inwardly as the appropriate setting for the pursuit by individuals of their creative self-fulfilment. The ability of humans to reason and to be conscious of themselves sets them apart from nature. It is an ability which entails an ominous choice between innocence, as a state of unity with nature.[cdi] on the one hand and 'culture' on the other hand.[cdii] Hegel interprets innocence as an illusory condition for human beings which, just as morality, can only be partly attained because human self-realisation becomes meaningful only in the context of a public world. [cdiii] But because of this there is also an aspect of contradiction in the assumption of human innocence, since 'innocence' derives its normative value only from the discourse by which meaning is conveyed in the world of 'culture.' However, while the world of 'culture' can serve to give the concept of innocence an identity, it cannot provide the conditions for the state of innocence, because this can exist only in nature from which the world of 'culture' is set apart both logically and by practical necessity. Hegel therefore implies in his argument that there is a compulsion for humans to organise themselves politically and hence advocates the state as a form of political organisation which can potentially achieve the synthesis of individual aspirations and public 'rationality.' In his 'poignant, painful longing' [cdiv] for the political example of the ancient Greek city states, symbolised in Sophocles play by Thebes, Hegel emphasised the capacity of the state, by virtue of its logical structure, to harness human reason and guide it to this happy synthesis. It is in this mission of the state in which God realises his will on earth and through which the

state reveals to its subjects the plot of history in which they partake in keeping with God's design. Only through a responsible civic consciousness, therefore, can individuals acquire the judgement required to distinguish between good and evil and hence achieve genuine moral insight. The sentimental idealisation of 'innocence' therefore bears within it a moral vanity and selfishness which makes it akin to the popular conception of morality as being a kind of poor man's virtue, that is, the 'virtue' of acquiescence to the *status quo* by those who have no alternative. It is therefore a 'virtue' which is inherently subversive of the state and which thus tends to offend God's purpose. This popular conception of morality and Hegel's conception of morality are thus in the character of an antonymous pair.

In addition to these philosophical foundations, the state also needs to be supported by a physical pillar: The family. Hegel sees the family as the physical nucleus of the state and as the mirror in which the state can see the Kingdom of God as its reflection in heaven. The family therefore is an entity that belongs into two worlds and makes them complementary. The triadic pattern which permeates Hegel's thinking, having served to symbolically sever the umbilical cord that joined man to nature, thus reappears in Hegel's image of the family and its relationship with the state. In the family, the woman has a central role, whether as wife, mother or sister. As a wife she has the power to undermine the public standing of statesmen and hence the institution of the state as such. In Sophocles' play the consequential effect of the proposed punishment for Antigone on Haemon erodes Creon's authority as the people are touched by Haemon's probable fate of losing his fiance. At the end of the play Euryidce's suicide leads to Creon's total isolation and final ruin. Eurydice symbolised to the people that Creon, even as the ruler of Thebes, could not be above his obligations to the family in general

and to this own family in particular. The family gives the state its citizens, it nurtures its soldiers, and it cares for those who have become unproductive; Creon's family, as the first family in state was the one with which not only he fell but with which the polity also fell, and this power of the family demonstrates its dependent and yet antithetical relationship with the state. To Creon, in turn, his wife Eurydice was the personification of his own physical connection with nature and, through nature, with God. Through Eurydice Creon could have known that his Aris & Phillobligations to the state, to the family and to God were related and only seemed to conflict in consequence of being only partially comprehended.

A similar apparent conflict presents itself to Antigone and her sister Ismene

Of Creon, given his position as the head of the state of Thebes, the insight into the

By moreover destroying the inchoate familial bond between his son and Antigone Creon deprived the state of the future citizens who may have come from the union between Haemon and Antigone, and in doing so he showed himself unworthy of the loyalty and of the love of his own family.

Tragic conflict is . . . a conflict between two planes
of being which one of those who acts regards as
valueless, but which is recognised by others.[cdv]

Antigone's predicament, by comparison, emphasises different aspects of the nature and of the role of the family. Unlike Creon, whose actions are determined by his public office (and his own conscientiousness in discharging his civic duties), Anitone's initial role is that of a free moral agent who can follow the dictate of conscience in deciding whether or not to obey the law. Only when she resolves to buty her brother's corpse and to do so in defiance of Creon's edict does Antigone assume the role in the family that is assigned to her by divine law. However, her sister Ismene's action suggests that Antigone, like Ismene, is acting of her own volition and without illusion about the consequences. But once Antigone has accepted her familial duty as a sister towards her cedeased brother she comes to represent the realm of the family and she fated to suffer as an individual the consequence of its opposition to the state. Her eventual death, like Creon's ruin, is a sacrifice for the advance towards absolute knowledge that is achi Aris & Philler side of history, by the confrontation between the two planes of being to which the family and the state belong.

Hegel argues that death is a state of being whereas life is a state of action. The family's concern is the transition of humans from the world of being in to the world of action and *vice versa*. As the family exists within the parameters of civil law, the state is its 'mother'[cdvi] and is on account of this owed obedience by those whom the family has prepared for their civic role. As the state's claim on the obedience of Polynices has not been settled, its endeavour to seek some kind of redress is legitimate in principle. However, as Polynices, through his death, has already returned to the realm of the family, the state turns on Antigone who through her own choice and having already buried Polynices' corpse has perfromed her role of taking charge of the transition of a family member from the state

of action to the state of being. The consequent collision between the wills of Antigone and Creon is one that admits of interpretation in terms of a collision between male and female, each of which, again, represent partial but complementary manifestations of knowledge.

As has already been noted, religion is a crucial pillar in Hegel's conception of knowledge. Like philosophy, religion both contains knowledge and is knowledge, but the knowledge of religion is obscured by religious symbolism whereas the knowledge of philosophy is plain and immediate. Moreover, the knowledge of religion is knowledge that is not fully recognised as such in human consciousness, because for the human mind to be conscious of knowledge it has to know itself as spirit, that is, as the manifestation of God's purpose on earth and, in fact, as a partial manifestation of the spirit of God itself. Aris & Phill view of God was not pantheistic because he conceived of God as spirit and of the human and the natural environment as spirit and matter. ; In a number of ways, the status and the perception of religion and of the gods in ancient Greece differed quite considerably from the idealised image of Christianity which inspired Hegel. Nonetheless, Hegel's views on the philosophical potential of the Christian religion provice some cues on his reasoning in the interpretation of Antigone. Hegel's concern with misconceptions about the nature of religion and about its indepsinsability as a means to the attainment of absolute knowledge stem from the historical conditions in the eighteenth century, that is, when the political power of the ecclesiastical establishment was at its prime and when, because of this, religion *per se* came to be challenged by the *philosophes* who sought to put rationality in its place. Hegel thus argued that political opportunism, that is, the desire of the privileged to perpetuate the feudal order, accounts for the bond betwen religion

and politics in that era, and political opportunism, again is at the root of the subsequent attack, under the banner of rationality, on religion by the *philosophes* because the latter were the intellectual mouthpiece of the rising bourgeoisie which sought to topple the monarchy and to constitute the government itself.Thus both before and after the French Revolution, the image of the separation of politics and religion is used deceptively for the benfit of sections of society only. This not to say that the separation of politics and religion is itself false, either in the sense that it does not exist or that it ought not to exist. Rather, the separation which is pretended is a trivial one, whereas the true separation which does exist (ought to exist) is suppressed, to the ultimate detriment, both spiritually and materially, of the state's citizens. It is the utilitarian current, which is hence present in both feud Aris & Phillal images of the role of religion in the political order, which Hegel seeks to banish from his model of the relationship between religion and the state, and ancient Greece was to him an example of political organisation in which religion and politics were separate and truly autonomous ethical orders which, as such, could constructively complement one another. The conflict which did arise between religion and the stae arose not because of inherent shortcomings in the model of ite interaction of these separate ethical orders, but because of moral and intellectual shortcomings on the part of the protagonists and because of the nature of religion at the time, which, in a number of respects, was fallible, not dependable, 'worldly' – could be probed / manipulated.

Sophocles's Antigone was for Hegel both a piece of testimony to the merits of an ancient political order and a work in which his theses on issues of law, religion, the family and other pivotal political forces were illustrated. Hegel saw history as a process in which Reason was progressively realised, [cdvii] and this progressive

realisation of reason, in turn, was the mission of the state as the principal vehicle and agent of history. But for the state to fulfil this role, its internal organisation had to be one in which there was a rational balance between divine law and civil law, a balance that allowed each body of law to function and to complement the other without encroaching upon it. For although civil law is derived from the Scriptures and hence has areligious origin which can justify its claim to obedience, witin the state its claim to obedience is absolute and independent of religious sanction. The legitimacy of the civic law in its day to day application is given by its universality, that is, by the fact that it extends to the greatest number of subjects and therefore subsumes other systems of law which govern the ineraction Aris & Phillips in the state. Thus the duties which family members have towards one another and which are assigned to them by divine law assume the character of civil rather than of divine duties in the polity in so far as the state normally integrates these duties into its worldly system of rights. In doing so the state does not arrogate to itself the right to administrate and to enforce - and therefore, by implication, to override - divine law, but, on the contrary, it defers to divine law as it governs family relations in recognition of the family's civic function as the nucleus of the political realm. Furthermore, the principel of law is one that can be meaningful only in the setting of a polity; in the Scriptures, the Kingdom of God is therefore the parallel to the civil state, and on earth even divine law can be realised only by worldly means. It is therefore possible to speak of a subtle but fruitful interplay between civil law and divine law in the state in that the spirit of divine law has a discernible though unquantifiable influence on legislation. Whereas in eighteenth century France the polity collapsed on account of a corrupt interpretation of divine law (and this analysis probably reinforced - or at least is consistent with Hegel's view of Christian religion

as harbouring absolute knowledge), the confrontation between Antigone and Creon in ancient Thebes is of an altogether different and – in spite of its detrimental consequences for the individuals involved – ultimately positive outcome in the sense that it represented an advance towards absolute knowledge. In his interpretation of Antigone Hegel is not concerned with the virtue or the culpability of Antigone and Creon as individuals; what is important to Hegel is that Antigone and Creon are representatives of different ethical orders, the family and the state, and it is as much Antigone's duty to administer the rituals of the family which are prescribed by divine law to her close relatives as it is Creon's duty to Aris & Phillips of the state which he represents in his person. Because of this there arises a supervidially obvious and inevitable convlict between Antigone and Creon about the corpse of Polynices to which both have an apparently legitimate claim: Antigone as the sister of the deceased and Creon as the personification of Polynices's object of betrayal, the state of Thebes. At this obvious level of the confrontation between Antigone and Creon, their moral fallibility is not an issue, and the seemingly conflicting demands of divine law and civil law are also not of principal significane here. Rather, the tru dilemma of the situation is the evident irreconcilability between the desires of an individual which have a *prima facie* quality of reasonableness and the collective will of Thebes which its ruler Creon is required to express and to enforce. Antigone's quest for the burial of her brother and her owen preparedness for sacrifice in the pursuit of this objective arouses sympathy with her stance and with her person, a fact which makes Antigone's challenge to the state more formidable. But Creon's principled and unfaltering dedication to his purpose and duty as the head of the state of Thebes at a time when he is beset from many quarters by emotional pleas to yield also commands respect. In Hegel's view, the failure to resolve such a

fundamental conflict between a private will and the public will must result in an erosion of the authority of the laws and therewith in the weakening and possible collapse of the state. For the individual such extreme authomy leads to purposelessness and ultimate defeat in that the individual's original purpose is meaningful and realisable only through the state and in the setting of the state. If the individual sets out to attain his objective against the state he necessarily places himself outside the parameters of civil society within which rituals such as the burial of a deceased relative have moral significance, and hence his action becomes sensel Aris & Phillive. But although both Antigone and Creon are destroyed as individuals in their confrontation with one another, the conflict as such is fruitful in so far as it follows the 'Hegelian' progression of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The synthesis contains within it knowledge that was already contained in the thesis and the antithesis but whcih there was self-contradictory and therefore not recognised as valid truth. The synthesis thus achieves a higher order of knowledge by rising above the superficial incompatibility of the thesis and the antithesis. In the context of Antigone the conclusion that is therefore to be drawn is that the dichotomy between divine law and civil law is artificial and hence invalid, and both Antigone and Creon had to be sacrificed to make hits wisdom evident to a later generation. This interpretation assumes the purity of Antigone's and Creon's motives. Elements of Antigone's and Creon's actions, however, which show that they are not solely inspired by the requirements of the ethical order which they represent allow alternative and additional interpretations of the play in which other elements of Hegel's philsophy can be emphasised. In Hegel's conception, law does not deirve its force and legitimacy from the comprehension or approval of it by those to whom it applies, and this is true for both divine law and civil law. The fact, therefore, that Antigone and Creon make

a number of attempts to interpret the law in order to show to their opponent that they are right, not just morally but legally, in their course of action is ironical. Once could take this to be a mere embellishment of the plot of the play if there was not also a further significance in Antigone's and Creon's reasoned appeals to 'the law' as the justification for their action. Since to Hegel the subjects of the law need not understand it in order to be bound by it, efforts to lend weight to the law by emphasising its rationale through Aris & Phillthe possibility of the opposite, that is, that the applicability of the law might be arbitrarily diminished by similar argument which pruports to show that the law does not make sense. Hegel refers to this idea as the 'blasphemy of knowing,' a condition which adds a kind of qualifying complexity to the actions of Antigone and Creon. This is so because, in as far as Antigone and Creon presumptuously place themselves on a par with the law,[cdviii] they draw attention to other elements of their personality and their motivation and thereby to aspects of honour, morality, pride and custom. Although Antigone's principal claim for the legitimacy of her action is her conviction that divine law sanctions the burial of a close relative, it is clear throughout the play that she at the same time shows herself disrespectful of divine law. Already in her first appearance she laments her predicament as one of the evils that stem from Oedipus and which has hence unjustly befallen her. Later she persists in her determination to violate Creon's ruling by burying her brother although she then already knows that her action will bring about her own death and possibly that of others too, a consequence which divine law would not justify. As it is virtually certain that she will be defeated not only in her quest for the burial of her brother but beyond that in her endeavour to portray herself as pietous as well, and because of her proud and wilful behaviour also in the function in in the family assigned to her as a woman by divine law, it moreover becomes clear that her preoccupation with

defying Creon as an individual subsequently becomes her principal motive and before this background her appeal, to the chorus, for sympathy on the hasis of her obedience to divine law comes to Aris & Phillous. Creon, by comparison, although claiming to uphold civil law at the same time claims to have divine authority, but then he also shows fear of being seen as a liar by the people and being defeated by a woman. These observations necessarily raise questions about the nature of morality and its admissibility to and possible bearing on the relationship between the individual and the state as well as perhaps as a concept with heuristic qualities in analyses of the relationship between divine law and civil law. Sophocles'[s] play makes apparent a significant contrast between a popular conception of morality and a more solid and genuine morality based on an informed consceince. Whereas the former kind of morality is one that exists in the self-image of its bearer through a combination of 'common sense,' equivocation of ignorance and innocence, and the acceptance of defeat by higher powers, the latter kind of morality is a state in which the sentimental idea of innocence has been recognised as one that has not place in civil society. As Hegel interprets innocence as a condition of being at one with nature, of not having passed from nature into civil society, Antigone's pretence of innocence is essentially either fallacious or deceptive or opportunistic.

Bibliography

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and Philosophical Justification of Hegel's Tributes to Ancient Greece: Elective Affinities Through Time and Space - From Plato to Fukuyama, From Africa to Germany

{antigone.add:}

CHORUS Of so many marvelous things, nothing
Is more wonderful than man; he crosses the foamy sea
In the south wind, navigating its depths and crests;
And the mother of gods, the sovereign Earth, immortal,
Inexhaustible, year after year he takes his plow
And furrows her with horse and mule.

Sophocles, **Antigone**, lines 332[ ]-[ ]341

quoted in Macrone, Michael, **It's Greek to Me! Brush up your Classics**,
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[The role of Eurydice]

In Periclean Athens there was *only a politicisation of art without an aestheticisation of politics*

Veblen

Romanticism

Archilochus

Ovid: in Thebes nature imitated art without

also becomes clear that as this only explains

And it is no mere happenstance that just when this development, with the advent of Rationality in the eighteenth century, had taken its full course, and not before, the ancient 'concordance of faith and reason' came to be nostalgically mourned. It was precisely the corrup

. . .

context within which to situate its in another form that make its
transition into modernity by retaining for itself, in another form
that tributary of (and other through the indirect again, .

nectarNone lustedwhen it was on the verge of the political greatness
that it was to aggain, sought the blessing of its own distant past,

which was beyond history, for the glory for which it then already
. . .   considered its then already almost tangible destiny, and the
glory which was associated with it, to be blessed by virtue of its
relatively greater affinity with Rome's distant, pre-historical
past than with the present.

Crypto-Christians

And this, of course, was the beginning of the (at least *apparent)*
erosion of the authority of metaphysics, which some generations
later could manifest itself in the unbridled irrationalism of
Nietzsche and Rilke,[◊] for example, but which in Hegel's lifetime –
in which the cultural heritage of antiquity had a more than just
sentimental hold on the social elite's imagination for as long as
the greatness of classical Rome's power had a continuing, albeit
increasingly nominal, political reality in the form of the Holy
Roman Empire[◊] – still had to be harnessed and directed
intellectually. Rationalism, Reason and logical positivism
therefore, which were all the ideological embodiments of the
increasingly impatient and ultimately violent rejection of the
'judgement of time' – in other words: of history – and therefore of
faith, since religion asserts its validity with reference to the
glory of saints in times immemorial, had to serve the rising
bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth century as the philosophical
auxiliary, or alibi, by which it could make its own enfranchisement
palatable initially to those from whom it wrested political power
and subsequently to those whom it then excluded from its own hardwon
privileges in that process of the nineteenth century (or – for a lack
of an organised policy in its support – it should rather be called
'*tendency')* which has appropriately been seen as one of
re-feudalisation. The simultaneous current of Romanticism, whose
momentum also was augmented by the disaffection with feudalism of

> the economically and intellectually buoyant new class (the
> bourgeoisie), though it was so patently different and indeed
> evidently *opposed* to the ideal of Reason, nonetheless shared with
> it a common foundation in the spirit of the Enlightenment, which
> sought to excoriate the present from the life-denying patina of the
> past: as much as Reason, in keeping with its purported affiliation
> with Fact rather than with Feeling, sought to emancipate the natural
> sciences from the overlordship of metaphysics in order to make them
> a pillar of its political enterprise, so Romanticism elevated the
> Self and the Present . . .

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i.Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Miller, A. V., translator, **<u>Phenomenology</u>
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...ii.cf. Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Art**, **Literature and** **...ht**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page twenty six

...v.cf. Bloch, M., et al., 'Introduction: Death and the Regeneration of Life,' in Bloch, ...t al., editors, **Death and the Regeneration of Life**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ...page 227, quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek** **...State**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, page thirty three, and note . . . ...rence note or content note?]

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d, 1977, page 270, original emphasis

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ii .Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone</u>,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, hire, 1987, page twenty seven, emphasis added

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ii.cf. Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone</u>,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster, hire, 1987, page sixty seven

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i .Brown, Andrew, translator, **Sophocles: <u>Antigone</u>,** Aris & Phillips, Warminster,
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v.Kojève, A., **Introduction à la lecture de Hegel**, page 105, quoted in Steiner, George,
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.Kojève, like Hegel, does not see the family as the internal foe of the *modern* state,
se the modern state deprives itself by its utilitarian ideology of this potentially
ructive and invigorating antagonism to which, *as proxy* of the gods of the nether world,
amily was a party in antiquity.

i.cf. Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and
ht,** Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 26

ii .Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and
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iii.cf. Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Art, Literature and
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viii.Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
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xii.Kojève, A., **Introduction à la lecture de Hegel**, page 105, quoted in Steiner, George,
ones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
page 35

xiii.It was the *popular* conceptualisation of the divine realm in ancient Greece that
lay the happy concordance of heaven and state which Hegel observed there and that provided
asis for his own philosophical model of the relationship between religion and politics.

xiv.cf. Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right:**
my of an Argument, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1984, page . . . , original emphasis:

n more than one occasion Hegel reminds us that a
hilosophical treatment of 'the state' should concern
tself with the *concept,* or Idea, of the state, not
ith this or that state, nor with the conditions under
hich given states come into being. The actual states
f the world do not provide a model of what the true
ssence of the state is. On the contrary, if we cast
 quick glance at the history of human society we can
mmediately show that any state is in some way
efective or bad: 'The state is no ideal work
f art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere
f caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour
ay disfigure it in many respects.'

xv.Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right:** **my of an Argument**, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1984, page . . .

xvi.cf. Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 89: US [to Antigone]: " . . . you alone among mortals will descend by your own law . . . ."'

xvii.cf. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, d, 1977, page 271

xviii.cf. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, d, 1977, page . . .

xix.cf. Bloch, M., et al., 'Introduction: Death and the Regeneration of Life,' in Bloch, t al., editors, **Death and the Regeneration of Life**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, page 227, quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek State**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, page 33, and endnote . . .

.cf. Loraux, Nicole, **Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman**, Harvard University Press, Cmabridge, chusetts, 1987, page . . .

i.cf. [Mitias?]: '[T]he laws regulating the family and civil society are the institutions e rational order that glimmers in them.'

ii.Alcaeus, circa 600 before Christ, quoted in Lobel, E., **Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta**, ndon Press, Oxford, 1955, in turn quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The of the Greek City-State**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, page three

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iv.cf. Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right:**

my of an Argument, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1984, page . . .

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vi.Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right:**
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viii.Mitias, Michael H., **Moral Foundations of the State in Hegel's Philosophy of Right:**
my of an Argument, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1984, page . . .

ix.cf. Humphreys, S. C., **The Family, Women and Death: Comparative Studies**, Routledge &
 Paul, London, 1983, page 148

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979,
270, emphasis added

.Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979,
270, emphasis added

i.

ii.Sophocles, **Antigone, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 67, emphasis**

v.Sophocles, **Antigone, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 67**

.cf. Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 93:
GONE: ' . . . Ah, my brother, maker of a fatal marriage, in your death you have destroyed
ile I yet live.'

i.

ii.cf. endnote . . .

iii.Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek City State**, Cambridge
rsity Press, Cambridge, 1987, page thirty two

x.cf. Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death**, Duckworth, London, 1985, pages 60 to 64:
 . '

.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 63

i.[add here the words of Creon or Tiresias concerning the 'altars']

ii.Garland, Robert, **The Greek Way of Death**, Duckworth, London, 1985, page 52, quoting
ylus, **Eumenides**, line 273

iii.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 71

iv.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 71

v.Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's
menology of Mind,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, page 167, emphasis added;
lso pages 163 and 164

vi.Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's
menology of Mind,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, page 163

vii.cf. endnote . . .

viii.Nederman, Cary J., 'Sovereignty, War and the Corporation: Hegel on the Medieval
ations of the Modern State,' **The Journal of Politics**, 1987, page 504

ix.' . . . who would of course still claim divine right . . . ' (Nederman, Cary J.,
reignty, War and the Corporation: Hegel on the Medieval Foundations of the Modern State,'
ournal of Politics, 1987, page 504)

x.on the ancient Greeks relationship with gods the note in this context Rieu, E. V.,
oduction,' Homer, **The Odyssey**, Book Club Associates, London, 1975, page 11, emphasis
:

Homer's] heroes and heroines were the supposed
ncestors of the nobles before whom he recited
is poems. It flattered his audience to hear of
heir doughty deeds and, in the absence of genuine
edigrees and records, to imagine these
ivinely-descended and godlike beings as
eparated from themselves *by only a few*
enerations.

xi.Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek City State**, Cambridge
rsity Press, Cambridge, 1987, page 9

xii.Hegel, G. W. F, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 271

xiii.Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,
menology of Spirit, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 552

xiv.cf. Aries, Philippe, **The Hour of Our Death**, Peregrine Books, Harmondsworth,

esex, 1981, page 29, quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the City State**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, page 35

xv.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 27

xvi.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 79

xvii .Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **menology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 552; an analogous cterisation of the modern state would note that in it the individual is primarily related e State as a whole and not by ties of graft and camaraderie to its particular 'estates.'

xviii.original emphasis

xix.Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **Phenomenology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, page 369, emphasis added; which may be analogised by substitution of 'State' for 'Family' gh this would apparently contradict Hegel's argument elsewhere that the individual can ve full self-actualisation only *in* the state)

xx.cf. pages . . . above

xxi .Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **menology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 552

xxii .Findlay, J. N., 'Analysis of the Text,' in Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, **menology of Spirit**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, page 552

xxiii.cf. Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, pages 79 05

xxiv.[add Plato quotation from Morris here]

xxv.cf. Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 95:
N: "Do you not know that no one facing death would ever cease to utter songs and cries
e if it were of any use to utter them . . . ?"'

xxvi .cf. Aries, Philippe, **The Hour of Our Death**, Peregrine Books, Harmondsworth,
esex, 1981, page 29, quoted in Morris, Ian, **Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the
City State**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, page 35

xxvii.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 27

xxviii.Sophocles, **Antigone**, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1987, page 95

xxix.which has divine sanction and is hence conceptually subsumed in divine law

.cf. Fukuyama, Francis, page 5, original emphasis: '[T]he basic *principles* of the liberal
ratic state could not be improved upon' after they had been 'actualised' by 'the *vanguard*
manity' in 'the French Revolution.'

i.Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature**, **Art and Thought**,
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 22

ii.Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature**, **Art and Thought**,
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 30

iii .cf. also Poulantzas, Nicos, who - writing from a different ideological
ective - comes to similar conclusions about Russia

iv.cf. Shklar, Judith N., **Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of
's <u>Phenomenology of Mind</u>,** Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, page 164

v.cf. Fukuyama, Francis, page 5, original emphasis: '[T]he basic *principles* of the liberal

ratic state could not be improved upon' after they had been 'actualised' by 'the *vanguard*
manity' in 'the French Revolution.'

vi.Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature**, **Art and Thought**,
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 22

vii.Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature**, **Art and Thought**,
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 30

viii .cf. also Poulantzas, Nicos, who - writing from a different ideological
ective - comes to similar conclusions about Russia

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's <u>**Phenomenology of Mind**</u>, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, page 164

einer, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature**, **Art and Thought**,
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 30

f. Johnson, Peter, page 131

It is a hypothetical choice in Hegel's reasoning as he does not conceive of an alternative
e state as a form of organisation among humans (see below), but the choice which presents
f to the individual, though not real, is not therefore any less ominous in the individual's
ctive perception.

.cf. Johnson, Peter, **Politics, Innocence, and the Limits of Goodness**, Routledge, London,
 pages 128 and 141

Stiner, George, page 22

teiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,**

ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 36

Steiner, George, **Antigones: The Antigone Myth in Western Literature, Art and Thought,**
ndon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 23

.cf. Kumar, Krishan, page nineteen

i.cf. Antigone comparing herself to Danae, the daughther of Zeus; her questioning of
e law if it permits her being punished for piety; Creon identifying himself with 'the
'